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ABSTRACT 
Nur „Aisyah Nasution: The Dynamics of Piped-Water and Sewer Development in Jakarta, 
Indonesia (1945-2015): A Case Study using Multilevel Perspective  
(Under the direction of Dale Whittington) 
 
Inadequate access to water and sanitation has been characterized as a challenge to 
developing infrastructure and public health in Jakarta, Indonesia. Access to piped-water network 
has only increased from 10% to 48% between 1975 to 2015. Sewer coverage, which is only 
available to 2% of population, has been mostly stagnant since 1989. Drawing on interview, 
documentation approaches and the application of a multilevel perspective, we documented 
factors that contributed to water and sanitation from 1945 to 2015. We found that there has been 
no substantial change in piped-water and sewer coverage in Jakarta. This is because regime 
actors have not changed their cognitive routines, formal rules, or norms despite political and 
economic changes that occurred as Indonesia moved from a centralized to decentralized system. 
This case study found that decentralization does not improve piped-water and sewer 
performance. Future studies should address the multi-regime dynamics between piped and non-
piped systems. 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
Water and sanitation are fundamental to life and are important basic human needs. Over 
the past few decades, providing “water and sanitation for all” has become one of the central 
international development goals included in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While critical end-goals, there are many challenges to 
achieving universal access to water and sanitation including institutional weaknesses (Gandy, 
2008); corruption and rent seeking (Davis, 2004; Lovei and Whittington, 1993); insufficient 
regulation (Johnstone, 2014), colonial legacy (Kooy and Bakker, 2008), lack of investment 
(Hutton and Bartram, 2007), and governance failure (Bakker et. al., 2008).  
Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia has experienced substantial economic growth since 
the-1990s. However, its piped water and sewer coverage has been much slower to improve. 
There are many households, both poor and rich, that do not have access to piped water or a sewer 
network. Piped-water and sewer coverage in Jakarta are much lower than in other large 
Indonesian cities, such as Surabaya, Medan and Banjarmasin as well as in other Southeast Asian 
countries.  
Inadequate access to water supply and sanitation has challenged the development of 
Jakarta since the mid-1970s. Attempts to ameliorate this condition have been implemented, but 
results were unsuccessful. Today, of the 10 million people living in Jakarta, only 48% have 
access to piped water and less than 2% are connected to a sewer network. The estimated 
economic impact resulting from lack of water and sewerage access is Rupiah (Rp.)16.2 trillion 
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(US$1.4 billion) per year, which was approximately 1.3% of Jakarta‟s gross domestic product  
(GDP) in 2012. This amount is the equivalent to approximately Rp.1.7 million (US$139) per 
person per year, which is three times more than the cost for the rest of the country (Water and 
Sanitation Program [WSP], n.d.). These statistical trends, however, cannot fully explain the 
delays in piped water and sewer system improvement in Jakarta.  
The human right to have proper water and sanitation is a complex issue, and each country 
has had different degrees of development over time. For example, the success of developed 
countries in providing water supply and sewer services was highly related to the emergence of 
germ theory (Hamlin, 1992, 1998; Melosi, 2000, 2011; Tarr et al., 1984). Furthermore, the 
history of water and sewer development in developed countries, such as the United States, 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Japan has important implications. For example delays in 
water and sewer development caused a series of waterborne epidemics to occur in the early 19
th
 
century (Geels, 2005, 2006; Gosho, 2014; Hamlin, 1992, 1998; Melosi, 2000, 2011; Tarr et al., 
1984). As a result, many lives were lost and other public health threats hindered economic 
growth in the developed countries listed above.   
 The history of water supply, sanitation, and public health has been well-documented in 
developed countries using descriptive approaches to present the chronological order of water 
supply and wastewater system evolution. From these descriptive studies, it is known there are 
many different factors that contribute to the transformation from non-piped water and sanitation 
system to piped system: (i) the interplay between the change in scientific theories, engineering 
practice, technological designs, and their perceived impacts and cost to cities (Tar, 1996); (ii) the 
role of science and states in decision making (Hamlin, 1998); (iii) the presence of new 
3 
 
technological urban sanitary and organizational systems (Melosi, 2000); and political power and 
control of society over water sources (Melosi, 2011).  
 Although pathways to the development of water and sanitation infrastructure have been 
well-documented in developed countries, such documentation has not occurred in Jakarta. 
Western scholars have attempted to explain the lack of water development in Jakarta as a failure 
in governance (Bakker et. al., 2008), poor outcome of colonial and post-colonial governmentality 
(Kooy and Bakker, 2008), absence of sufficient regulations (Braadbaart, 2007; Jensen, 2005), 
urbanization (Chifos and Suselo, 2000), or corruption (Crane, 1994; Lovei and Whittington, 
1993; Server, 1996). However, these studies only analyzes one or two factors at a time, thus in-
depth studies regarding water and sanitation development in Jakarta are still needed.  
 Throughout Indonesia, the amount of literature on water and sanitation history is limited. 
There is only one study, led by Kooy (2008), that has attempted to analyze water supply 
development in Jakarta over a longer period of time, from the colonial era to the late of 1990s. 
Her major conclusion is that Jakarta‟s fragmented urban water supply had been present since the 
colonial era, thus providing a centralized system that may not be ideal for urban populations in 
modern Jakarta.  Although Kooy provides detailed and comprehensive historical case studies 
regarding water supply in Jakarta over a longer timeframe (1873-2007), her analysis only focuses 
on the role of the government and the political mindset that contributed to the water supply 
system change. There is little information about other aspects such as the political and economic 
condition and international development agendas that affect many development initiatives in 
Indonesia as a whole and Jakarta specifically. Nevertheless, Kooy‟s dissertation is the only 
available literature in English that presents a comprehensive history of water supply development 
in Jakarta. No scholars have yet studied the history of sewer development in Jakarta.  
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While Hamlin (1998), Melosi (2000 and 2011), and Tarr (1996) use descriptive 
approaches to describe historical case studies on water, sanitation, and public health sectors and 
factors that contribute to the transformation of these sectors, there are other approaches to 
describe historical case studies that focus on socio-technological transition. Such literature uses 
multi-level perspectives (MLP) to present the socio-technical transition of sewer, water supply, 
and personal hygiene in the Netherlands (Geels, 2005, 2006).  MLP has become one approach to 
understanding the challenges and possibilities of achieving a more developed socio-technological 
system (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012) and gives structure to the description of historical case 
studies. Key principles in MLP are (i) taking a multi-actor approach in a long-term perspective, 
(ii) analyzing the learning process at a niche level, and (iii) identifying problems that span in 
multiple domains, levels, and actors. MLP used three different levels of analysis to describe 
factors that contribute to system transformation: (i) landscape such as economic and political 
condition; (ii) regime such as regulations, normative, and cognitive
1
 aspect of actors including 
problems in organizational level that hamper the improvement of the system; and (iii) niche 
where R& D, innovation and learning process occur.  
 To understand why slow progress of piped-water and sewer development has occurred in 
Jakarta as well as respond to the lack of literature describing such development in this city, this 
thesis aims to explain and analyze the dynamic of piped-water and sewer development in Jakarta 
from 1945 until 2015 using the MLP framework, using Geels‟ MLP work as a model (2005, 
2006). Taking a historical perspective can help explain the chronological shifts of water and 
sanitation development in Jakarta over a longer time span. Furthermore, historical case studies 
                                                 
1Cognitive are actors‟ routines and capabilities that are based on particular understandings about how things should 
be done. Cognitive routines are subject to actors‟ interpretation (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). 
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are essential to produce evidence-based analysis to prevent poor policy-making (Sadoff et al., 
2015). Thus, analysis within the context of a country‟s historical setting is crucial. 
 To explain the slow improvement of piped-water and sewer development in Jakarta and 
to analyze the factors that enabled and constrained its development from 1945 (when Indonesia 
gained its independence) to 2015, three different levels of analyses were used: landscape, regime, 
and niche (Geels 2005, 2006). The dynamic of piped-water and sewer development will be 
presented in three development phases based on the changes in the Indonesian government 
system (landscape) particularly the political and economic systems. The first development phase 
is from 1945-1966 when Indonesia was ruled by President Soekarno. The second development 
phase is from 1966 to 1998 when President Soeharto led the country. The third development 
phase is during the Reform Era from 1998 to 2015. Table 1 describes the definition of the level 
of analysis as used in this thesis. 
Table 1. Definition of Each Level of Analysis in Multi-Level Perspective  
Level 
Definition as described 
in Geels (2005) 
Practical definition as used in thesis 
Landscape 
Socio-technical landscape 
or exogenous environment 
that is beyond the direct 
influence of actors such as 
economic development, 
broad political coalitions, 
cultural and normative 
values 
 Landscape is an environment beyond the 
direct control of water and sanitation 
development actors in Indonesia that can 
influence the improvement of water and 
sanitation provision. 
 Landscape is analyzed specifically on 
political, economic, social and health 
condition, and international policy on water 
and sanitation development that influence the 
development of water and sanitation in Jakarta 
 International development policy is analyzed 
only in the period of 1966-1998 since it is the 
period when international policy affects the 
water and sanitation development in Jakarta. 
After 1998, water supply provision in Jakarta 
is managed by private operator thus 
international development policy particularly 
that comes from donors no longer can 
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intervention the policy making for water 
supply provision policy in Jakarta. While for 
sanitation sector, there is no international 
development policy has been affecting the 
policy of sanitation development in Jakarta 
since 1998.  
Regime 
Socio-technical regime 
where institutional 
arrangements and formal 
regulations are created and 
where engineers and 
designers share their 
cognitive routines such as 
roles, way of thinking, and 
way of doing. Regime is 
situated at the level of 
organizational field which 
show the behavior, 
perception, and action of 
actors as part of 
communities. 
 
 Regime level refers to the dominant practices, 
technologies, and rules embedded at an 
organizational level (institutions and 
infrastructure) which shape technological 
innovation. Regime provides stability and 
reinforcement to the prevailing socio-technical 
systems including factors that enable and 
constrain the improvement of water and 
sanitation in Jakarta such as government and 
donor policies and activities, regulation, 
problem in organizational level, etc. 
 Regime level in this thesis will mostly 
describe government and donor policies and 
activities. They are the dominant actors in 
water and sanitation provision in Jakarta. 
Niche 
Technological niche and 
the locus of radical 
innovations around new 
system may develop 
 Niches is the level or area that can facilitate 
the interactions between actors that support 
radical innovation and experimentation. 
Niche act as safe environments in which 
breakthrough development can grow, 
different from the selection process that 
occurs at regime level.  
 A regime can be a place to generate niche 
(innovations) and to challenge the status quo. 
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CHAPTER 2 : METHOD 
 
2.1. Case Study 
A single-case study was employed as a research strategy. The case study strategy is 
especially conducive to understanding the transformation of technology and society (Geels, 
2005). The case study in this thesis aims to describe and analyze how water and sanitation 
conditions in Jakarta have changed over time. The rationale for selecting single-case study 
design rather than a multiple-case design is based on the characteristic unique to Jakarta. For 
example, Jakarta is the only province in Indonesia where 100% of its population lives in urban 
areas, it is home to all of the approximately 300 ethnicities in Indonesia, and its GDP accounts 
for 17% of Indonesia‟s GDP.  Additional reasons for using a single-case study are replication 
logic. The period of analysis for this paper is 1945 to 2015. The year 1945 was chosen as the 
starting point of analysis because this was the year Indonesia gained its independence.  
 
2.2. Data Collection 
The sources data collected for this paper are: documentation, archival records, and 
interviews. 
1. Documentation 
According to Yin (2003), the reason to use documents for case studies is to corroborate and 
augment evidence from other sources. The variety of documents used in this paper includes: 
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written reports, administrative documents of governments and donors, formal water and 
sanitation studies in Indonesia as a whole and/or Jakarta specifically, and articles in mass media. 
2. Archival records 
Archival records are used to present precise and relevant quantitative data (Yin, 2003). Archival 
records used in this paper include: organizational records such as population, water and 
sanitation access, and budget over a period of time; list of foreign aid projects; and survey data 
such as census records or data previously collected about Jakarta and/or Indonesia as a whole.  
For this case study, national and regional survey and census data from the Indonesia National 
Statistical Bureau are used.  
3. Interviews 
Interviews are an essential source of evidence for case studies because key respondents share 
facts and their insights and opinions about events and situations.  
a. Selection process 
Key respondents from governmental and non-governmental arenas were interviewed. The 
potential respondents were identified previously during the writer‟s experience working in 
water and sanitation in Indonesia. To minimize bias, respondents were chosen from different 
institutions or organizations involved in decision making, policy planning, and advocacy of 
water and sanitation in Indonesia and/or Jakarta. These individuals are knowledgeable about 
current situations and past situations about the development of water and sanitation in Jakarta 
over the period covered by this study. Because this paper aims to describe water and 
sanitation history over a long period of time, most of the interviewees are senior water and 
sanitation experts in Jakarta and/or Indonesia.  
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b. Respondents 
Of the 27 key respondents that were contacted, 8 respondents were from the government and 
19 respondents were from non-government arenas (see APPENDIX I for The List of 
Interviewee). Respondents from the government include central and local governmental 
officials while non-government respondents were donors, a water supply operator and its 
private partner, a water supply regulator, a sewer operator, and a consulting firm. Nineteen 
respondents were interviewed and 8 respondents could not be reached or declined to 
participate. 
c. Interview designs 
A semi-structured interview consisting of a series of open-ended questions and probes was 
designed by the writer. The guide addressed the main research objective of determining the 
dynamic of water and sanitation development in Jakarta. A semi-structured interview format 
was used to elucidate facts and/or opinions of interviewees on water and sewer development 
situations and events in Jakarta. The interviews also sought to identify factors or barriers that 
prevent water and sewer expansion in Jakarta. The interviewer first asked the interviewees to 
describe the condition of water and sanitation systems when they were in charge assisting 
water and sewer development at their respective institution. The interviewer then asked the 
interviewees about major issues in water and sewer development in Jakarta and policies that 
had been used to improve development followed by question about what aspects of the 
policies, in their opinion, do or do not work. The interviewees were also asked about what 
major events contributed to the changes in water and sewer development policies. Finally, 
the interviewer asked how the interviewees would respond if they have been given the 
chance to reform water and sewer development in Jakarta. Respondents were given the 
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option to ask questions or to say anything that was on their minds not previously covered 
during the interview. This study was reviewed by The University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill Institutional Review Board (study number: 15-2943) and it was determined that the 
study did not require IRB approval. 
d. Interviews 
In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted by phone or Skype for 30 to 120 minutes 
per person after obtaining their verbal consent. Some follow up questions were also asked to 
solicit specific responses. Interviews were conducted from November 2015 to March 2016. 
One interview was conducted in English and 18 interviews with Bahasa Indonesia. 
Interviews were recorded using a tape recorder and were transcribed together with notes 
taken during the discussions with respondents, providing the corpus of data for text analyses. 
The small number of respondents made it feasible to carry out the analysis without using 
computer tools for coding. The interview transcripts were read to identify statements on 
specific topics including factors, issues, and events influencing water and sewer development 
in Jakarta. Then, the interview results were used in combination with the data and 
information found in documents and archival records. This approach was used to avoid bias 
and to ensure the triangulation as corroboration of the findings. Selected interview quotes 
appear in-text to show authenticity or reveal the perspective of actors on particular issues or 
events in water and sanitation development in Jakarta. Figure 1 illustrates the case study 
method of this paper. 
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Figure 1.Case Study Method 
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.3 Data Analysis 
 Multilevel Perspective as Analytical Framework 
A multilevel perspective (MLP) framework was used to both analyze the information 
collected and to present the case study on water and sanitation development in Jakarta. The MLP 
has been used in similar historical case studies to analyze the transition of water supply and 
hygiene in the Netherlands (Geels, 2005) and the transition of cesspools to sewer systems in the 
Netherlands (Geels, 2006). The MLP is the most relevant framework to describe the case study 
because it allows the writer to frame many factors that contribute to the dynamic and changing 
processes of water and sanitation in Jakarta at broader aggregation levels and in the desired time 
interval (1945-2015). Therefore, the MLP was expected to reveal key stages and changes in 
water and sanitation development in Jakarta. The framework aims to capture, organize, and 
examine various factors that directly or indirectly contributed to water and sanitation 
development pathways in Jakarta.  
 The MLP stresses „no simple cause or driver in system transitions‟ (Geels and Kemp, 
2007:444). The key point of MLP is that system innovations come about through the interplay 
between dynamics processes at three levels in different development phases (Geels, 2006).  
According to Geels (2006), it was necessary to meet a set of conditions for regime 
transformation - from cesspool to sewer system - as what occurred in the Netherlands. These 
conditions include: (i) regime insiders change their cognitive beliefs, behavioral norms, and 
regulations and (ii) increased pressure from outsiders. Figure 2 illustrates the dynamic at three 
different level of analysis in MLP. 
 Factors that contributed to the system change process were framed at three different 
levels (landscape, regime and niche level) with the definition as described in Table 1. 
13 
 
Furthermore, analyses were also conducted based on type of transition pathways (Table 2) as 
described by Geels and Kemp (2007). Table 2 summarizes the type of transition pathways based 
on main actors and type of interactions that contribute to regime transformation. 
Figure 2. A Dynamic Multi Level Perspective on System Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source: Geels, 2002 
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Table 2. Main Actors and (Inter) Actions in Transition Pathways 
Transition 
pathways 
Main actors Type of (inter) actions Key words 
Transformation 
Regime actors 
and outside 
groups (social 
movements) 
Outsiders voice criticism. 
Incumbent actors adjust 
regime rules (goals, guiding 
principles, search heuristics)  
Outside pressure, 
institutional power 
struggles, negotiations, 
adjustment of regime 
rules 
Technological 
substitution 
Incumbent 
firms versus 
new firms 
Newcomers develop novelties, 
which compete with regime 
technologies 
Market competition and 
power struggles between 
old and new firms 
Reconfiguration 
Regime actors 
and suppliers 
Regime actors adopt 
component-innovations, 
developed by new suppliers. 
Competition between old and 
new suppliers 
Cumulative component 
changes, because of 
economic and functional 
reasons. Followed by 
new combinations, 
changing interpretations 
and new practices 
De-alignment 
and re-alignment 
(transition) 
New niche 
actors 
Changes in deep structures 
create strong pressure on 
regime. Incumbents lose faith 
and legitimacy followed by 
emergences of multiple 
novelties. New entrants 
compete for resources, 
attention and legitimacy. 
Eventually one novelty wins, 
leading to re-stabilization 
regime 
Erosion and collapse, 
multiple novelties, 
prolonged uncertainty 
and changing 
interpretations, new 
winner and stabilization 
Source: Geels and Schot, 2007 
The following chapters present the development phases of piped-water and sanitation in 
Jakarta based on the change in landscape level (political and economic condition) in Jakarta from 
1945 to 2015. There are four conditions at the landscape level that described each development 
phase: (i) political condition; (ii) economic condition; (iii) social and health condition; and (iv) 
15 
 
international development policy on water and sanitation development. The latter was only 
described in the development phase from 1966 to 1998 since this is the only period where 
international agenda affected water and sanitation development in Jakarta. Regime and niche 
level factors present enabling and constraining factors for water and sanitation development in 
Jakarta.  
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CHAPTER 3 : CASE STUDY : THE DYNAMIC OF WATER AND SANITATION 
DEVELOPMENT IN JAKARTA FROM 1945 TO 1966  
 
3.1 Landscape Level 
3.1.1 Political Condition 
The political system under the Old Order Era
2
 was known as Demokrasi Terpimpin or 
Guided Democracy (1958-1966), which is a democratic government with increased autocracy. 
After Indonesia gained its independence from Japan in August 17
th
, 1945, The Government of 
Indonesia focused its efforts on political development, with 70% of the Indonesian national 
budget allocated to the military (Yazid, 2014). As the new government primarily focused on 
growing the military sector, water and sanitation development received low priority. 
Nevertheless, the first development of piped-water supply in Jakarta happened under the 
direction of President Soekarno (1945-1966) as an attempt to create political stability and to 
create a new image of Indonesia through the development of Jakarta as the capital city of 
Indonesia. 
 
                                                 
2
 The period between 1945 until 1966 is known as Old Order, a term when President Soekarno ruled Indonesia. 
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3.1.2 Economic Condition  
Indonesia experienced modest economic progress in the early years of independence 
(Hill, 1996). However, the economy did not expand from 1961 to 1964 and inflation reached 
600% (Hill, 1996). Poor economic growth, high inflation rate, political instability and an 
inability to wipe out colonial economic legacies led to many negative effects, including 
infrastructure maintenance neglect. Consequently, there was serious damage to infrastructure 
including water supply networks that had been built during Dutch colonial era (Ravestejein and 
Kop, 2008).  
 
3.1.3 Social and Health Condition  
Health, water, sanitation, and hygiene development had low political priority during 
Soekarno‟s presidential era. The central government only spent approximately Rp.416.5million 
per year (US$2.1million per year) for health development, roughly 5.2% of the national budget. 
The goal of health development under President Soekarno was to abolish the different treatment 
received by native verses non-native Indonesians (Hill, 1996).
3
 Policies to improve public health 
involved implementing curative actions such as building health care facilities and increasing the 
number of doctors. Preventive actions for the development of water and sanitation were not 
considered a priority, despite high mortality rates in infants and adults during this period. Table 3 
illustrates the health condition in Indonesia from years 1948-1949 and 1960-1961. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 As a result of different treatment to native and non-native Indonesians (The Dutch, The Chinese and The Arab), in 
1961, calories intake of Indonesian people was 1,816 per capita/day and there was 68.1% of population with no 
schooling background and only 0.1% of population with tertiary education (Hill, 1996). 
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 Table 3. Health Conditions in Indonesia in 1948-1961 
Health Indicators 1948-1949 1960-1961 
Number of hospital beds (number per 1,000 people) 0.8 0.8  
Number of doctors (number per 1,000 people) 0.016 0.028  
Infant mortality (number per 1,000 people) 115 to 300 125  
Maternal mortality (number per 1,000 people) 12 to 16 N.A 
Crude death rate (number per 1,000 people) 10 to 15 21  
Crude birth rate (number per 1,000 people) 20 to 30 N.A 
Source: Leimena, 1953, World Bank, 1974, Hill, 1996 
 
3.2  Regime Level 
As developing water and sanitation systems was not a priority during President 
Soekarno‟s era, urban condition in Jakarta deteriorated with little money invested for urban 
management (Ravestejein and Kop, 2008). Electricity connections were limited, piped water 
networks were broken, drainage and canals were clogged with sewage and solid waste, and no 
maps were available to locate and repair the water network system (Argo, 1999; Kop, 2008b). 
Sanitation was viewed as a private business or household responsibility (World Bank and 
Ausaid, 2013).  
By the end of 1960s, the proportion of households using flush toilets was 54% (30% were 
private toilets and 24% were shared and public toilets) and the proportion of households using 
non-flush toilets was 46% (5% were private toilets, 28% were shared and public toilets, and 13% 
used other type of toilets) (World Bank, 1974).  While flush toilets improved overall sanitation 
and hygiene for Indonesians, none of these toilets were connected to a piped sewer network. 
Rather, all flush toilets discharged to household holding tanks, requiring household or private 
services to maintain. 
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3.2.1 Enabling Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Regime Level 
 The Government of Indonesia’s Development Policy to Develop Sizeable Projects  
President Soekarno guided development policies in an effort to create an Indonesia that was 
different from the colonial East Indies. This included molding Jakarta into a town different from 
Batavia
4
 and developing it into the greatest city possible (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). To 
achieve this development goal, the Government of Indonesia developed sizeable projects such as 
constructing large water treatment facilities in several big Indonesian cities, including in Jakarta, 
to support economic development. During President Soekarno‟s era, Indonesia increased its 
water production capacity from 3.000 l/s in 1945 to 9.000 l/s in 1968. Piped-water supply 
(private and shared) coverage increased from 8% to 19% (KemenPUPR, 2015) during the same 
time period.  
As a way to obtain international recognition and modernize Jakarta, President Soekarno 
wanted to build a water supply network that could support his plan to host the 1962 Asian Games 
(Hill, 1996).
5
 At the same time, the Major of Jakarta, Sjamsurizal, felt that water supply had 
become one of the main problems in Jakarta due to rapid population growth and the increasingly 
ruptured water supply network (interview, government official).  
To implement the vision of the President and to tackle water supply problems, the Major with 
the assistance of the Ministry of Health planned to build a 1,000 l/s water supply treatment plant, 
called Instalasi Pengolahan Air (IPA) Pejompongan I.
6
 The government realized that to 
                                                 
4
 Batavia is the name of Jakarta during the colonial period of Indonesia (before 1945). 
5
 The plan also included to host Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) in 1966. However, this event was 
never held. 
6
 During the colonial era the Dutch had established Gemeentelijk Waterleiding Bedrijf  (town water supply 
enterprise) in several municipalities in East Indies including Jakarta. Since the water supply enterprise was a 
government enterprise, all the cost was bear by the government. The supervision of water supply enterprises was 
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implement such a big and modern water project, it would need a reputable contractor (interview, 
government official). Due to the lack of water supply engineers in Indonesia, Degremont, a 
company from France was chosen as the planner and the executor for the project (interview, 
government official).  
 
 The Establishment of Environmental Health Units under Ministry of Public Works 
The Government of Indonesia established anEnvironmental Health Unit under Directorate 
General of Water Resources in Ministry of Public Works to carry out the project of 
Pejompongan I in 1952 (KemenPUPR, 2015). Ir. Lie Tjong Hian was assigned to be the head of 
the Environmental Health Unit. His main responsibility was to carry out the development of IPA 
Pejompongan I project, the first water supply project in Indonesia after independence of the 
nation (KemenPUPR, 2015). Because water and sanitation development was of low interest 
among Indonesian engineers, he only had six staff members, to help him implement water supply 
projects until 1961.  
One of the reasons why there was limited interest among engineers could be explained by 
a lack of understanding of environmental health and sanitary engineering at the time 
(KemenPUPR, 2015). Due to the lack of engineers, many large piped-water systems in big 
Indonesian cities including in Jakarta were developed with the assistance of Degremont 
(KemenPUPR, 2015). 
 
 
 
under Department vanVolksgezondheid (Ministry of Health). The main concern of the Netherlands to put water 
supply under Ministry of Health was related to the assurance of water quality and public health concern. 
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3.2.2 Constraining Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Regime Level 
 The Dual Function of Water Supply Operators as Mandated in Law No.5/1962  
The Government of Indonesia issued Law No.5/1962 on Local Government Companies 
during Soekarno‟s era as the fundamental legal basis for the establishment of local water supply 
companies (PDAMs) including the establishment of PAM Jaya, a water supply operator for 
Jakarta. According to the law, PDAM is a company that belongs to the local government. Its 
fundamental arrangement is determined by local regulation, or in other words, by the 
Mayor/Regent or local legislature.
7
 Generally, the Mayor/Regent appointed a civil servant with 
no business experience as managing director of a PDAM, while the local government intervened 
with the day-to-day management of PDAMs (World Bank, 2006). 
PDAM has three obligations: to provide water supply services, to act as a public utility, 
and to provide money for local revenue (Law No.5, 1962). These obligations have put PDAMs in 
difficult situations, particularly because most local governments do not want to allocate their 
money to the expansion of PDAM services (particularly for the expansion of distribution 
networks which is the main responsibility of local governments) while they have to provide basic 
services to the community through cross subsidies with limited ability to draw on local 
government funds. (interview, government official). Furthermore, the full cost of recovery is not 
emphasized. The trend of making PDAMs a source of local revenue complicates how they 
provide their services.  
The management of PDAMs is quite complex as many central government agencies are 
responsible for their operation (see APPENDIX II for Institutional Framework in Water and 
Sanitation in Indonesia). Technical aspects such as the development of infrastructure and the 
                                                 
7
 In the case of Jakarta, it is determined by Governor of Jakarta. 
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provision of raw water are the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works. Managerial and 
institutional aspects are the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs, financial and 
investment aspects are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance, and quality drinking 
water assurance is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health (see APPENDIX II). 
 
 Lack of Health Education and Preventive Action  
Curative action was more prioritized than preventive action during Soekarno‟s 
presidential era. J.Leimena, a physician who served as the first Minister of Health for Indonesia 
(1946-1956) had noted the necessity of good sanitation for gaining better public health and 
controlling communicable diseases that were endemic to Indonesia such as malaria and 
hookworm.
8
 In his plan, he stressed the integration of curative and preventive action to improve 
public health (Leimena, 1953; Murakami, 2015).  
While the Government of Indonesia was aware of that, because of such issues, greater 
attention was paid to curative actions as they more readily repaired damage sustained from wars 
(increasing the number of doctos, building hospitals, and other health care institutions, etc.). 
Preventive action to improve public health during President Soekarno era relied on conventional 
medical wisdom emphasizing the same techniques of courteous coercion, regulation, and 
reliance on curatives previously used by the Dutch government in the colonial era (Gouda, 
2009). 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 From colonial era until Soekarno‟s era, sanitation sector was defined as water supply, sewerage, refuge disposal, 
sanitation in the field of malaria, and rat proofing of houses in the plague endemic areas (Mertonegoro, 1953). 
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3.3 Niche Level 
3.3.1 Enabling Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Niche Level 
 Development Aid and Technical Assistance from France  
Many large water treatment plants (WTP) in Indonesia use material and technology from 
the country of France, as both the French Government and the French-based company 
Degremont have been involved in many water supply projects in Indonesia since 1957. Projects 
include the development of IPA Pejompongan I in Jakarta as well as several WTP projects in the 
capitals of provinces such as Bandung, Semarang, and Banjarmasin (KemenPUPR, 2015).  
Due to political instability in the 1950s, only the Government of France was willing to provide 
loans for the development of IPA Pejompongan I. The company Degremont acted as a liaison to 
convince the Government of France to fund IPA Pejompongan I project. Degremont also 
constructed all but the smallest water treatment plants in Jakarta and WTP Cisadane in 
Tangerang (Martijn, 2005). While the type of technology used in IPA Pejompongan I was 
conventional compared to similar projects in developed countries, it was considered modern 
technology for Indonesia (KemenPUPR, 2015).
9
 Due to the heavy influx of migrants to Jakarta, 
in 1962 the Government of Indonesia invested in the development of the second largest water 
supply treatment in Jakarta, IPA Pejompongan II, with a capacity of 1,000 l/s.
10
  
 
                                                 
9
 The raw water came from Ciliwung River which routed through the city from Banjir Kanal Barat (West Flood 
Canal, built by the Dutch in 1923) then it pumped to water treatment plant in Pejompongan, Karet in Central Jakarta. 
From pipe transmission, the water is treated in coagulation unit (baffled channel) and flocculation unit (tube settler) 
before distributed to consumers. 
10
 The technology used in Pejompongan II was a slightly more modified than Pejompongan I. Pejompongan II has 
“pulsator” system for coagulation and flocculation with separation of flocs occurring by the creation of a vacuum 
rather than by gravity. It was considered good technology for the time and continued to be applied in other big cities 
in Indonesia (Martijn, 2005). 
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3.3.2 Constraining Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Niche Level 
 Lack of Sanitary Engineers and Ill-Suited Engineering Approach 
During the 1950‟s and 1960‟s there was insufficient number of Indonesian engineers and 
urban planners (Van Roosmalen, 2008). Furthermore, after transfer of power from the 
Netherlands to Indonesia in 1957, the number of Dutch‟s urban experts, city administrators and 
sanitary engineers decreased creating insufficient control and maintenance of public works 
infrastructure including water supply networks (Van Roosmalen, 2008). The condition of 
existing water networks further deteriorated due to a lack of spare parts, as the water system built 
during the Dutch during colonial period had been manufactured in Germany (Argo, 1999). To 
cope with the failing piped water system, people increasingly relied on ground water supplies. 
By 1950 the number of registered wells had grown to approximately 90 wells (Argo, 1999; 
Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian, 2014) (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Groundwater Extraction and Number of Registered Wells in Jakarta (1879-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian, 2014 
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Beside insufficient numbers of Indonesian engineers and planners, another constraining 
factor for water and sanitation development during the early stages of independence was the lack 
of capacity for engineers and urban planners. This lack of capacity was caused by difference in 
civil engineering works in Indonesia verses the Netherlands (Ersten, 2008).  Most public works 
projects in Indonesia were executed under direct control of the government. Engineers were not 
only responsible for implementing technical designs, but also for managing non-technical aspects 
of the project, such as labor recruitment and organizing worker accommodations. In contrast, 
engineers in the Netherlands were only responsible for implementing technical designs (Ersten, 
2008). These non-technical skills, were not adequately covered for Indonesian engineers at 
Bandung Technical College.
11
 Furthermore, a senior Dutch urban planner, Thijsse in Ersten 
(2008), mentioned that the lack of competence of personnel correlated with inadequate education 
and lack of publications and manuals on city planning applicable to the Indonesian context. 
Ersten had frequently proposed plans to improve the capacity of Indonesian planners by adding a 
sanitation and hygiene course to the urban development curriculum in Indonesia. However, the 
civil engineering curriculum continued to be based on that of the Technical College in Delft, 
Netherlands (Van Roosmalen, 2008).  
 
 The Growth of Informal Water Vending 
The water vending industry first grew in the northern part of Jakarta in response to a lack 
of clean drinking water. Previously, the northern communities of Jakarta satisfied their domestic 
water needs by taking water from ponds as ground water in the area was brackish and unfit to 
drink (Susantono, 2001). Beginning in 1952, people who lived in the Tanjung Priok port, North 
                                                 
11
 Bandung Technical College was the former of Institute Technology of Bandung (ITB), the first technical college 
in Indonesia. 
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Jakarta had to buy water from vendors at prices ranging from Rp.0.33 (US$0.0016) to Rp.200 
(US$1) per jerrican (1 jerrican = approximately 20 liters) depending on the distance required to 
deliver the water (Bappenas, UNICEF, and Yayasan Dian Desa, 1990). Vendors bought water 
from the PAM center or public hydrants at prices ranging from Rp.0.083 (US$0.0004) to Rp.6.25 
(US$0.03) per jerrican. The vendor then ported around 12-20 jerricans worth of water with a 
single-axle handcart and visited neighborhoods in need of their services. These vendors, mostly 
immigrants from Central Java, came to Jakarta in search of sanctuary and jobs during the Darul 
Islam movement at the beginning of the 1950s (Bappenas, UNICEF, and Yayasan Dian Desa, 
1990).  While vendors lived scattered across Jakarta, many settled in North Jakarta, where the 
proportion of household using vended water was the largest compared to other areas of Jakarta. 
These vendors had few marketable skills because they had been farmers in the past but were 
willing to do anything to survive (Susantono, 2001).  
Informal water vending continued to grow in Jakarta not only to fill the gap left by formal 
services but also to provide better perception of water in the areas where piped-water was 
available. With subsidies from the central government, public hydrants were developed to give 
the poor access to water, particularly to those who lived in North Jakarta.
12
 However, due to the 
rapid expansion of Jakarta‟s population, hydrants were not always available where needed. This 
is where water vendors filled the gap, by transporting water from hydrants to houses in need 
(Susantono, 2001). 
 
                                                 
12
 A public hydrant is a hydrant owned by an individual or an institution that paid for its construction after getting 
approval from Lurah. Public hydrants are under-ground reservoirs with capacity of 2-6 m
3
 made of concrete and 
facilitated by an electrical pump to draw water. The reservoirs are designed to anticipate emergency situation when 
PAM Jaya cannot meet the schedule to deliver water as well as anticipate peak consumption. Hydrants were built so 
that households were able to fetch water themselves within walking distance. 
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3.4 Summary of Water and Sanitation Development during 1945-1966 
By the end of the Soekarno era (1966), the water production capacity in Jakarta had 
increased tenfold from 315 l/s to 3,315 l/s. However, only 12% of the population had access to a 
piped-water supply, although the volume of water supply available in Pejompongan I was 
considered adequate to meet city demand (Kooy, 2008). Water use was unmetered. A flat rate of 
Rp.100-200 per month (US$0.241-0.482) was applied (Kooy, 2008). The combination of high 
water use, lack of metering, and the flat tariff contributed to the financial burden of water 
operations (PAM Jaya) especially after the enactment of Law No.5/1962 on Local Companies 
(KemenPUPR, 2015). The poor bore much of the burden in that they had no piped-water access. 
Poor households were served by only 230 public hydrants. They had to buy water from a vendor 
or rely on shallow wells or exposed sources such as polluted canals and drainage ditches (World 
Bank, 1974).
13
 Figure 4 illustrates the location of Pejompongan I and II water treatment plants 
and their distribution pipelines.  
The development of IPA Pejompongan I is regarded as one of the greatest achievements 
of water supply development in Indonesia although its services were only enjoyed by specific 
groups of people (Kooy and Bakker, 2008).
14
 Investment made by the central government to 
increase water production capacity was not accompanied by an investment from PAM Jaya 
and/or the central government to expand distribution networks and improve non-technical 
aspects of piped-water supply provision in Jakarta.   
 
                                                 
13
 The water tariff was a flat rate without metering of Rp.100-200 per month (US$0.241-0.482) or about Rp.10-20 
per m3 (US$0.024-0.048 per m3). In contrast, wwater from vendors could reach up to Rp.440 per m3 (US$1.06 per 
m
3
). Some households in North and East Jakarta ended-up paying water vendors 5 to 44 times the flat rate water 
tariff or more than 10% of their household income (World Bank, 1974). 
14
 These groups of customers are household in the city suburb (Kebayoran Baru), hotels and buildings along Jalan 
Thamrin-Jalan Sudirman and Asian Games complex in Senayan.  
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Figure 4. Pejompongan I and II Water Treatment Plants and Its Distribution Line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Martijn, 2005 
  
Historical documentations suggest that several factors contributed to water and sanitation 
development in Jakarta during the Soekarno era. Factors that support the development of water 
supply in Jakarta are: (i) the Government of Indonesia‟s policy to develop sizeable projects; (ii) 
the establishment of Environmental Health Unit under Ministry of Public Works; and (iii) 
development aid and technical assistance from France. Factors that hampered water supply 
development in Jakarta are: (i) lack of sanitary engineers and use of Dutch engineering 
curriculums that did not meet the real conditions of Jakarta and Indonesia; (ii) lack of health 
education and preventive action; (iii) the dual function of water supply operators as mandated in 
Law No.5/1962; and (iv) the growth of informal water vending. Table 4 summarizes the water 
supply and sanitation development from 1945 to 1966. 
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Table 4. Summary of Water and Sanitation Development during 1945-1966 
Landscape Level Regime Level Niche Level 
Water Supply 
Coverage in 
1966 
Sanitation 
Coverage in 
1966 
Political: guided 
democracy (a 
democratic 
government with 
increased 
autocracy) 
Economic: 
economy did not 
expand and 
inflation reached 
600% 
Social and health: 
Health, water, 
sanitation, and 
hygiene 
development had 
low priority  
International 
policy on water 
and sanitation 
development:- 
Enabling 
factors for 
water and 
sanitation 
development 
Constraining 
factors for 
water and 
sanitation 
development 
Enabling 
factors for 
water and 
sanitation 
development 
Constraining 
factors for 
water and 
sanitation 
development 
Piped-water: 
approximately 
10% households; 
(ii) flat tariff; 
(iii) water tariff: 
Rp.200 
(US$0.67-1) per 
month per HH 
Non-piped 
water: 25% use 
private well, 
42% use 
common well, 
19% use carried 
water, and 4% 
use other sources 
Flush toilet: 
30% of HHs 
use private 
toilet, 24% of 
HHs use 
shared and 
public toilet 
Non-flush 
toilet: 5% of 
HHs use 
private toilet; 
28% of HHs 
use shared and 
public toilet; 
and 13% of 
HHs use other 
type of toilets 
Policies to 
develop 
sizeable 
projects 
including large 
water treatment 
plants 
The 
establishment 
of 
Environmental 
Health Unit 
under Ministry 
of Public 
Works 
 
The dual 
function of 
water supply 
operators as 
mandated on 
Law No5/1962 
Lack of health 
education and 
preventive 
action to 
improve public 
health 
 
Development 
aid and 
technical 
assistance 
from France 
 
Lack of 
sanitary 
engineers 
and ill-suited 
engineering 
approaches 
The growth 
of informal 
water 
vending 
 
 
2
9
 
2
9
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CHAPTER 4 : CASE STUDY: THE DYNAMIC OF WATER AND SANITATION 
DEVELOPMENT IN JAKARTA FROM 1966 TO 1998 
  
4.1 Landscape Level 
4.1.1 Political Condition  
The macro political culture under the President Soeharto era was characterized by 
authoritarian rule. After the “Old Order” of Soekarno, the political focus changed from political 
development to economic and social development under “New Order” of Soeharto. Defense 
through the achievement of political stability, economic development, and equity were pivotal 
concepts under the New Order cultural policy, known as The Development Trilogy. The 
government implemented numerous development programs with the continued use of foreign aid 
money including the development of water and sanitation infrastructure.  
 The authoritarian system was highly centralized with the main financial and policy 
making responsibilities at the central government level in Jakarta. The central government 
provided 80% of the investment for development (World Bank, 1984) and was the height of its 
power. There were high levels of corruption, nepotism, and collusion in governmental circles 
which affected the delivery of services to communities. The local government often had a 
substantial amount of money granted to them through lobbying and collaboration with different 
agencies. In the late 1990s, Indonesia was among the top five countries with the highest 
corruption perception index (CPI) (Transparency International, 2015).
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 Under the Soeharto era, the modernization of Jakarta initiated during the Soekarno era 
continued but with altered goals. The development of Jakarta in an effort to foster national 
prestige under President Soekarno changed to an effort to enable economic growth under 
President Soeharto (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). Figure 5 shows the urban expansion of Jakarta 
from 1993 to 2010 which affected the growth of its peripheral areas by form in Greater Jakarta 
(aka Jabodetabek, an acronym that stands for Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi 
regencies). This extensive growth further threatened the public infrastructure conditions in 
Jakarta.
15
 
Figure 5. Administrative Map of Jabodetabekk and Its Urban Expansion (1993-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pravitasari et. al., 2015 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Jabodetabek is considered the second largest megacity in the world after the Tokyo metropolitan area. It covers 
6,392 km
2
, only 0.3% of Indonesia‟s total area. However, its population is about 11.3% of the Indonesia population, 
with an annual growth rate of 2.6% over the period 2000-2010. During the period of 1967-1998, Jabodetabek‟s 
share in foreign and domestic investment in Indonesia accounted for about 44% and 42%, respectively (Firman, 
1998).  Jabodetabek contributed 24.8% of national GDP in 2010 (Pravitasari et. al., 2015). 
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4.1.2 Economic Condition  
The Indonesian economy continued to grow rapidly during the Soeharto era without 
much improvement in water and sanitation services, where GDP grew by an average of 5-7% 
annually from the late 1960s to the late 1990s (BPS, 2000). Water, sanitation, and health sector 
did not receive much attention during the beginning of New Order era with high incidence of 
cholera in the beginning of the 1970s (Figure 6). The proportion of the national budget spent on 
the water and sanitation sector from 1968 to 1973 was Rp.16billion (US$50million) or about 
Rp.698 (US$2.13) per capita (Presidential Decree No.319, 1968). 
Figure 6. Number of Reported Deaths and Number of Reported Cholera Cases in 
Indonesia 
 
Source: WHO, 2015 
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4.1.3 Social and Health Condition  
Despite a high degree of centralization, the health and social sectors were subsequently 
improved under the era of President Soeharto, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Life 
expectancy rose from 48 years in 1950 to 65 years in 1997 and infant mortality decreased from 
200 per 1,000 in 1950 to 52 per 1,000 in 1997 (BPS, 2015a and Kristiansen and Santoso, 2006). 
Death rates in children younger than 5 years old fell from 218 to 60 between 1971 and 1999 
(BPS, 2015a). Poverty incidence declined 50-60% during the 1960s (Hill, 1996) to 24% in 1998 
(Aulia, F., personal communication, September 4, 2015). Limited room for dissenting in policy-
making and policy implementation was considered to be a key in alleviating poverty and health 
improvements (Indonesia Investment, 2016). 
 
4.1.4 International Development Policy for Water and Sanitation Development 
The Mar Del Plata Action Plan in 1977 and the impetus of the International Drinking 
Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) encouraged the Government of Indonesia to 
accelerate water and sanitation development. As a response to the IDWSSD and in parallel with 
the implementation of the equity principle of trilogy development (political stability, economic 
growth, and equity), the Government of Indonesia formulated a new policy for urban water 
supply and sanitation known as the Basic Needs Approach (BNA). This approach provided a 
basic quantity of safe water and basic sanitation facilities to as many people and as rapidly as 
possible (World Bank, 1985a). BNA was a new type of government policy in which special 
attention was given to speedy implementation of infrastructure development, low-cost 
construction, and tariffs that the poor could afford.  
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The investment required to achieve IDWSSD in urban areas was estimated to be 
approximately US$1.7 billion or 3-fold higher than the national budget during 1974-1979 
(REPELITA II). Given the government‟s limited resources, the financial gap was to be funded 
through multilateral developmental bank loans and water tariff improvements (World Bank, 
1983).  
Beside BNA the Government of Indonesia also established a new policy in the mid-1980s 
to improve the use of local government resources in the development of urban infrastructure. 
This urban development reform was known as the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development 
Plan (IUIDP). Reforms carried out under the IUIDP to increase local revenue included 
improvement in the property tax and PDAM accounting systems, as well as changes in tariff 
mechanism for water supply and electricity (World Bank, 1987). Under these reforms, the water 
tariff in Jakarta was increased from Rp.235 per m
3
 (US$0.14) in 1987 to Rp.516 (US$0.31) per 
m
3
 in April 1988 (World Bank, 1990b). PAM Jaya also retained and reinvested their share of 
profits in the piped-water supply system expansion in Jakarta.
16
  
 
4.2 Regime Level 
The city of Jakarta experienced an even greater population growth in the 1960s and early 
1970s (approaching 6% annually), which caused a considerable strain on its already inadequate 
water and sanitation services. Jakarta had a housing stock of 486,000 units and only a few houses 
had electricity in 1969 (World Bank, 1974). Of these dwellings, 68% had no private sanitation 
facilities, only 32% of households had a private toilet (albeit with sub-standard pit privy or septic 
                                                 
16
 Based on Law No.5/1962 on Local Government Companies, PDAMs have to return 55% of their profit to local 
government and the other 30% of profit could be distributed among PDAM staffs, leaving only 15% to be used as 
capital, operation, and maintenance expenditure.  
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tanks) and only 35% of households had access to private piped-water connections and/or private 
well (World Bank, 1974).   
 There are three main drinking water sources in Jakarta: (i) piped water (private and public 
taps); (ii) vendor-supplied water; and (iii) private and public wells. Only 10% of households in 
the city had private piped water supply in their homes, 40% of the households bought water from 
water vendors at a relatively high-price and more than 50% of the population relied on 
groundwater wells, which were often contaminated by sewage seepage and increasing salinity 
due to depletion of the fresh water aquifer (World Bank, 1974). By the late 1980s, 32% of 
households relied on vendors for drinking water and more than 40% of these households 
belonged to the low income households (income less than Rp.130,000 per month or US$78 per 
month) (Kooy, 1998). At the end of 1988, there were 1,100 public hydrants in Jakarta, delivering 
on the average 13.6 m
3
 per day per hydrant (Martijn, 2005).   
 Groundwater with high salinity was commonly found in the northern part of Jakarta 
where the majority of poor people resided (BPS, Jakarta 2015).
17
 Affluent households opted to 
connect to piped water if their groundwater was saline, but poorer households generally bought 
drinking water from vendors while continuing to use well water for other purposes (Alberini et 
al., 1996).  Ninety-eight percent of households in North Jakarta depended on water vendors. 
More affluent households living in Central Jakarta had the highest proportion of households with 
piped water supplies. In 1973, the water tariff was flat without metering and was Rp.100-200 per 
month (US$0.241-0.482). At the same time water from vendors was Rp.440 per m
3
 (US$1.06 per 
m3). Approximately 40% of the households living in North and East Jakarta bought water from 
vendors at rates 5 to 44 times more per m
3
 than the piped-water tariff or more than 10% of their 
                                                 
17
 The northern part of Jakarta has been estimated to be part of Jakarta where high percentage of low income resides 
and migrants from various ethnic background firsts settle (BPS Jakarta, 2015). 
36 
 
household income (World Bank, 1974). Average water use was estimated to be 80l/capita/day 
while poor households living in kampungs consumed about 45 l/capita/day (World Bank, 1974).  
Because there were no sewer systems, middle, and upper income households had privies 
or septic tanks, the majority of which the majority were substandard or simply functioning as 
holding tanks for sewage. One-half of the population already used flush toilets although only 
32% of the population owned a private toilet (World Bank, 1976). Most of the effluent of the 
sub-standard septic tanks was deposited directly into open canals and drainage ditches. Poor 
households in kampungs used rivers or canals for bathing, washing, and defecating as very few 
public toilets were available. Subsequently, canals and rivers were heavily polluted with sewage 
and solid waste.  
 
4.2.1 Enabling Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Regime Level  
 The Government of Indonesia’s Development Policy on Low Cost Technology to 
Provide Water and Sanitation Access to the Poor 
Aware of water-borne diseases, the Government of Indonesia initiated the Water Supply 
and Sanitation Sector Study with funding from WHO/IBRD in 1971-1977. One of the 
recommendations was to create a list of priority projects to address water and sanitation 
conditions, of which many were related to housing and kampung development and through the 
application of low cost engineering solutions. A study conducted by UNDP for sanitation in 
Jakarta also recommended an immediate establishment of sanitation program that would focus 
on the provision of pit latrines and septic tanks through kampung improvement (World Bank, 
1976). The public water taps and communal toilets for kampungs, private water taps, pit privies, 
septic tank and seepage pits for formal low-cost housing were the targeted interventions 
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presented as solutions. These recommendations were incorporated into several project designs 
during the 1970s and 1980s. This program is known as Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) 
and the majority of funding came from the World Bank. The strategy of KIP was rooted in the 
colonial slum cleaning activities that were received and expanded in 1969 by Ali Sadikin, the 
Governor of Jakarta (Chifos, 1996).  
 The government chose an “appropriate technology” policy or low cost technology 
solution as a way to provide basic infrastructure and implement the trilogy development policy 
of Soeharto (political stability, economic development, and equity) particularly the equity 
principle. In other words, the government chose to accelerate the provision of water and 
sanitation services throughout the country and to ensure national resources were distributed 
evenly across income groups and regions. The policy objective was to lower investment costs 
and make the technology more affordable to the poor while also providing low cost services to 
poor customers (World Bank, 1994). The low cost principle was applied until the 1980s when 
the Government of Indonesia embarked upon BNA and IUIDP approaches. There were no 
technical guidelines or standard for developing low cost water and sanitation options when the 
government implemented KIP in the 1970s and1980s. While the World Bank realized that the 
standards used for the KIP were not ideal solutions, this option was thought to be a vast 
improvement over the existing conditions (World Bank, 1976). 
Around 31,000 additional units of leaching pits were built via KIP I and III in 1980.
18
 
There was no sewage treatment plant in Jakarta at that time. In the absence of any rational 
standards governing the pit privy design in Indonesia, little was known on how pit privies or 
septic tanks generated biological and chemical pollution into ground and surface waters (World 
                                                 
18
 KIP I 25,000 units and KIP III 6,312 units. KIP III also built 3 mini water supply plants and 1 deep well.  
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Bank, 1976). It was hoped that sewage would be treated via anaerobic and aerobic bacterial 
decomposition in a 2 m
3
 pit volume for a 5-year life time period (World Bank, 1976). Later in 
1984, the government built the first sewage treatment plant in Pulo Gebang with a capacity of 
300m
3
/day to serve the eastern part of Jakarta. The second, sewage treatment plant was built in 
Duri Kosambi in 1995 for the western part of Jakarta with capacity of 300m
3
/day (Japan 
International Corporation Agency, JICA, 2009).
19
 These two treatment plants treated less than 
one-third of their planned capacity, with only 30% of septic tanks and pits in Jakarta emptied as a 
consequence (WSP, n.d.) (Figure 7). 
Figure 7. Volume of Septage Emptied and Number of Customers with Septic Tank 
Emptying (1996-2013) 
 
*Estimated number of septic tanks and/or pits in Jakarta in 2015 is 2.17 million (WSP, n.d.) 
Source: BPS Jakarta, 2000-2014 
                                                 
19
 Pulo Gebang was planned to serve the whole of East Jakarta and 50% each of West Jakarta, South Jakarta, North 
Jakarta, and Central Jakarta. Duri Kosambi on the other hand was planned to serve the whole of West Jakarta along 
with 50% each of East Jakarta, South Jakarta, North Jakarta, and Central Jakarta.  
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 The Enactment of Law No.11/1974 on Irrigation: The First Law Governing the 
Water Sector 
An important regulatory achievement established by the water sector during the Soeharto era in 
1974 was the enactment of Law No.11/1974 which stated irrigation and water use priorities. The 
first priority was for domestic water purposes such as drinking water, flushing, etc.; the second 
priority was agriculture and irrigation. Under this law, water was considered a social good and 
was managed in a partial-fragmental approach with the government as the dominant actor.  
 
 The Separation of Regulator and Operator Function of Water Supply in Jakarta 
The water regime in Jakarta began to rise in late 1960, marked by the separation of 
management between regulators and water supply operators (PAM Jaya) initiated by the 
Governor Ali Sadikin in 1968. This separation was also in response to the enactment of Law 
No.5/1962. Prior to 1968, Jakarta‟s water supply operator was under the management of 
Jakarta‟s Public Works Agency. In 1973, Jakarta‟s Water Supply Company-PAM Jaya was 
established as a regional water supply enterprise for the Jakarta province responsible for the 
management and operation of production facilities and for generating revenue for operation and 
maintenance of the system.  
The establishment of PAM Jaya as a semi-autonomous water operator was an effort to 
encourage local government to operate and manage the distribution system and service 
connections already built by central government. However, many corruption issues within PAM 
Jaya such as tendering chemical processing and overpricing household connections that hindered 
the implementation of good governance to increase piped-water supply access in Jakarta (ICW, 
2000). For example, households paid Rp.500,000 (US$56.8) to establish a private piped-water 
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connection in their home while the true connection fee was only Rp.200,000-Rp.300,000 
(US$22,7-34,1) (ICW, 2000). 
 After PAM Jaya became a semi-autonomous operator, the old management practice 
changed from un-metered and low charges for water to metered water and a cost-recovery 
(covering operation and maintenance costs) based tariff structure. A new regulation known as 
“meterisasi” or metering program was imposed during the 1970s to introduce meter and 
monitoring devices. The “meterisasi” program was also introduced as a result of the central 
government program for expanding the distribution pipe line for IPA Pejompongan I and II in 
the beginning of 1970s (interview, government official). Integrated records of actual 
consumption and numbers of customers were maintained and an actual list of customers was 
recorded for the first time in 1975 (Bakker et al., 2006). Around 90,000 meters were installed by 
1975 (Kooy, 2008). Furthermore, a new water tariff structures was introduced in 1975. This 
structure changed from a flat tariff of Rp.200 per month (US$0.48) to Rp.2,000-3,000 per month 
(US$4.8-7.2 per month) based upon the actual volume consumed by customers (Kooy, 1998). In 
1974, non-revenue for water was estimated to be 40% of total water supply (World Bank, 1974). 
 
4.2.2 Constraining Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Regime Level 
 Lack of Public Health Approach in Water and Sanitation Provision 
The low cost development policy through the implementation of KIP faced many 
problems. KIP suffered from poor physical planning and link to the city-wide infrastructure. The 
evaluation of KIP after 20 years showed sanitation received low priority and that the use of 
public sanitation facilities was limited due to the top-down approach of the program 
(Haryatiningsih, 1996; World Bank, 1994).  Furthermore, its technical design did not meet local 
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conditions and needs. There was failure to involve households in location planning, lack of 
maintenance training programs, and there no financial or in-kind contributions (Haryatiningsih, 
1996; World Bank, 1994).  One of national government officials conceded that“We realized we 
needed to generate community demand before building sanitation facilities, however, many times 
we were too impatient to implement such a community based-program” (interview, government 
official). 
The knowledge taught to sanitary engineers during education was among the reasons why 
the decentralized system suffered from poor physical planning and lack of ties to the centralized 
system. The education of sanitary engineers in Indonesia mostly incorporated the technologies 
and approaches used in developed nations with only the hardware aspects of these technologies 
taught at universities (Slamet, 1991). Most engineers did not prioritze non-technical aspects of 
low cost technology, nor did they believe public health considerations were their responsibility, 
but the responsibility of the Ministry of Health (Ouano, 1980).  Regarding the roles of sanitary 
engineers and public health practitioners, a senior government official explained that the effort to 
integrate sanitary engineering and public health in water and sanitation development projects had 
been attempted since the government established the National Policy Development of 
Community-Based Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation in 2003. This policy mainly 
aimed to better implement water supply and sanitation provision in rural areas. However, the role 
of engineers in providing water and sanitation systems in urban areas was still the dominate role 
compared to the role of a public health specialist. The same government official stated that “This 
condition [the dominant role of engineers in urban areas] happens since government policy is 
still mainly focused on technical outputs [shown by the number of infrastructure that has been 
built]. It [the technical output] is a populist choice for politicians and governments to attract 
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public attention” (interview, government official). The national budget for water supply and 
sanitation provisions was much higher for the Ministry of Public Works than for the Ministry of 
Health. The condition has affected the number of public health practitioners in Indonesia.  
  
 Reliance on Donors’ Assistance to Develop Water and Sanitation Infrastructure and 
Policy 
Based on considerations by donors and the government, water was prioritized over 
sanitation as water is a prerequisite for adequate sanitation. The provision of water can also 
reduce water-borne disease (World Bank, 1984).
20
 The sewer regime in Jakarta was still in its 
infancy in the 1970s. However, communities, particularly the poor started to realize their need 
for sanitation, as reflected in the household survey for the KIP I project where communal toilets 
were ranked high among other basic infrastructure needs ( along with roads, footpaths, water, 
solid waste, and drainage) (World Bank, 1974).  
While water supply was prioritized over sanitation, the first wastewater master plan in 
Jakarta was being prepared by Nihon Suido from Japan from 1972 to 1977 with investments 
from UNDP and WHO. The plan recommended the construction of a conventional sewer system 
at an estimated cost of US$500million (World Bank, 1983) with plans to serve 900,000 people 
living in the affluent regencies of Setia Budi and Gambir. The plan covered the development of a 
sewerage network where untreated sewage would be disposed-off in the Java Sea in the northern 
part of Jakarta. After subsequent review by the Government of Indonesia, the plan was not 
implemented due to its high cost and questionable justifications of using a sewer system when 
lower-cost solutions appeared feasible (World Bank, 1983).  
                                                 
20
 The proportion of budget in KIP III for water and sanitation was 23% for water and 7% for sanitation.  
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The Government of Indonesia sought another approach through assistance from the 
World Bank to improve sanitation condition in Jakarta. The government requested assistance 
from the World Bank to finance a plan and to find a more appropriate approach for sewage 
disposal in Jakarta. The proposed project would use separate sewer systems and combine the use 
of on-site systems (septic tank, pit privies, and other low cost sanitation options) with the sewer 
system. It was agreed to implement conventional sewer pilot project in 1983 by installing 
interceptors in Tebet and Setia Budi with central government funding through the World Bank 
loan. Tebet and Setiabudi were selected because both have a mix of high, middle, and low 
income areas (interview, non-government).
21
 Lower-income households would use septic tanks, 
while affluent households would be served through the collection of liquid wastes in drains 
(interceptor) connected to major sewers. It was hoped that by serving all different types of 
consumers; the sewer system could generate adequate revenue to cover operating and 
maintenance costs and could recover an appropriate share of capital cost (World Bank, 1983).  
Based on the statement from a senior government official, the decision to not provide 
private sewer connections for the poor was made based on experiences from sewer pilot project 
in other cities (Bandung and Tangerang). In these cities, sewer connections became stagnant 
because poor communities were given priority to connect to the sewer. This experience had a 
psychological effect on the central government leading to them not prioritize poor households in 
future sewer development projects including in Tebet and Setiabudi (interview, government 
official). Figure 8 illustrates the location of the areas to be served by the sewerage system and 
other existing wastewater treatment facilities in Jakarta. 
                                                 
21
 Tebet was a mix of kampung and middle income residential areas. Setia Budi had existing and projected 
commercial and industrial development area. Some of the existing industries in Setia Budi were home-based 
industries such as tempeh, tofu, and batik industry and cattle husbandry which contributed to high organic pollutant 
loads to the Krukut River, which flows directly to the city‟s intake water supply. 
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Figure 8. Wastewater Infrastructure in Jakarta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Beside 2 sludge treatment plants in Duri Kosambi and Pulo Gebang and sewerage system in 
Setia budi, Jakarta also has 35 individual wastewater treatment plants (ITPs). 55% of ITPs are 
not operating (JICA, 2009; WSP, n.d.). Tebet and Setiabudi are located in the shaded area #1. 
Source: Putri, 2014  
 
Obstacles exited in the implementation of the project such as the change in planning and 
design, the limited capacity of the Ministry of Public Works, the Government of Jakarta, and 
consulting firm, the requirement to return revenue from wastewater operation to the Ministry of 
Finance, issues in establishing a semi-autonomous body (PDPAL Jaya) to operate the sewer 
system, and the financial difficulties faced by the government amid falling oil prices (World 
Bank, 1993). These issues created a delay in the implementation of the project. The original plan 
was to be finished in 1988 but it was delayed until 1991. The end result of project was also 
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different from its initial plan. Of the 3,000 leaching pits and 30 public toilets planned for the on-
site sanitation component, 778 pits and 80 toilets were built (World Bank, 1993). The lack of 
willingness to pay and lack of community participations were among the lessons learned by the 
donor for the non-achievement of leaching pits and the over achievement of public toilets.  
The original goal for the sewer system was to serve 700,000 people by 1996. However 
due to the miscalculated financial projection for the hydraulic maximum capacity of the aerated 
lagoons, the system could only serve 38,880 m
3
/day or equivalent of approximately 175,000 
people (World Bank, 1993). A government representative mentioned that the lesson learned from 
implementing the sewerage project is that community awareness and participation is needed 
before implementing sanitation projects (interview, government official).  
 There are lessons learned based on the experience of World Bank and JICA in providing 
assistance to sewerage development in Jakarta. The lessons learned became a consideration for 
donors to further assist the Government of Indonesia in developing sewer projects as a 
representative of the International Non-Government Organization (INGO) mentioned that “It is 
not easy to convince our peers [within donor organization] to conduct sewer projects in 
Indonesia. Even though we have already assessed the feasibility of the project, colleagues from 
different countries will weigh-in on their perspectives and  experiences in conducting sewer 
projects in their respective countries. Donors usually consider sewer projects as a high risk 
project” (interview, non-government). Improper planning and design, difficulties in finding land 
for wastewater treatment plants, weak institutional capacity, and financial issues limit the 
expansion of sewer network in Jakarta. The absence of initiative from the central government 
and development aid projects delayed the improvement of human resources. The same INGO 
representative further explained that “This lack of innitiative slowed down the knowledge 
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transfer from donors and central government to operators and to the local government. It also 
prevented capacity improvement of local consulting firms. Currently, it is difficult to find 
national consulting firm that are capable in doing sewerage project” (interview, non-
government).   
 Increasing Block Tariff as a National Water Tariff Standard 
Another water development policy that came from donor‟s suggestion is the use of 
Increasing Block Tariff (IBT) as a national water tariff standard. In January 1984, Minister of 
Home Affairs and Minister of Public Works issued a joint decree on National Water Rate 
Structure as a way to implement Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Plan (IUIDP) in 
the water sector (Table 5).
22
 Following the policy of IUIDP to implement cost-recovery tariffs 
and a cross-subsidy policy, PAM Jaya changed its water tariff mechanism set in 1975 to a cross-
subsidy tariff system in 1983 (Table 6).  
Table 5. National Water Rate Structure Issued in 1984 
Classifi
cation 
Type of consumers 
Monthly consumption range 
0-10 m
3
 11-20 m
3
 21-30 m
3
 Over 30m
3
 
IA Public hydrants, public bath-
house, public toilets 
0.8A 0.8A 0.8A 0.8A 
IB Social-government clinic and 
hospitals, places of worship 
0.8A 1.0A 1.5A 2.0A 
IIA Residential  1.0A 1.5A 2.0A 3.0A 
IIB Government  1.0A 1.5A 2.0A 3.0A 
IIIA Commercial-small 2.5A 2.5A 5.0A 5.0A 
IIIB Commercial-big 4.0A 4.0A 8.0A 8.0A 
IVA Industry-small 3.0A 3.0A 6.0A 6.0A 
IVB Industry-big 5.0A 5.0A 10.0A 10.0A 
V Special (ports) 15.0A 15.0A 15.0A 15.0A 
* The base factor “A” refers to the selling price of water per m3 for residential consumers using 0-10 m3 
per month.  
Source: World Bank, 1985 
                                                 
22
 Kepmendagri No. 4 Tahun 1984 tanggal 23 Januari 1984 atau Keputusan Bersama Mendagri and Menteri 
PU No.27/Kpts/1984 and Kepmendagri No. 5 Tahun 1984 tanggal 23 Januari 1984.  
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Table 6. PAM Jaya Water Tariff in 1975 and 1983 
Category Year 
Water tariff based on consumption per month 
(Rp.) 
  0-15 m
3
 16-30 m
3
 31-50 m
3
 > 50 m
3
 
Household 1975 25 50 
1983 40 80 300 
Commercial (industry, shop, 
company, restaurant, bank, factory, 
hotel, etc) 
1975 125 
1983 100-600 (depends on the type of industry) 
Small businesses (at household 
level) 
1975 50 100 
 
1983 There is no category for small business in 
water tariff structure in 1983 
Non-commercial (government 
hospital, government office, 
school, barracks, private hospital, 
etc) 
1975 40-60 
1983 180-250 (depend on the type of non-
commercial customers) 
Places of worship 1975 10 25 
 1983 50 
Orphanages and sport institutions 1975 25 
1983 180 
Public hydrant/network and water 
truck 
1975 60 
1983 300 (this tariff only applies to water trucks as 
public hydrants were no longer indicated on 
tariff list) 
Tanjung Priok Harbour 1975 300 
1983 1,250 
Municipality of Bogor 1975 25 
1983 PAM Jaya no longer sell water to municipality 
of Bogor 
Before 1975, a flat tariff was applied (for household customers: Rp.200 per month)  
1US$ in 1975=Rp.415 and 1US$ in 1983=Rp.970 
Source: Martjin, 2005 
 
The cross-subsidy through the implementation of IBT was chosen as a national water rate 
standard. This principle was adopted to achieve cost recovery and to generate revenue for local 
governments. Furthermore, it was thought IBT could extend the availability of water and reduce 
waste water (World Bank, 1985a). While the World Bank realized the IBT would provide limited 
realibility of production and consumption estimates, the tariff was still proposed as a national 
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standard for achieving cost recovery of PDAM. This rate structure had to be adopted by all 
regional water enterprises responsible for setting tariffs. Unfortunately, the IBT scheme served as 
a disincentive to connect poor households, as poorer communities would pay less while consume 
more, thus leading to financial losses for water supply operators. The imbalance in pay versus 
consumption would also establish barriers for the poor to benefit from the IBT scheme 
(Whittington, 1992; Boland and Whittington, 2000; Whittington, 2003; Fuente et. al., 2014). 
 Lack of Investment to Expand Distribution Network 
While investments in building water treatment plants substantially increased from 1966 
(production capacity 3,000l/s) to 1990 (1,050l/s), a limited amount of money was invested in 
increasing household connections (see APPENDIX III for Water Supply and Sanitation 
Development in Jakarta during Old and New Order Era). Piped water coverage which covered 
10% of the population in the 1970s, only slightly increased to 14% by 1990. While efficiency of 
low water distribution and non-revenue for water reached 50%, PAM Jaya was still financially 
profitable with an annual net surplus of about Rp.2billion (US$3.2million) in 1981-1983 (World 
Bank, 1985b). PAM Jaya had shared between Rp.3-10billion (about US$1.5-5million) of its 
revenue with Jakarta‟s government annually (ICW, 2000). Between 1990 and 1995, PAM Jaya‟s 
total profit distribution to the Jakarta government was Rp.30.6billion (about US$15million) 
(Martijn, 2005) (see APPENDIX IV for the PAM Jaya Share to Jakarta government).  
 
4.3 Niche Level 
4.3.1 Enabling Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Niche Level  
The author did not find any important factors at niche level that contributed to the 
development of water and sanitation during the Soeharto era. 
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4.3.2 Constraining Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Niche Level  
 Backlog of Sanitary Engineers and Paradigm Shift in Sanitary Engineering 
Educational System 
During the Soeharto period, the Ministry of Public Works dominated the water supply 
and sanitary regime. Many of its employees were sanitary engineering graduates of ITB. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, one-third of ITB alumni were working at the Directorate of Sanitary 
Engineering. These engineers were the pioneers of water and sanitation development in 
Indonesia. The remaining of the graduates were working in local governments, the water supply 
enterprise, and at universities (KemenPUPR, 2015). During the 1970s and 1980s, water and 
sanitation development in Indonesia focused on providing centralized and decentralized water 
supply and wastewater systems. However, the material taught at ITB heavily focused on 
providing piped-water and sewer networks with limited practical knowledge on how to 
implement such systems in previously developed locations (interview, non-government). There 
was limited teaching material for ground water management, septic-tank and communal water or 
sanitation facility provisions. Impractical knowledge on centralized systems was taught until 
recent years (interview, non-government). 
 By 1980, Indonesia had only 50% of the sanitary engineers required to provide to achieve 
water and sanitation development targets based on the IDWSSD goals. There were only about 
220 sanitary engineers including foreign graduates and civil engineers in the country with post 
graduate degrees in sanitary engineering. Most of these graduates occupied administrative 
positions in government offices and private companies. Consequently, few had practical 
knowledge of water and sanitation infrastructure development. These graduates also opted to 
work in the Ministry of Public Works rather than in the Ministry of Health, as job responsibilities 
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under the Ministry of Health were much less attractive then the former. The Ministry of Public 
Works, responsible for the technical aspects of water and sanitation offered higher pay and 
greater opportunities for career advancement than the Ministry of Health which was responsible 
for non-technical aspects (Ouano, 1980).  
 Beginning in 1984 there was a paradigm shift in the Department of Environmental Health 
Engineering in ITB, a technology-oriented university in Indonesia which focused on meeting 
industry demands and provided 80% of the country‟s water and sanitary engineers. From then 
on, the program not only offered specialization in water and sanitation engineering but also 
focused on industrial occupational subjects. The student‟s practical and in-depth knowledge on 
water and sanitation engineering gradually shifted toward environmental and occupational 
safety. After graduation, most students chose to work in the oil and gas industry, as it offered 
higher salaries (interview, government official). Although there were 47 Indonesian universities 
offering undergraduate degrees related to environmental or sanitary engineering in 2012, the 
number of students pursing this degree every year was less than maximum capacity. Only 
approximately 25% of graduates went on to work in the sanitation sector as consultants or 
contractors (Ausaid, Bappenas, and WSP, 2012). 
 
 Lack of Public Health Practitioners 
The national development target for the urban water and sanitation sector from the time 
of Soekarno until the present day has only focused on technical aspects such as the development 
of water treatment plants, transmission and distribution networks and the provision of a 
communal sanitation system (see APPENDIX V for Theme of the Five Year Plans). These 
policies support the dominant role of engineers rather than public health experts in the 
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development of water and sanitation in Indonesia. As stated by one senior government official: 
“Our policy is heavily oriented in increasing technical output [how much water and sanitation 
infrastructure has been built] rather than on public health outcome. This orientation occurred 
because it is the more popular choice for politicians and policy makers. Furthermore, we also 
have a much greater budget [national and local budget] for the Ministry of Public Works [to 
build infrastructure] than for the Ministry of Health [to focus on non-technical aspects]. All of 
these impacted the focus of the higher education market in Indonesia where people are more 
interested to become an engineer rather than a public health specialist. It is hard to find an 
engineer in Indonesia who understands and of non-technical aspect of water and sanitation 
development such as implementing behavioral changes in populations” (interview, government 
official). The low demand for public health specialists has been affecting the achievement 
outcomes of water and sanitation development. 
 
 The Growth of Water Vending Industry 
While the central government and PAM Jaya increased water production capacity 
through the development large water treatment plants, the provision of public water hydrants also 
increased substantially. Public hydrants –particularly increased in North Jakarta where ground 
water is brackish, the majority of households are poor and there is no water supply pipeline 
(Susantono, 2001).  By 1991, there were 1,874 public hydrants in Jakarta (Crane, 1994). These 
public hydrants allowed water vending market to grow, which provided water to about 8,000 
water vendors and served approximately 21.7% of Jakarta‟s population (Crane, 1994). Although 
the official piped water price was Rp.350 (US$0.17) for each of the first 15m
3
 per month, 
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consumers of water vending often payed higher prices, at around Rp.1,000-Rp.4,000 per m
3
 
(US$0.48-1.9 per m
3
) (Crane, 1994). 
 To abolish the thriving informal vending market, the government announced a 
deregulation policy in mid-1990s which allowed all households with a metered connection to 
legally sell water to any party (Crane, 1994; Lovei and Whittington, 1993). Before this policy 
took effect, all water vendors had to have permits from PAM Jaya (Susantono, 2001). The 
deregulation policy was terminated after its 3-year trial period for institutional and technical 
reasons including the contradiction between PAM Jaya regulations on the deregulation policy 
and the Jakarta Provincial Government No.6/1988 which did not allow households to resell water 
to other users (Lukito, 1994). Table 7 illustrates the price of vended water in Jakarta from 1952 
to 2014. The table shows that there is no significant improvement in water supply provision in 
Jakarta where households particularly the poor still buy vended water as their drinking water 
source. 
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Table 7. Water Price of Vended Water (constant price based on 2000) 
Year Price Paid by 
Distributing 
Vendor to 
Operators 
(Rp. per m
3
) 
Price Paid by 
Household to 
Distributing 
Vendors 
(Rp. per m
3
) 
 
1952
*)
 4.15-312.5  
(US$0.02-1.56) 
16.5-1,000 
(US$0.08-5) 
Vendor bought water at price per 20 L 
(jerrican)  
1973 228.9-457.7 
(US$0.55-1.1) 
457.7-10,070.1 
(US$1.1-24.26) 
40% of HHs used vended water as their 
primary drinking water source. About 
10% of HHs income was used for 
buying drinking water. 
1988 
1)
 2.527.4-3159.3 
(US$1.52-1.90) 
12,637.0-22,114.8 
(US$7.61-13.32) 
32% of HHs used vended water as their 
primary drinking water source. 
1991 152.5-889.3 
(US$0.08-0.46) 
2541.0-10,163.7 
 (US$1.30-5.20) 
27% of HHs used vended water as their 
primary drinking water source. 
1994 US$0.53 US$2.5 32% of HHs used vended water as their 
primary drinking water source. 
2007
2)
 984.2-13,123.3 
 (US$0.06-0.08) 
23.434.5-117,172.6 
(US$0.57-3.57) 
49% of HHs used bottled and refilled 
water (including vended water). Low 
income HHs spend about 10%-14% of 
income on drinking water. 
2014 
2)
 2,017.7-26,902.8 
(US$0.17-2.26) 
48.040.8-240,203.8 
(US$4.04-20.22) 
71% of HHs used bottled and refilled 
water (including vended water) 
*) Price in 1952 is in real price. 
* Price paid by distributing vendors depends on where the vendors buy the water (public hydrant, 
water tanker, small domestic business or individual house connections). Price paid by household 
to distributing vendors depends on the distance to transport water from sources where vendors 
buy the water from households. 
Vendors bought water from individual households at price of Rp.150 (US$0.09) per m
3
 (before 
deregulation policy effective in 1990) 
The tariff of PAM Jaya for public hydrant is Rp.1,050 (US$0.11, kurs in 2007) and for kiosk or 
small domestic business is Rp.5,000 (US$0.55, kurs in 2007) per 0.36 m
2
. Households buy 
vended water from water vendors that bought water from public hydrant, kiosk, or small 
domestic HHs. 
Source: author, with information drawn from multiple sources 
 
 The Rise of Bottled and Refilled Water 
Because the Government of Indonesia did not invest much in the expansion of water 
distribution networks and because piped-water is not potable, the bottled water industry filled the 
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gap to address the demand for drinking water. In 1973, PT Aqua Golden Mississippi, the leading 
bottled water companies in Indonesia was established (Kurniati, 2007).
23
  In parallel to the 
growing number of bottled water companies, the existence of public hydrant and water terminals 
created a business opportunity for the water vending industry particularly in the northern and 
western parts of Jakarta where groundwater is brackish (Susantono, 2001). 
In 1995, entrepreneurs started to run informal water businesses that offered similar 
services to bottled water at cheaper prices (Darandono, 2003 as cited in Prabaharyaka, 2014). 
This refilled water industry created business models different from the bottled water industry 
where they relied on small-scale water depots that treated raw water on site (Darmawan, 2009).  
As the bottled and refilled water industries continued to grow, they eventually became different 
regimes in the country‟s water supply industry managed by the Ministry of Industry (see 
APPENDIX VI for The Growth of Bottled Water Industry and Gro wth of Refilled Water in 
Indonesia).  
Due to the increased use of bottled and refilled water, the proportion of households in 
Jakarta who boiled their drinking water decreased from 85% in 2007 to 46% in 2010 (Depkes, 
2017, 2010). To this day, the government cannot stop the use of bottled and refilled water, 
especially considering that the piped-water supply cannot consistently deliver potable water. 
Furthermore, the regulation of bottled and refilled water is managed by the Ministry of Industry 
which is a different regime that of the piped-water supply (interview, government official).  
 
                                                 
23
 Tirto Utomo is a former journalist and head of the legal departmentin Pertamina (the state-owned national oil 
company of Indonesia). He is responsible for building partnership with foreign investor. Utomo almost failed in 
sealing contract with an investor from the United States as the wife of the investor experienced diarrhea after 
drinking piped water in Indonesia. Utomo also noticed that a colleague of him from Japan always brought bottled 
water with him, as he is afraid to drink the unhygienic piped-water in Indonesia. The poor quality drinking water in 
Indonesia encouraged Utomo to develop the company PT Aqua Golden Mississippi (Kurniati, 2007). 
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 The Increase of Groundwater Extraction 
In addition to the growing consumption of bottled and refilled water, the amount of 
groundwater extracted in Jakarta had also increased alarmingly (Figure 3). Although President 
Soeharto favored industry development in the city, an inadequate piped water supply led to the 
over-utilization of groundwater resources through excessive pumping. In 1995, more than 70% 
of industries in Jakarta used ground water (Colbran, 2009). The Ministry of Public Works was 
unable to control the extraction of ground water, as its regulation was the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Furthermore, representatives from both central and 
local government stated that local governments issued permits allowing groundwater extraction 
as a source of local revenue (interview, government official). 
 
4.4 Summary of Water and Sanitation Development during 1966-1998 
Piped-water did not increase substantially during the New Order Era. In the late 1990s, 
the number of individual water connections only covered approximately 29% of the total 
population of Jakarta. Seventy percent of the Jakarta‟s population still relied on groundwater as 
their primary drinking water source with total groundwater consumption reaching 11.6m
3
/s 
(Susantono, 2001). Fewer than 3% of Jakarta‟s households used bottled and refilled water. These 
households were mainly affluent households and expatriates because the price of a bottled water 
could be more than 100 times that of piped water (Sidharta, 2007). More than 50% of households 
relied on hydrants with vending prices five times higher than the price of piped water for poor 
households (Adzan, 2001).  
By 1990, there were only 965 sewer connections that served below 1% of Jakarta‟s 
population. That same year JICA gave another technical assistance to PDPAL Jaya to develop a 
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new master plan for waste water and drainage in Jakarta (JICA, 1991)24. However, during loan 
negotiation in 1994/1995, the Minister of Public Works cancelled the proposed project because 
only 5% of the total implementation budget was to be used to fund Indonesian manpower. A 
representative from non-government mentioned that the 5% of total budget would only cover the 
payment for adriver, office boy, and surveyor (interview, non-government).  
 During the era of President Soeharto, factors that supported the development of water 
supply and sanitation in Jakarta were: (i) the Government of Indonesia policy on low cost 
technology to provide water and sanitation access to the poor; (ii) the enactment of Law 
No.11/1974; and (iii) the separation of regulator and operator function of water supply in Jakarta. 
Factors that hampered water supply development in Jakarta were: (i) the backlog of sanitary 
engineers and paradigm shift in the sanitary engineering educational system; (ii) lack of public 
health practitioners; (iii) lack of public health approach in water and sanitation provision; (iv) 
reliance on donor‟s assistance to develop water and sanitation; (v) increasing block tariff as a 
national water tariff standard; (vi) lack of investment to expand distribution networks; (vii) the 
growth of water vendors; (viii) the rise of bottled and refilled water; and (ix) the increase of 
groundwater extraction. Table 8 summarizes the water supply and sanitation policy adopted from 
1966-1998 and its output indicators. 
 
                                                 
24
 The plan divided Jakarta into 9 zones of multiple small scale on-land treatment system which would be integrated 
into 3 central sewerage zones, one in each of the western, central, and eastern parts of Jakarta, with a total capacity 
of 1,348,000m
3
/day. The master plan continued with the preparation of preliminary detail design of the wastewater 
treatment plant in Pluit serving the central part of Jakarta (JICA, 1990). 
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Table 8. Summary of Water and Sanitation Development during 1966-1998 
Landscape Level Regime Level Niche Level 
Water Supply 
Coverage in 1998 
Sanitation 
Coverage in 
1998 
Political: 
authoritarian rule 
Economic: 
economy grew 
rapidly by an 
average of 5-7% 
ocial and health: 
health and social 
sectors were 
improved 
International 
policy on water 
and sanitation 
development: The 
Mar Del Plata 
Action Plan and 
the International 
Drinking Water 
Supply and 
Sanitation Decade 
(IDWSSD) 
Enabling factors 
for water and 
sanitation 
development 
Constraining 
factors for water 
and sanitation 
development 
Enabling 
factors for 
water and 
sanitation 
development 
Constraining 
factors for water 
and sanitation 
development 
Piped-water:  
In 1975: (i) 10% of 
households had 
piped-water 
connections (ii) 
Water tariff: Rp.25 
per m
3
 or US$0.05 
per m
3
) with no 
differentiation in the 
socio-economic 
status of HHs 
In 1998: (i) 31% of 
households had 
piped water 
connections in 1998; 
(ii) Average water 
tariff was Rp.682 
per m
3
 (US$0.4 per 
m
3
) in 1990 and 
Rp.1,491 per m
3
 
(US$0.6 per m
3
) 
Off-site 
coverage: 
increase 
from 0.01% 
in 1983 to 
0.05% in 
1998.) 
On-site 
coverage: 
increase 
from 30% in 
1970 to 57% 
in 1998 
 
Development 
policy on low 
cost technology 
to provide water 
and sanitation 
access to the 
poor 
The enactment 
of Law 
No.11/1974 on 
Irrigation 
The separation 
of regulator and 
operator function 
for water supply 
operator  
 
Lack of public 
health approach 
in water and 
sanitation 
provision 
Reliance on 
donors‟ 
assistance to 
develop water 
and sanitation  
infrastructure 
Increasing block 
tariff as a 
national water 
tariff standard 
Lack of 
investment to 
expand 
distribution 
networks 
 Backlog of 
sanitary 
engineers and 
paradigm shift in 
sanitary 
engineering 
educational 
system 
Lack of public 
health 
practitioners 
Growth of water 
vending industry 
Rise of bottled 
and refilled 
water 
Increase in 
groundwater 
extraction 
5
7
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CHAPTER 5 : CASE STUDY: THE DYNAMIC OF WATER AND SANITATION 
DEVELOPMENT IN JAKARTA FROM 1998 TO 2015 
 
5.1 Landscape Level 
5.1.1 Political Condition  
An important landscape development was the collapse of the centralization era when 
President Soeharto resigned on May 21, 1998. New constitutions on decentralization i.e. Law 
No.22/1999 and Law No.25/1999 were enacted and marked the rise of decentralization or the 
Reform Era.
25
 One of the immediate impacts of the Reform Era was the change in important 
political decisions making which started being made at the legislative level. Another immediate 
impact was an increased demand for freedom of expression and speech. Popular issues for 
reform were brought and generated primarily by the media combined with demand from 
communities (Jones, 2012).  
Governance performance also improved during the Reform Era. From 1996 to 2014, all 
governance performance indicators had increased except for the regulatory quality indicator 
(World Bank, n.d.).
26
 The effort to eradicate corruption has grown since the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) was established in 2002.  The Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) increased from 32 in 2012 to 36 in 2015 (Transparency International, 2015) (Figure 9). 
Corruption is still found in the public and private sector and at every tier of governmental 
                                                 
25
 Law No.22/1999 on Local Administration and Law No.25/1999 on Balanced Fiscal between Central and Local 
Government 
26
 Voice and accountability rises from 23.6% to 53.2%, political stability increases from 13% to 31.1%, government 
effectiveness increases from 37.1% to 54.8%, and rule of law increases from 39.7% to 41.8%. However, regulatory 
quality indicator decreases from 57.4% in 1996 to 49% in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). 
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authority (KPK, 2004, 2015).  Unfortunately, the improvement in the governance system did not 
bring many changes in water and sanitation development. 
There has been no substantial improvement in private water sector investment in recent 
years (Figure 9). In addition to endemic corruption, regulatory risks, legal uncertainties from 
unclear or conflicting laws and delayed regulation and law changes, a corrupt judicial system 
was also identified as a risk and challenge in doing business in Indonesia (KPMG, 2015). These 
conditions also hamper investment in the water sector particularly from the private sector where 
it takes several years for private companies to prepare the criteria for implementing water 
business in Indonesia. To date, there have been only nine private investors involved in water 
supply PPP in Indonesia (BPPSPAM, 2016).  
Figure 9. Corruption Perception Index in Indonesia (1996-2015) and B to B Investment in 
Water Supply Sector (2011-2014) 
 
Source: Transparency International, 2015 and BPPSPAM, 2016 
  
Administrative power to manage water and sanitation service was changed after the 
implementation of decentralization. In the decentralization era, the central government does not 
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have direct control over water and sanitation provision. After reform began  in 1998, water and 
sanitation were among the responsibilities transferred from the central to the local government.
27
 
According to law and regulations, the central government was excluded from implementing 
water supply and sanitation projects, except for regional or national strategic water and sanitation 
infrastructure projects. However, in practice, the central governments still plays a major role in 
planning, executing, and financing water supply and sanitation projects. Almost 80% of total 
urban water and sanitation expenditure comes from the central government budget, with – much 
of it coming through Ministry of Public Works (Presidential Regulation No.7/2005; No.5/2010, 
and No.2/2015). The central government still invests more than local governments by 
constructing and rehabilitating water supply and sanitation infrastructure in urban and rural 
areas. However, in the city of Jakarta this is not the case, it has the highest fiscal capacity in 
Indonesia. Its GDP is about 17% of Indonesia‟s GDP.  
 
5.1.2 Economic Condition  
Economic growth has been maintained between 5% to 6% annually from 2004 to the 
present. At the beginning of Reform Era, the Indonesian economy was hit by a crisis and its full 
impact was felt in 1998. Inflation rose to more than 80% (Thee, 2012).  This deep “twin crises” 
that occurred both  economics and politics from 1997-1998 was a watershed period in Indonesia 
history (Basri and Hill, 2011). After the crisis, political instability continued until 2003. Political 
normalization took root in 2004 when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became the sixth 
President of Indonesia. Since then the macroeconomic condition has generally been stable. In 
                                                 
27
 Law No.32/2004 on Regional Governance, Law No.33/2004 on Fiscal Balance and Government Regulation (PP) 
No.38/2007 on Specific Allocation Function between Central, Provincial, and Local Government, and PP 
No.19/2007 on The Role of Provincial Government are the current regulations that specify the responsibility for 
investment in municipal infrastructure and provision of basic services has been transferred to local governments.  
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2009, Indonesia was the third fastest-growing economy in the G-20 group, behind only China 
and India (Basri and Hill, 2011).
28
  
 
5.1.3 Social and Health Condition  
While decentralization provides faster response and more appropriate policies, there were 
some disadvantages for social and health development. In the centralization era, central 
government provided 80% of the total public budget on health (Thabrany, 2008). The central 
government health expenditure in the decentralization era has been stagnant at levels below 
US$4-6 per capita per year, with health services standards dependent on the amount of money 
allocated by local governments (Bappenas, 2016; Thabrany, 2008). Furthermore, inadequate 
infrastructure remains a major impediment to poverty reduction in Indonesia where infrastructure 
investment fell from an average of US$400 million in the 1990s to under US$45million in 2005. 
Another way to look at the changes in investment is that infrastructure investment was about 5-
6% of GDP before 1997, 1-2% in 2000 and 3.4% in the mid-2000s (Ehrhardt et  al., n.d.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 G-20 is an informal international forum for the governments and central bank governors from 20 major economies 
in the world (19 countries and the European Union). 
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Figure 10. Infant and Under-5 Mortality Rate in Indonesia and Jakarta (1970-2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BPS, 2015 
 
Health status has been slowly improving since the late-1990s (Figure 10). Life 
expectancy rose slightly from 67.8 years in 2000 to 70.1 years in 2015 (BPS, 2015b). Between 
2000 and 2012, infant mortality rate decreases from 47 per 1,000 to 34 per 1,000, with  the 
under-5 years old mortality rate falling from 60 per 1,000  to 43 per 1,000 (BPS, 2015a). In terms 
of social development, poverty incidence declined from 24% in 1998 to 11% in 2014 ((Aulia, F., 
personal communication, September 4, 2015).  
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5.2 Regime Level 
The growth of piped-water and sewer in Jakarta cannot keep up with the population 
growth per capita income (Figure 11). The number of piped-water connections increased from 
approximately 560,000 in 2000 to 820,000 in 2015 (piped-water coverage increase from 34% in 
2000 to 40% in 2015) while the number of sewer networks increased slightly from 954 to 1,852 
during the same period (sewer coverage increase from 0.05% in 2000 to 2% in 2015). By 2015 
about 40% of Jakarta‟s population (or approximately 4.1 million people)  has a piped-water 
connection but less than 2% are connected to sewers (or approximately 0.21 million people). 
However, in terms of households with improved access to water and sanitation, the numbers are 
much higher in recent times. In 2014, approximately 93.7% households have access to an 
improved water source and there were 88.5% households with access to improved sanitation 
facilities (BPS Jakarta, 2015) (Figure 12 and Figure 13).  
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Figure 11. Jakarta Real GDP per Capita, Population of Jakarta, Population with Piped-Water Connection, and Population 
with Sewer Connection (1975-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is an Asian economic crisis in 1998.  
Source: author, with information drawn from multiple sources 
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Figure 12. Proportion of Jakarta's Households with Access to Main Drinking Water Source 
(1990-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BPS Jakarta, 2000- 2015 
Figure 13. Proportion of Jakarta's Households with Access to Basic Sanitation Facilities 
(1993-2014) 
 
Source: BPS Jakarta, 2000-2015 
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Perhaps due to poor water and sanitation conditions, there has been an increase in 
households buying bottled and refilled drinking water. The number of households who buy their 
drinking water sources (bottled and refill water) increased from 3.4% in 2000 to 71.2% in 2014. 
Additionally, 60% of total domestic water consumption per year was provided by shallow 
ground water (BPS Jakarta, 2015; Local Government Regulation No.1, 2008). Poorer households 
bore the brunt burden by paying much higher prices tobuy drinking water. Low income 
households in Jakarta used multiple water sources with average expenses about Rp.182,000 
(US$18.7) per household (HH) per month  (Mungkasa, 2006).
29
 Water expense accounts for 
about 6.6% of the average poor household income (Rp.79,000 or US$8.2). In developed 
countries, water costs are considered expensive if they exceed 3% of the average HH income 
(Water Academy, 2004 as cited in Mungkasa, 2006). Table 9 summarizes the trend of water 
expenses of household in Jakarta.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 The detail of expenses per HH per month is Rp.68,620 (US$7) to buy bottled and/or refilled water; Rp.86.419 
(US$8.9) to pay piped-water; Rp.21,766 (US$2.2) to buy vended water; and Rp.5,266 (US$0.5)  to fetch water from 
neighbor (Mungkasa, 2006). 
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Table 9. Water Expenses by Income Group, as a Proportion of Income 
Income group 
Water Expenses as Percentage of Income (%) 
1975 
1)
 1994 
2)
 2008 
3)
 2011 
4)
 
Low 3-5 9.8 5-14 5.0 
Middle 4.8 2-5 4.7 
High 4.2 1 5.4 
Average income group in 1975: Rp.66,400 (US$160) per month 
Income group in 1994: Low income: Rp.250.000 (US$119) per month; Middle income: 
Rp.450.000 (US$214) per month; and High income: Rp.800,000 (US$380) per month 
Income group in 2008: Low income: <Rp.1.5million (US$160) per month; Middle income: 
Rp.1.5million-Rp.6million (US$160-645) per month, and High income: > Rp.6million (US$645) 
per month 
Income group in 2011: Low income: < Rp.1.7million (US$180) per month; Middle income: 
Rp.1.7million-Rp.2.8million (US$180-298) per month, and High income: >Rp.5.5million 
(US$579) per month 
Source: 
1)
 Martijn, 2005; 
2)
 Cestti, et al., 1994 as cited in Adzan, 2001, 
3)
 Kooy, 2008, 
4)
 author 
with the information drawn from PAM Jaya. However, the data only for Aetra customers 
(households live in eastern part of Jakarta). 
 
  
About 92% of households in Jakarta had private toilets by 2009 (JICA, 2009). The 
number of pit latrines is estimated to have increased from about approximately1.6 million 
(Miller, 2006 as cited in Putri, 2014) to about 2.17 million pits. However, only 30% of these pits 
had been emptied in the last 5 years and only 14% of total fecal sludge had been safely disposed 
(WSP, n.d.). It is estimated that about 1.3 million people in Jakarta are still practicing open 
defecation (Pokja Sanitasi DKI Jakarta, 2012). Due to poor sanitation, a reported 90% of shallow 
ground water sources has been polluted by E. Coli (Soegijoko, 1995; BPLHD, 2013) and 13 
rivers in Jakarta  monitored by BPLHD have been contaminated by E.Coli (Steinberg, 2007) (see  
APPENDIX VII for Water Quality of River and Groundwater in Jakarta). Contamination affects 
the urban poor more than affluent households by causing a higher incidence of diarrhea illnesses 
(Agtini et. al., 2005; Alberini et. al., 1996).   
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 Sewer coverage in Jakarta has been stagnant, covering less than 2% of the population 
(Figure 11).  The number of sewer connections only increased from 954 house connections 
(HCs) to 1,852 HCs from 2000-2015. Jakarta has the lowest number of connections compared to 
other big cities in Indonesia such as Bandung (99,454 HCs), Medan (14,872 HCs), Yogyakarta 
(14,329 HCs), Surakarta (12,620 HCs), and Banjarmasin (5,242 HCs) (Direktorat Air Limbah, 
personal communication, November 3, 2015). During this period of sewer stagnancy, PDPAL 
Jaya ran its business successfully although its performance cannot be compared with other cities, 
because it serves many high rise buildings in the business district of Jakarta where 15% of 
PDPAL Jaya customers are industrial and commercial (USAID, 2006). PDPAL Jaya also applies 
a cross-subsidy tariff mechanism (see APPENDIX VIII for Service Tariff and Connection Fee in 
PDPAL Jaya). PDPAL Jaya has achieved an operation and maintenance cost recovery tariff 
(133%) , which is the highest operation and maintenance cost recovery compared to other cities 
(Bandung, Medan, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and Banjarmasin). However, PDPAL Jaya‟s 
collection efficiency is only between 60%-80%, (USAID, 2006).
30
  
One of the contributing factors of slow progress of sewer expansion in Jakarta is due to 
the lack of investment. The last master plan for wastewater development in Jakarta for the period 
of 1991-2010 was finalized in 1991 with assistance from JICA. However, no projects were 
implemented by the central government and/or donors to improve sewer connections from 1991 
until 2011 as stated in the master plan. The newest master plan for 2012-2050 was created in 
2011 through a grant from JICA. The goal of sewer development in the master plan from 2012-
2050 is to achieve 20% coverage by 2020 and 80% by 2050 (JICA, 2012). Department of Public 
Works and JICA has presented the new master plan to Governor of Jakarta and Jakarta‟s 
                                                 
30
 The efficiency for a household‟s bill collections is 60% while for high rise buildings it is 80% (USAID, 2006). 
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legislature. However, the Governor and the legislature stated that there is another foreign 
investor who is willing to invest their money through PPP. Regarding Jakarta‟s government 
response to the new master plan, one national government official stated: “We [the Ministry of 
Public Works] were very upset about their comments [the Governor and legislature]. We planned 
to cover half of the funding through acentral government loan, however they [the Governor and 
legislature] thought the investment was expensive and there was a better opportunity through 
PPP where the local government did not have to invest their money” (interview, government 
official).  
 Another contributing factor to the slow progress of sewer development in Jakarta is 
related to the lack of transparency of donor data and information sharing with stakeholders. A 
representative from Sanitation Partners Group (SPG) in Indonesia mentioned: “We cannot access 
the master plan, we aimed at helping them [JICA] by providing funding and technical assistance 
to the government.  [To achieve 20% sewer coverage by 2020], the plan would need a huge 
amount of money and we are willing to help, however, it seems the master plan can only be 
accessed by the government” [interview, non-government]. Currently, the central government, 
the Jakarta government, and JICA are preparing to develop awaste water treatment plant for zone 
1 (as planned in master plan to improve sewerage coverage by up to 23% in 2020) with a total 
investment of US$17.5million (Mardikanto, A., personal communication, January 5, 2016) 
. 
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Figure 14. Sewerage Zones for Each Target Development Year 
 
 Source: JICA, 2012 
 
5.2.1 Enabling Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Regime Level 
 The Substitution of Law No.11/1974 with Law No.4/2004 
An important achievement in the water sector in Reform era was the substitution of Law 
No.11/1974 with Law No.4/2004 on Water Resources which marked the water resources 
management reform. This law introduced a more integrated and comprehensive policy 
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framework in managing water , and was prepared by the government with the assistance from the 
the World Bank. In the previous Law (Law No.11/1974), water resource management was 
heavily controlled by the government and water use was not distributed equally among sectors. 
The Law No.4/2004 is the only national law pertaining to wastewater policy.  
The concept of water as an economic good was introduced.
31
 The law is in line with the spirit of 
decentralization and also acknowledges the participation of community and private sectors in 
water resources management. Despite this achievement, the law was overruled by Indonesia‟s 
Constitutional Court in February 2015, as it was deemed that the law allowed the private sector 
to monopolize water resources. The Court has reinstated the previous regulation, Law 
No.11/1974 as the controlling legislation until a new law is adopted. 
 
5.2.2 Constraining Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Regime Level 
 Lack of National and Local Government Attention to Water and Sanitation Provision in 
Jakarta 
The water and sanitation regime at the central level has been dominated by the Ministry 
of Public Works (currently Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing) with the National 
Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Home Affairs 
being responsible for preparing non-technical aspects such as advocacy, promotion for sanitation 
and hygiene and capacity of local government development (see APPENDIX II). Although more 
than half of Indonesia‟s urban population (55%) continued to depend on non-piped water 
systems, the attention of most actors at the national level in the water supply regime shifted 
towards the provision of individual piped water connections. With respect to sanitation, the 
                                                 
31
 The law is further complemented with PP No.16/2005 on Water Supply Provision. 
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majority of urban households in Indonesia in 2013 still used septic tanks with over 60% of the 
urban populations having flush toilets discharging to septic tanks (World Bank and Ausaid, 
2013). Only 1% of the urban population had access to sewer and only 4% had access to safe 
sewage collection and disposal (World Bank and Ausaid, 2013). The attention of most actors in 
the sanitation sector was on the provision of Decentralized Wastewater Treatment (DEWATS) or 
communal sanitation facilities.   
The Government of Indonesia increased its national-level interest in water and sanitation 
in 2000 along with the government‟s commitment to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The increased interest had a considerable impact on refocusing public investment on 
water and sanitation provision once they began lagging behind. Figure 15 shows that there has 
been increased investment per capita for water and sanitation since 2005. While an improvement, 
this investment is still small compared to the magnitude of water and sanitation problems in 
Indonesia. The estimated investment to achieve 100% urban water supply access is US$11.7 
billion per year (based on the projection in 2012) and to achieve 100% urban sanitation access is 
US$11.2billion (based on the projection in 2015) (World Bank, Ministry of Public Works, and 
Water Partnership Program, 2012; Bappenas, 2014).   
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Figure 15. Water Supply and Sanitation (Wastewater, Solidwaste, and Drainage) 
Investment per Capita from Central Budget (2005-2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Presidential Regulation No.7/205; No.5/2010, and No.2/2015 
  
The central government also started to prioritize the development of sanitation. The 
central government realized sanitation had been long regarded as a private business and had been 
a lower priority than water supply development. The central government became more aware of 
sanitation after the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP), The World Bank conducted a study to 
measure local government awareness on sanitation in 2005 and after a study by WSP on 
Economic of Sanitation Initiatives in 2008. The result of the 2005 study showed that local 
governments could identify the general impact of sanitation but that they had limited knowledge 
and awareness of the benefits from better sanitation and hygiene (Akademika, 2006). The 
economic impact due to poor sanitation as shown by the WSP study in 2008 promoted greater 
attention to sanitation issues from the central and local government. 
Jakarta already had a water supply operator (PAM Jaya) and a wastewater supply 
operator (PDPAL Jaya). The water regime in Jakarta was dominated by PAM Jaya and its private 
partners and the sewer regime was dominated by PDPAL Jaya. Central government shifted its 
attention to other cities and districts of Indonesia due to the high fiscal capacity of Jakarta. The 
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central government diverted its attention from Jakarta because other big cities in Indonesia such 
as Medan and Surabaya also faced similar urban problems (high population growth, poor raw 
water quality, etc) and had proven that they could solve their water and sanitation problem s 
without heavy reliance on central government initiatives (interview, government official).  
 The Government of Jakarta did not pay much attention to water and sanitation because 
the regulatory function for water supply and sanitation development was only managed by the 
Section Head or by a lower working unit under the Jakarta Public Work Agency. The unit was 
dissolved in 2008 based on Regional Regulation No.10/2008 on Regional Organization. From 
2008 water and sanitation provision in Jakarta had been managed under BPLHD (Jakarta 
Environmental Management Agency). However, this agency had also heavily focused their 
attention on regulating groundwater extraction particularly after the Government of Indonesia 
issued Government Regulation No.43/2008 on Groundwater. The BPLHD had also been 
increased their attention on groundwater particularly on deep well extraction as a source of 
revenue for the local government.  
 The responsibility of managing sanitation facilities was transferred from the Public Work 
Agency to BPLH when the Jakarta Public Work Agency was abolished in 2008. However, 
because BPLHD is essentially a regulatory department, it did not have the ability to construct 
and manage sanitation facilities (JICA, 2012).  The result was that allocating budget funds to 
water supply and sanitation in Jakarta was a low priority. PAM Jaya and PDPAL Jaya were 
treated like other public corporations run on a self-paying basis and did not get money from 
Jakarta‟s budget. Jakarta paid more attention and allocated much more funds to managing flood 
control and traffic and transportation construction. It is possible that the city government‟s 
prioritization of drainage and transportation sectors aligned with household‟s preferences when 
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communities paid more attention to flooding and traffic jam issues (Figure 16). The working unit 
for water and sanitation was reactivated in 2014 under the Water Management Agency. The 
agency is currently adjusting and preparing activities to improve water resources in Jakarta for 
the water and sanitation sector.   
Figure 16. Community Complaints Reported to the Legislature of Jakarta (2000-2013) 
 
 Source: BPS Jakarta, 2000-2013 
 
 Lack of Public Awareness on Water and Sanitation Issue 
In concordance with a lack of attention from local governments, the public also 
recognized sanitation as a private rather  public responsibility. This is why in general, households 
self-service their toilets and septic tanks and are generally unwilling to connect or to pay for 
wastewater services which could have a bigger impact on the whole community (World Bank 
and Ausaid, 2013).  These generally poorer households often choose non-piped water services 
such as water vending and ground water, even  in areas where piped-water networks and services 
are available. Perceived water quality and price were the two most important factors behind 
households‟ decisions to use non-piped water services (Bappenas, UNICEF, and Yayasan Dian 
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Desa,1990; Susantono, 2001). Poor households choose non-piped water sources possibly because 
the poor cannot afford to pay for piped-water connection fees and transaction costs ((Bakker et. 
al., 2008). Furthermore, housing and residence status, water availability and perceptions of water 
quality may also play a role in the decision to not connect to piped-water networks (Bakker et. 
al., 2008; Susantono, 2001). 
 Among water supply, wastewater, solid waste management, and drainage issues, public 
and governmental agencies in Jakarta paid more attention to solid waste management and 
drainage issues (Figure 16). Of 40-50 community complaints reported to Jakarta‟s local 
parliament every year, none were related to water and sanitation between the periods of 2000-
2013. The public demanded better solid waste and cleanliness management but not improved 
water and sanitation services (BPS Jakarta, 2000-2013). Furthermore, the campaigns and 
promotions that did  relate to water and sanitation that frequently drew community attention were 
solid waste and cleanliness (61.5%); water supply (3.2%); drainage (1.8%); and wastewater 
(1.5%). The remaining 32% of the communities did not know what topic they were interested in 
(Pokja Sanitasi, 2012).  
 Although the majority of communities did not understand the importance of sanitation, a 
2014 study by USAID-IUWASH in Pademangan Barat, North Jakarta showed that after 
sanitation campaigns, the proportion of households who said they did not need septic tank 
desludging decrease from 57% to 4% (IUWASH, 2015). This study implied that community 
education can increase demand for sanitation. However, governments have not paid much 
attention to conducting community campaigns or implementing water and sanitation demand 
studies. Furthermore, those who demanded better water and sanitation services were usually poor 
(interview, government official and non-government). One representative from INGO stated that 
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“[While] actually, there is demand from the community, this demand is low and is not a top 
priority listed in community consultations on development planning (Musrenbangdes). 
Furthermore, those who may want to demand better water and sanitation are usually voiceless 
[the poor community]” (interview, non-government). 
Media interest in covering water and sanitation was also low. Of the 1.644 news articles 
related to the water and sanitation sector in 2013-2014, only 6% were related to wastewater. 
Forty-two percent were related to water scarcity, 38% to solid waste management, and 15% to 
drainage issues (personal documentation from Sekretariat Pokja AMPL, 2014). In summary, 
there is a general lack of household demand for better water and sanitation services in Jakarta. 
 
 Corruption in the Preparation of PPP in Water Supply in Jakarta  
The initiative to implement Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in Indonesia began in the 
early 1990s. The Government of Indonesia started the discussion on the involvement of the 
private sector in water supply provision in Indonesia, including Jakarta. The government realized 
PDAMs in Indonesia needed to improve their performance and that a huge amount of money was 
needed to create piped-water supply large enough to support the growing urban population 
(interview, government official). PAM Jaya had already started to conduct a study on finding 
alternative financing from non-government resources (interview, non-government). Multilateral 
development banks such as the World Bank and JICA recommend the involvement of the private 
sector as one of the main policy framework in enhancing urban water supply in Indonesia 
(interview, government; Lucossol, 1997). Through the Indonesia Urban Water Supply 
Framework (IWSPF), World Bank gave 6 recommendations of urban water policy reform 
including PPP. 
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 International water companies were keenly interested in investing their money in 
Indonesia, an emerging country with low piped water coverage. With the PAM Jaya System 
Improvement Project (PJSIP) loan in place, it was easy for the private companies to penetrate the 
water supply market in Jakarta. The World Bank was among the advocates who convinced the 
government to open the water market to foreign investor (Bakker, 2007; Harsono, 2003; Kooy, 
2008). However, advocates of PPP (World Bank, JICA and ADB) were not involved in the 
preparation of water supply PPP in Jakarta (interview, non-government). 
 There is corruption behind decision-making to implement PPP in water supply in Jakarta. 
In the beginning of the 1990s, President Soeharto asked the Minister of Public Works, Radinal 
Mochtar, to improve water supply services in Jakarta because he was surprised that the water 
running to his house, Istana Negara, was high in turbidity (interview, non-government). The 
Minister further received guidance from the President to establish PPP with foreign investment 
in Jakarta to accelerate the provision of drinking water considering budget and capacity 
limitation of PAM Jaya (Lanti, 2006; interview, non-government). However, the existing law at 
that time, Law No.1/1967 on Foreign Investment prohibited foreign investor involvement in 
drinking water supply (ICW, 2000; Argo and Firman, 2011).
32
 To prepare the implementation of 
PPP in Indonesia, the Government of Indonesia issued Government Regulation No.20/1994 on 
Share Ownership in Companies Established for Foreign Investment. This regulation stipulated 
that the drinking water sector is among the sectors that can receive foreign direct investment with 
the involvement of local investors (ICW, 2000). 
                                                 
32
 Jakarta consists of 6 districts (North, East, Central, South, and West Jakarta and Thousand Island Regency). The 
service area for PPP does not include Thousand Islands District which is located in separated island with other 5 
cities in Jakarta.  
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 Following instructions from President Soeharto,  the Minister of Public Work issued two 
Letters of Intent (LoI) to two international investors, one to Thames Water International to 
manage water supply provision in the eastern Jakarta and  the other to Lyonnaise des Eaux for 
part of western Jakarta in the mid-1995 (Lanti, 2006) (Figure 17). The process of selecting these 
two foreign investors was without public tendering as there was no legal basis in Indonesia for 
PPP at that time (for details of contract negotiation see Harsono, 2003 and Lanti, 2006).  
During the negotiation, the Minister of Home Affairs issued Decree No.21/1996 stating 
that using an unsolicited process in water supply concession in Jakarta was permissible due to 
the non-existence of laws and regulations on PPP in Indonesia (Lanti, 2006). According to 
Government Regulation No.20/1994, every international investor had to establish a partnership 
with an Indonesian firm as a prerequisite to operate the utility network (Bakker, 2005). 
Conveniently, the chosen local firms were owned by President Soeharto‟s eldest son‟s company 
(PT Kekar Pola Airindo partner with Thames Water International) and Soeharto‟s crony, Salim 
group (PT Garuda Dipta Semesta partner with Lyonnaise des Eaux).  
Many parties already knew there was obvious conflict of interest in the effort to privatize 
water supply in Jakarta. However, since it was a directive from the President Soeharto, no one 
could object to the President‟s instruction (interview, government official and non-government). 
The sudden directive from President Soeharto was a shock for PAM Jaya considering there was 
no discussion between the government and PAM Jaya about the transfer of management and 
operation of Jakarta‟s water supply (interview, government official and non-government).  
Furthermore, PAM Jaya was also still working on the implementation of physical project of its 
large water treatment projects (PJSIP) funded by World Bank and OECF loan (interview, non-
government).  
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Figure 17. Service Area of PALYJA and AETRA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PAM Jaya, 2016 
The process to prepare the PPP agreement was tedious, with negotiations between the 
two private investors taking over a year to settle. During negotiation preparations, PAM Jaya and 
its partner (consulting firms) asked  for guidance from the former Governor of Jakarta, Ali 
Sadikin (1966-1977), who is well-known in Indonesia as the best governor of Jakarta. PAM Jaya 
asked the Governor to advise President Soeharto to cancel the plan to privatize Jakarta‟s water 
supply. According to a representative from non-government, the Governor declared that “if there 
is any part of President Soeharto’s policy that we should agree with, this part is it” (interview, 
non-government).  
The plan to privatize water supply in Jakarta was endorsed by Ali Sadikin as it would 
both improve and  accelerate water supply provision in the city, especially considering the 
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limited capacity of PAM Jaya (interview, non-government). Some representatives from PAM 
Jaya also went to Manila to learn about how the Government of Manila prepared its PPP 
contracts. One of the main differences that PAM Jaya staff found between the PPP contract in 
Manila and in the proposed contract of Jakarta was the clause of a safety net, which stated that if 
there would be a force majeure situation, if the country‟s inflation rate increased above 12% per 
year (interview, non-government). As a follow up visit to Manila, PAM Jaya and other 
government agencies held a meeting with Ministry of Finance. PAM Jaya brought up their 
Manila finding during the meeting and asked central government to add the safety clause of a 
force majeure situation  and protect PAM Jaya in the future, the proposed first party for the PPP 
in Jakarta. However, no one considered the input an important issue since inflation never reached 
double digits during President Soeharto‟s era (interview, non-government).  The negligence to 
consider a safety net clause in the agreement became a major issue of PPP implementation until 
the present time particularly considering that private companies requested to be paid in US dollar 
currency. 
 The Conflict with the Implementation of PPP in Water Supply in Jakarta 
In June 1997, two 25-years cooperative agreements were awarded for the provision of 
water services in Jakarta with PAM Jaya acting as the first party and Lyonnaise des Eaux (later 
known as PALYJA) and Thames Water International (later known as TPJ) as the second parties.  
Total investment of PALYJA and TPJ set in this contract was US$250million and 
US$225million respectively (Sukarma, 2003). Initially, an investment schedule was not part of 
the target set in the contract, as it was planned to be negotiated every 5 years. 
 There are two major uncommon mechanisms set in the PPP agreement between PAM 
Jaya and its two private partners. First, the arrangement of PAM Jaya as the first party is unusual 
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where in Indonesia it was usually the respective local government who acts as the first party for 
PPP (interview, non-government). Second, there was the use of water charge where the customer 
tariff was explicitly delinked from the private operator‟s remuneration. Private entities were paid 
based on a volumetric water charge (multiplication between the volume of water billed and the 
water charge) that was set in the PPP contract adjusted every semester regardless of the 
performance of private operators.  
The concessionaire parties chose a volumetric water charge mechanism based on the 
assumption that the local government can set water bills to the customers based on service 
performance, affordability, and efficiency of the business. Therefore, if the water charge is lower 
than  the water bills, the government could still have a profit margin (Nugroho, 2011).The water 
charge would be levied by the government to customers based on volumetric charges, fixed 
charges  and meter charges (Shofiani, 2003). The use of water charge is different with the 
common PPP model where usually the service fees are set based on the user fee (Nugroho, 
2011). A representative from non-government stated that “This mechanism (water charge 
mechanism) was chosen because the local government could freely set tariffs and change it as 
they see fit,  while  private operators did not have to be afraid of incurring losses as all  
produced water would  be bought by PAM Jaya” (interview, non-government).   
The government intention to apply volumetric water charge indicated that the 
government treats water supply as an economic resource. The mechanism of volumetric water 
charge allows the Government of Jakarta to fully guarantee the loss of the private company by 
implementing water charge per volume water sold. Adjusting the water charge should be in line 
with the realization of finance and expenditures of private operators. The more the expenses the 
private operators incur, the higher the water charges (interview, non-government).  
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 When the Asian economic crisis hit in 1998, the two local private companies decided to 
resign and sell most of their shares to the foreign partners. Inflation rose to more than 80% 
during the crisis, leaving local private companies with only 5% of shares left (Lanti, et. al., 
2008). Foreign investor convinced the central government to continue the partnership after 
separating themselves from Indonesian partners. The government and PAM Jaya decided to 
return to the agreement and renegotiate contracts due to fear of troublesome litigation and 
decreasing interest of foreign investors in Indonesia (interview, government official and non-
government).  
 The new cooperation agreement “Restated Cooperative Agreement” (RCA)” was signed 
in October 2001 where PAM Jaya and its private partners renegotiate the contract for three years  
(Lanti, 2006). During the renegotiation, private investors insisted that they cannot meet the 
original technical target due to increased US dollar exchange rates and high national inflation 
rates (interview, non-government). The new targets, therefore, were revised several times and set 
lower than the original target (see Appendix IX for Technical Target of Aetra and PALYJA). 
Private investors also insisted that the government had escalated their investment plan five times 
higher than the original contract (interview, non-government), especially considering the value 
of the Rupiah per US$ rose from Rp.2,400 to Rp.13,000 during the crisis.  In reality, the price of 
pipes and their fixtures declined due to decreased of construction sector performance during the 
economic crisis (interview, non-government). However, limited capacity of the government and 
PAM Jaya hindered the process of renegotiation of rate-rebasing (interview, non-government).  
 The signing of RCA in 2001 brought some reform for the implementation of PPP in 
Jakarta. One of the important reforms was the establishment of the Jakarta Water Supply 
Regulator Body (JWSRB). The study and the design of JWSRB were initiated by World Bank 
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assistance. The Bank adopted institutional arrangements of PPP in Australia for the design of 
JWSRB. The main responsibility of JWSRB was to propose new tariff adjustments to local 
governments. JWRB acts as mediator, facilitator, and regulator as well as maintains a balanced 
interest between the customers and the parties under the contract agreement. When the first PPP 
agreement was signed in 1997, there was no regulator body that carried out general supervision 
of the agreement implementation. Thus, there was no party that could ensure the obligation of 
each party was met nor facilitate and mediate disputes between contracting parties.  
 Since the collapse of President Soeharto‟s regime, there has been no political support for 
the PPP in Jakarta to move forward. Tedious discussions have taken place between the central 
government and Jakarta government on which party should issue the JWSRB regulations. 
JWSRB has not been able to strongly influence concessionaire parties due to insufficient 
authority. JWSRB was established based only on a Governor Decree and its operating fund 
comes from private parties and PAM Jaya (interview, non-government). Since 2001, there have 
been several times when JWSRB has been off-duty thus leaving no party to actsas a mediator for 
PAM Jaya and its private partners. “JWSRB is now temporarily in-active [in December 2015-
January 2016] since the Governor Decree to elect a new member of JWSRB for the period of 
2016-2018 has been delayed by the Jakarta government” (interview, non-government). It was 
decided that the JWSRB will be established under Governor Decree No.95/2001 (interview, non-
government).  
 The Absence of Water Tariff Adjustment, the Continual Use of Increasing Block 
Tariff, and  Lack of Investment 
There are persistent issues in the implementation of PPP in Jakarta. These problems 
existed before the PPP. First, the problem on water tariff adjustment. Because of the severe 
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economic crisis in 1998, the Governor of Jakarta was unwilling to adjust the water tariff for 
inflation.
33
 Many times the Governor of Jakarta was unwilling to increase the tariff due to 
political reason and due to the dissatisfaction with the private operators‟ performance. The 
Governors of Jakarta, Fauzi Bowo (2007-2012) and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (2014-to date) have 
opposed tariff adjustments since there was social resistance and complaints from communities 
with poor water services from private operators (interview, non-government).  
Because the absence of tariff adjustments the water charge (payment from PAM Jaya to 
private operators based on shared revenue adjusted every six months in accordance to their 
realized financial and expenditure program) is above the tariff several times. In this situation, it 
is PAM Jaya who bear the burden, as they have to pay the gap between the water charge and 
water tariff. The total gap that should be compensated to private operators from the gap between 
water tariff and water charge in 2015 is about Rp.400billion (US$30million), excluding the debt 
PAM Jaya owes to the central government (PJSIP loan) (interview, non-government).
34
 In order 
to catch up with inflation from 1998, tariffs were adjusted for the first time in April 2001 (Figure 
18). Since 2007, the Governor and Jakarta regional parliament has been reluctant to increase the 
water tariff. 
 
 
                                                 
33
 In the original contract, the water charge for Aetra was fixed at Rp.1,305 per m
3
 but in 1998 it increased to 
Rp.1,619 per m
3
, and reached Rp.3,326 per m
3
 in 2003 (Shofiani, 2003). 
34
 The shortfall PAM JAYA for AETRA is Rp.31.02billion (after rate rebasing has been revised in master agreement 
in 2012 and water charge is capped about 1-1.5% per year. This is not inflated by annual inflation rates and is not 
adjusted every 6 months). Without a master agreement rate rebasing amounted to about Rp.330billion. The shortfall 
PAM Jaya for PALYJA is Rp.403.58billion (PAM Jaya, 2016). Furthermore, the total debt of PAM Jaya to World 
Bank (for PJSIP loan) is about Rp.800billion (PAM Jaya, 2016), however ICW stated the amount of PAM Jaya debt 
is Rp.4trillion (ICW, 2000). This should also be paid by PAM Jaya to Ministry of Finance. However this debt will 
be fully paid in 2016 (PAM Jaya, 2016). 
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Figure 18. Water Tariff Adjustment in Jakarta, 1994-2007 (for water consumption >20m3 
per month) 
 
Customers are classified based on their housing condition (for household customers) or type of 
services and the magnitude of the service they provide (for non-household customers). 
Before privatization (1994): Group I: public hydrant, public toilet, water terminal, social 
institutions, very poor HHs, private and public school, orphanages, public hospital, and religious 
facility; Group II: low and middle income HHs, embassies, consulates, government offices, 
foreign representatives; Group IIIA: non-commercial bodies, kiosk, small-scale business, and 
small domestic business, Group IIIB: importer and exporter; agent, broker, commissioner, 
supermarket, private hospital, gas station, public and private swimming pool, small trading 
distributor, night club, bar, tailors, hotel, restaurant, workshop, and private commercial bodies; 
Group IVA: small scale industries; Group IVB: big scale industries; and Group V: special 
Tanjung Priok Harbour. 
After privatization (1998-2007): Group I: social institutions, orphanages, religious facility, and 
public hydrant; Group II: public hospitals, very poor HHs, water storage tanks and tanks; Group 
IIIA: low income HHs and simple flat; Group IIIB: middle income HHs and flats, non-
commercial bodies, kiosk, small workshops, small-scale business, and small domestic business; 
Group IVA: upper-middle income HHs, embassies, consulates, government offices, foreign 
representatives, private commercial bodies, schools, training centers, military facilities, medium 
class workshops, barbershops, tailors, small restaurants, private hospitals and laboratories, 
clinics, law offices, small hotels, small industries and superb apartments; Group IVB: stars 
hotels, beauty salons, night clubs, banks, large scale, workshops, large tradings, sky scrapers 
buildings, factories, amusement parks, fantasy lands; and Group V: special Tanjung Priok 
Harbour. 
Source: Martijn, 2005; Local Government Regulation No.11/1993; and PAM Jaya, 2016 
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Furthermore, the use of increasing block tariff (IBT) for tariff setting has created an 
imbalance in revenue for all parties. A cross subsidy mechanism is applied where tariffs for the 
first and second group of customers is much lower than the tariff for non-households.35 
However, water tariffs for some non-household customers such as small scale businesses, 
hospitals, and offices are also lower than the real operating cost to produce piped-water. The real 
operating cost is estimated at Rp.12,000 per m3 (US$0.9 per m3) in 2015 (interview, non-
government).  
A very low tariff of the first and second group of customers has created problems for 
revenue generation (interview, non-government). Figure 19 illustrates the proportion of customer 
connections in each tariff band in 2015 where the majority of Aetra‟s customers are in group 
IIIA (low income households) and the majority of PALYJA‟s customers are in group IVA 
(affluent households and businesses). Figure 20 illustrates the trend on the type of costumer 
connections from 2000 to 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Group I pays about 7.7% of the real operating cost of water per m
3
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Figure 19. Customer Connections and Tariff Band 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group I: social institutions, orphanages, religious facility, and public hydrant; Group II: public hospitals, very poor 
HHs, water storage tanks and tanks; Group IIIA: low income HHs and simple flat; Group IIIB: middle income HHs 
and flats, non-commercial bodies, kiosk, small workshops, small-scale business, and small domestic business; 
Group IVA: upper-middle income HHs, embassies, consulates, government offices, foreign representatives, private 
commercial bodies, schools, training centers, military facilities, medium class workshops, barbershops, tailors, small 
restaurants, private hospitals and laboratories, clinics, law offices, small hotels, small industries and superb 
apartments; Group IVB: stars hotels, beauty salons, night clubs, banks, large scale, workshops, large tradings, sky 
scrapers buildings, factories, amusement parks, fantasy lands; and Group V: special Tanjung Priok Harbour. 
 
Source: PAM Jaya, 2016 
 
Figure 20. Trend on the Proportion of PAM Jaya Customers (2000-2014) 
 
Source: BPS Jakarta, 2000-2015 
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PPP in Jakarta has been not supportive of poor communities as seen in Figure 19 where 
the majority of customers are non-poor households. Furthermore, there is also a decreasing trend 
of the proportion of households as the customers of PALYJA and Aetra (Figure 20). One of the 
possible reasons for the decrease of household customers is the continuation of the use of IBT 
mechanism and the absence of tariff adjustments since 2007. One non-government representative 
stated that the current tariff mechanism imposes a very low tariff for households and some of 
non-household customers. This makes private water operators see this group of customers as less 
appealing to connect to the piped-water network.  
The applications of IBT and cross-subsidy tariff s are applied based on the Minister of 
Home Affairs Decree No.23/2006 on Guidelines for PDAM tariff setting (Table 10). The 
regulation of water tariff s has become one of the most important issues in water supply 
development in Indonesia. A donot and representative from the national government stated that: 
“The regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs on Water Tariffs for Each PDAM Customer 
Group is a major issue for us [Ministry of Public Works and PDAMs] to increase the 
performance of PDAMs” (interview, government official and non-government). “We have raised 
this issue to the Ministry of Home Affairs to revise the regulation, but there has been  no 
response” (interview, government official). 
Table 10. The Water Tariff for Each PDAM Consumer Group 
 
Consumer Classification Minimum Daily Basic Need 
Consumption  
>10 m
3
/month 
Group 1 Subsidized tariff Break-even tariff 
Group 2 Break-even tariff Full-cost tariff 
Group 3 Full-cost tariff Full-cost tariff 
Special group Based on agreement Based on agreement 
* Subsidized tariff: tariff is set lower than the cost to produce clean water; Break-even tariff: a 
tariff at which water operators will earn zero profits on water sale (tariff=cost); Full-cost tariff: 
tariff is set higher than the cost to produce clean water. 
Source: Minister of Home Affairs Decree No.23, 2006 
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The issue of water tariff mechanisms as specified in Minister of Home Affairs Decree 
No.23/2006 prevents PALYJA and Aetra from prioritizing low income households as every 
connection for the poor causes a loss in revenue (interview, non-government). As a result, the 
proportion of households compared to non-household customers decreased from 88.9% in 2000 
to 66.5% in 2015 (BPS, 2015) (Figure 20). From 2003 to 2015, the percentage of subsidized 
customer groups (group I, II and III) had been decreasing from 58.2% to 54.1% while the 
proportion of non-subsidized customers groups (group IV) had been increasing from 37.5% to 
44.93% (Bakker et. al.,2006).  
There was also an increase in the number of zero customers (the customers who do not 
use piped-water although they have piped-water connection) from 2006 to 2012 from 14.28% 
(110,000 customers) to 16.25% (129,000 customers) respectively (Lanti et. al., 2008). 
Furthermore, public hydrant brought by the government during the Old and New Order Era to 
provide water to poor households had been decreasing from 1,902 hydrants in 2000 to 1,294 
hydrants in 2015 (BPS Jakarta, 2000, 2015; PAM Jaya, 2016) (Figure 21). A representative from 
non-government mentioned that perhaps the decreasing number of public hydrant in Jakarta is 
due to private parties particularly Aetra, as it has been developing a distribution pipeline to all its 
service areas. This could explain why public hydrants which were introduced by the government 
as an interim solution are now gradually decreasing (interview, non-government).  
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Figure 21. The Number of Public Hydrants (1982-2015) 
 
*The number of public hydrants has fluctuated due to the different sources of data and the high incidents of non-
operating public hydrants 
Source: BPS, 2000-2015, Martijn, 2005, PAM Jaya, 2016 
 
 Public hydrants are seen as a service that constituted financial losses for private operators 
since its tariff is the cheapest (group I) (interview, non-government). Governor Decree 
No.10/2016 on the  Revision of Governor Decree No.11/2007 on Automatic Tariff Adjustment 
(PTO) Semester I has  instructed to limit the use of water consumption of group I and II (public 
hydrants and very poor households) to a maximum of 10 m
3
 per month.
36
  
 Revenue constraint from lack of tariff adjustment and the use of IBT have pushed private 
operators, particularly PALYJA to shut down a few mini water treatment plants. Its high 
operation and maintenance costs could no longer be recovered from revenue (interview, non-
government). Another obstacle to the expansion of the water supply network in Jakarta is the 
lack of raw water supplies. Urban sprawl and poor sanitation in Jakarta and its neighboring cities 
(Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi; see Figure 5) have become major constraints to finding 
                                                 
36
 Water consumption above 10 m
3
 per month for each public hydrant or very poor household should be further 
justified with the proof of citizen identity card and assessment from water operators. 
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additional raw water resources. In 2000, there were 14 water treatment plants in operation. 
However, by 2015 the number of plants had decreased to 11 (BPS, 2015). Poor raw water quality 
coming from the rivers in Jakarta has escalated the cost of clean water production particularly for 
mini water treatment plants which use raw water from canals and/or river in Jakarta. Average 
production cost both for PALYJA and Aetra have increased from Rp.8,000 per m
3
 (US$0.8 per 
m
3
) in 2005 (Bakker, 2005) to around Rp.12,000 per m
3
 (US$0.9 per m
3
) in 2015 (interview, 
non-government). Until to date,  private operators only managed to produce about 18.000 l/s 
(including 3,000 l/s treated water bought from PDAM Tangerang), even with all water treatment 
plants built before PPP (APPENDIX III). 
 Lack of investment is also a persistent problem for water supply development in Jakarta 
along with the issues of no tariff adjustments and use of IBT mechanism (Figure 22). Since the 
implementation of PPP, investments of PALYJA and TPJ on average are around US$2.5 per 
capita per year (1998-2015) while in public era (1986-1997), investments for water supply 
development in Jakarta were around US$6 per capita per year on average.  
 The initiative to improve drinking water access to poor urban households had been 
brought by World Bank in their pilot project Global Partnership for Output Based Aid (GPOBA) 
in 2005 in Jakarta and Surabaya. GPOBA was implemented through the provision of grants to 
local governments (and in the case of Jakarta private operators) to reimburse partial cost of new 
piped water connection for poorer households. PALYJA and Aetra approached World Bank for 
support in piloting OBA approach including informal or slum communities in Jakarta. However, 
the program was only implemented by PALYJA since the Aetra proposed area failed to meet 
program requirements (Zakaria, 2009). From initial target of 11,630 connections as set out in the 
2005 contract between World Bank and PALYJA, the achieved target in 2009 was only 6,500 
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HCs (Zakaria, 2009). From 2009 until 2015, the connections of GPOBA only slightly increased 
from 1,384 HCs to 2,845 HCs (Zakaria, 2009; PAM Jaya, 2016).   
Figure 22. Water Supply Investment in Jakarta (1986-2014) 
 
Source: author, with information drawn from multiple sources 
  
Based on the experience and lessons learned of GPOBA in 2009, the Government of 
Indonesia (Department of Public Works together with Bappenas) embarked on a new type of 
national water policy for poor urban households known as Water Hibah Program. 
37
 Despite this, 
PAM Jaya and its private operators have never shown interest into participating in this program, 
                                                 
37
 Water Hibah is regulated under Minister of Finance Decree No.168/2008 and No.129/2008. The GPOBA 
approach was further adopted by Ausaid as one of the component in their infrastructure grant “Indonesia 
Infrastructure Initiative (IndII)” known as Water Hibah Program. The amount of grants provided to each local 
government who interested in the program was amounted as Rp.20-25billion (US$2-2.5million) during the period of 
2010-2014 (World Bank, Ministry of Public Works, and Water Partnership Program, 2012). 
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as the recipient of the program will be low income households with low tariffs, which indicate a 
loss of revenue for private operators for every household connection made (interview, 
government official). “Since 2015, we [Ministry of Public Works] have received a substantial 
amount of funding from Ministry of Finance in the amount of Rp.800billion (US$59billion) to 
fund Water Hibah but we do not see any interest from Jakarta to participate in this program” 
(interview, government official). Despite this, private operators are now continuing the OBA 
approach as they see it as a win-win solution to eradicate illegal water connections and fight the 
water mafia (interview, non-government). The water mafia consists of existing informal water 
suppliers, including public hydrant “owners” and informal local leader who gain highly 
profitable revenues from selling water from public hydrant to its neighbors (Menzies and 
Setiono, 2010). The water mafia has been one of the major constraints for expanding private 
water networks particularly in North Jakarta where the business of vended water existed for a 
very long time now (interview, non-government). 
There are conflicting views between government, PAM Jaya, and private operators 
regarding the absence of tariff adjustments and the lack of investments. These viewpoints are 
stated by representatives from government and non-government, including: 
 “Rather than increasing water tariffs to increase revenue, PAM Jaya and its private partners 
could reclassify the tariff band of the customers. I think there will be no issues particularly 
for the poor to be categorized as group III [rather than group I or II] since they already pay 
much higher for their drinking water [buying from water vendors or the water mafia]” 
(interview, government official).  
 “The absentce of central and local government investment in water supply provisions in 
Jakarta has sent the wrong signal to private investors. It is signaling that the government 
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does not pay attention to water supply provision in Jakarta. If this is the case, why should 
investors invest their money in these efforts if the government does not” (interview, non-
government). 
 “We have asked them [PAM Jaya] to invite us [Ministry of Public Works] when they [PAM 
Jaya] have meetings with private operators to establish performance targets or to 
renegotiate contract agreements. We can help them in improving the performance of PPP. 
However, to date, we have never received any invitations from PAM Jaya. How can we help 
them when no one is asking for our advice?  In this decentralized era, we [the central 
government] cannot directly involve ourselves in local government business especially if 
there are already private parties involved in water supply provision” (interview, government 
official). 
 “During negotiations, the government and private entities had a certain feeling that the 
existing water treatment plants could serve all of  Jakarta’s population” (interview, non-
government).  
 “In the beginning of the concessionaire, it seems that the private operators achieved their 
target. However, in reality, they just invested their money in the distribution pipeline, while 
we [PAM Jaya] invested the money [PJISP and OECF loans for the  new water treatment 
plants to be ready in the late 1990s]” (interview, non-government). 
 “The government [particularly the local parliament of Jakarta and the Governor of Jakarta] 
still does not have a clear understanding about what PPP is and how to implement it. They 
do not understand the concept of dividend s, which is the basis for private entities to run their 
business” (interview, non-government).  
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The absence of tariff adjustments, the continual use of IBT, and lack of investment has 
created poor outcome for water supply provision in Jakarta. These problems are aggravated with 
the issue of transparency where private parties are not transparent about the real condition of 
piped-water supply in Jakarta as well as the progress that has been achieved in improving this 
water suppl. As stated by one representative from a non-government stakeholder:. “We 
[KMMSAJ] have already filed a law suit regarding public information disclosure to Central 
Jakarta District Court. Even  though  we won the case, the data [about the progress of piped-
water provision] that we got is still limited and came from the Government of Jakarta not 
directly from private operators” (interview, non-government).  
In 2012, Kruha (People‟s Coalition for the Right to Water) made a coalition under the 
KMMSAJ (People Coalition against Jakarta Water Privatization) which comprised city residents, 
NGOs, trade unions, water justice activist, and community organization to initiate a petition 
against private water management in Jakarta. They took strategies including legal actions 
“citizen law suits” filling corruption cases between PAM Jaya and its private partners. The 
lawsuit was filed for the violation of human right to water as stipulated in 1945 Constitution of 
the Republic Indonesia, article 33: “The land, the waters and the natural resources within shall 
be under the powers of the State and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people”. The 
KMMSAJ filed a lawsuit in order to correct the government policy on PPP and water supply in 
Jakarta. 
 On March 24
th
, 2015, the Central Jakarta District Court issued a decision which declared 
the cooperation agreements to bear null and void. The decision was issued based on a lawsuit 
brought forward by 12 individuals under KMMSAJ against the President of the Republic of 
Indonesia, the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Minister of Public Works, the 
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Minister of Finance, the Governor of Jakarta, the Jakarta House of Representatives and PAM 
Jaya as defendants and PALYJA and Aetra, as the co-defendants (Soesabdo, 2015).  The court 
noted that the private operators were "negligent in fulfilling the human right to water for 
Jakarta‟s residents, while PAM Jaya, the city-owned partner in the water agreement, had lost 
Rp1.17trillion (about US$90 million) since PPP began in 1998, because the structure of the 
agreement favored the private firms” (Johnson, 2015). 
 One of the main factors that court judges considered to arrive at their decision is that 
PAM Jaya should have signed the agreements based decisions made by its own management, 
rather than be influenced by and follow instructions from  President Soeharto (interview, non-
government). Furthermore, the court also held that the concession agreement is conflicted with 
the prevailing Regional Provincial Regulation No.13/1992 on  the Jakarta Water Supply 
Enterprise (PAM Jaya). According to the regulation, the main responsibility of PAM Jaya is to 
improve public welfare, increase regional income, and to develop the provision and distribution 
of water in Jakarta (article 5) and PAM Jaya has to receive approval from the Governor if they 
want to establish PPP in water supply provision in Jakarta (article 15). This regulation still 
remains as law even though the PPP has been ongoing since 1998.  The role of PAM Jaya as 
stated in this regulation is in line with the concept that water is a social good as stipulated in the 
1945 Constitution of the Republic Indonesia.  
 The decision that water provision in Jakarta should not be privatized has sent shockwaves 
through many Indonesian infrastructure sectors, especially since the central government desires 
promote  private investment in infrastructure developments across the country (interview, 
government official). The government has not made any preparations to buy back the 
concessions, which remain in place pending a final court decision (interview, non-government). 
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Central government agencies and private operators have appealed to Jakarta‟s High Court. A 
further court stage process continues, while the Governor, Jakarta‟s representative and PAM Jaya 
accept the decision. They accept the decision due to the fear of termination fee as stipulated in 
the contract agreement where the first party (PAM Jaya) is obliged to pay the basic price of 
termination (see Hadipuro and Ardhianie, no date).  The central government appealed to the 
High Court since the decision may disturb the creation of a stable climate for water supply 
investment in Indonesia particularly remembering that Suez [the major shareholders in PALYJA] 
is one of the biggest water investors in the world (interview, government official and non-
government). “Actually, we [the Ministry of Public Works] agree with the court decision to end 
the contract. However, in the inter-ministerial meeting, it seems other central government 
agencies do not have the same agreement with us, thus, we cannot proceed with our decision” 
(interview, government official). Private operators have argued that the plaintiffs are actually not 
part of the agreement, as  the legal complaint is made by non-contracting parties (KMMSAJ), 
and therefore the contract cannot be nullified (interview, non-government). To date, the current 
decision is still not executed. The finality and binding effect of the decision has not yet occurred.  
 
5.3 Niche Level 
5.3.1 Enabling Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Niche Level 
The author did not find any important factors at niche level that contributed to the 
development of water and sanitation during the Reform Era. 
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5.3.2 Constraining Factors for Water and Sanitation Development at Niche Level 
 Lack of Capacity of Water and Sanitary Engineers  
There are several underlying reasons behind the lack capacity of water and sanitary 
engineers in Indonesia. First, the ill-suited water and sanitation material taught in universities, 
which mainly focus on engineering design of centralized systems and on industrial occupational 
and safety systems. There are a few engineers in Indonesia who understand and are able to 
design water and sanitation facilities that suits local conditions and needs such as for coastal 
communities and remote islands (interview, non-government). 
Second, during New Order Era, university roles were limited to serving the government. 
This compelled researchers to act more like technocrats than scientists. Although there was 
educational reform during the Reform Era, Indonesian academics mainly focused on doing 
commercial research projects that generated income for their institution with no requirement to 
publicly disclose how the university manages its funds (Rakhmani, 2016).  
Third, there was a mismatch between supply and demand for academic research. 
Academic performance goals in Indonesia were to publish as many as papers in international 
journals as possible, while on the other hand, the demand from public policy makers was for 
research addressing local policy needs (Soepriyanto, 2016).  
Fourth, there is currently limited room for engineers to be innovative while implementing 
R & D toadapt to local conditions. There are many permits that must be obtained by engineers 
and academia before and after conducting R & D (interview, non-government and government). 
Furthermore, R & D  is regulated under different institution R & D is the responsibility of 
Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education while water and sanitation is mainly 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works.  
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One government official stated: “Our partners is technical ministry [Ministry of Public 
Works], thus it is difficult to establish a connection between R & D with technical government 
activity” (interview, government official). In addition, a senior sanitary engineer in Indonesia 
stated that he has created a prototype of a compact fecal sludge treatment plant which can reduce 
the land requirements from 5,000m
2
 to 200m
2
. However, it is difficult to further implement this 
project by the Ministry of Public Works as the Indonesian procurement system is complex. 
Finally, the same Engineer also noted that his previous inventions such as a vacuum motorcycle 
to empty and transport fecal sludge and a mobile sewer system with a capacity of 10m
3  
have low 
uptake from governments and donors. “I have been marketing my innovation to government 
institution and donors but it seems they prefer to use technology from overseas” (interview, non-
government). 
 Public Health as a Less Appealing Sector 
Although the Government of Indonesia had increased its attention on water and sanitation 
issues,  public health concerns in Indonesia still receive limited attention from society. Urban 
health problem are still mainly solved through the provision of medicine and treatment (Jakarta 
Post, 2000). There is lack of joint effort between the government, medical sector, and 
universities to solve urban water and sanitation problems.  
There are a few medical doctors who pursued further graduate studies in the public health 
sector because public health still is considered less appealing job sector. Furthermore, most of 
the doctors in Indonesia prefer to work in private hospitals rather than in public hospitals and 
Puskesmas (community clinics). Even the doctors in Puskesmas have been reluctant to involve 
themselves in community-based activities and health education activities since they consider 
these activities unprofitable (Surjadi, 2012).  
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5.4. Summary of Water and Sanitation Development during 1998-2015 
During Reform Era, piped-water connection increased from approximately 560,000 in 
2000 to 820,000 in 2015 while for sewer networks only improved slightly from 954 to 1,852. In 
2015, only around 40% of Jakarta‟s population was connected to piped-water, while less than 2% 
was connected to sewer.  
There are many constraining factors at regime and niche level that hamper the expansion 
of piped-water and sewer connections in Jakarta: (i) lack of national and local government 
attention to water and sanitation provision in Jakarta; (ii) lack of public awareness on water and 
sanitation issue; (iii) corruption in the preparation of water supply PPP in Jakarta; (iv) the 
conflict with the implementation of PPP in water supply in Jakarta; (v) the absence of water tariff 
adjustments, the continuation use of IBT, and lack of investment; (vi) lack of capacity of water 
and sanitary engineers; and (vii) public health as a less appealing job sector. Table 11 
summarizes water supply and sanitation policies adopted during 1998-2015 and its output 
indicators. 
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Table 11. Summary of Water and Sanitation Development during 1998-2015 
Landscape Level Regime Level Niche Level 
Water Supply 
Coverage in 
2015 
Sanitation 
Coverage in 
2015 
Political: the rise of 
democracy 
Economic: economic 
growth has been 
maintained between 5-
6% annually 
Social and health: 
Health status has slowly 
improved since the late-
1990s 
International policy on 
water and sanitation 
development: - 
Enabling 
factors for 
water and 
sanitation 
development 
Constraining factors for 
water and sanitation 
development 
Enabling 
factors 
for water 
and 
sanitation 
developm
ent 
Constraining 
factors for 
water and 
sanitation 
development 
Piped-water:  
By 2015, only 
48% of 
household had 
piped water 
connection.  
Water tariff: 
average tariff 
in 2015 is 
Rp.8,395  per 
m
3
 (US$0.63 
per m
3
) for 
PALYJA and 
Rp.7,441 per 
m
3
 (US$0.56 
per m
3
) for 
Aetra 
Off-site 
coverage: 
Increase from 
0.05% in 
1998 to 2% 
in 2015 
On-site 
coverage: 
Increase from 
57% in 1998 
to 88% in 
2015 
 
The substitution 
of Law 
No.11/1974 with 
Law No.4/2004 
 
Lack of national and local 
government attention to 
water and sanitation 
provision in Jakarta 
Lack of public awareness 
on water and sanitation 
issue 
Corruption in the 
preparation of water 
supply PPP in Jakarta 
Conflict with the 
implementation of PPP in 
water supply in Jakarta 
The absence of water 
tariff adjustment, 
continuation of IBT, and 
lack of investment 
- Lack of capacity 
of water and 
sanitary 
engineers  
Public health as a 
less appealing 
sector 
 
 
1
0
2
 
1
0
2
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CHAPTER 6 : ANALYSIS 
 
Why has the piped-water and sewer systems in Jakarta only slowly improved since 
Indonesian independence in 1945? How have system dynamics been shaped between the periods 
of 1945-2015? To answer these questions, we applied key characteristics of the MLP framework 
in the case study of piped-water and sanitation in Jakarta to analyze interactions and linkages 
between the piped-water and sewer system and political, economic, social and health conditions, 
regulations, and outside pressure aspects over a long time scale (1945-2015). 
Clearly, from our findings in the case study there were both major and minor policy 
changes that enabled and constrained water supply and sewer development in Jakarta (Table 4, 
Table 8, and Table 11). However, these policy changes did  not substantially improve the 
expansion of piped-water and sewer networks in Jakarta as piped-water supply coverage only 
increasing from 10% in 1975 to 48% in 2015 and sewer coverage remaining largely stagnant at 
less than 2%  during the same time frame (Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13). Households, 
particularly  poor ones,  still use about 5-14% of their income to buy water (Table 9). Roughly, 
13% of Jakarta‟s population still practice open defecation. 
 
6.1 The Interplay between Three Multiple Levels (Landscape, Regime, and Niche) 
The MLP emphasizes both external landscape pressures and internal niche dynamics that are 
important for wider breakthroughs and diffusion of socio-technological systems. The case studies 
make it possible to identify the dynamic interplay between landscape, regime, and niche levels in 
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the piped-water and sewer system in Jakarta. Based on dynamics noted among the case study, we 
found that a key point of MLP, interplay or interaction between multiple levels (landscape, 
regime, and niche) during different development phases was not happening in Jakarta. This lack 
of interplay and interaction may explain why progress in expanding the piped-water and sewer 
network in Jakarta has been so slow. Further explanations for the slow progress of piped-water 
and sewer in Jakarta go as follows: 
 Lack of landscape pressure 
The change in political and economic system in Indonesia had not been accompanied by 
substantial changes of public perception on the importance of having adequate water and 
sanitation services (Figure 11). Demand from communities for water and sanitation remains low 
(Figure 16). One of the underlying reasons for the low demand is the availability of substitute 
services such as bottled and/or refilled water, ground water and septic tanks which are not 
adequately regulated or strictly enforced. Although the government has created regulations to 
control the use of ground water and manage bottled and/or refilled water, the government cannot 
directly stop the utilization of these water sources; 
 “The permit to use ground water and to utilize spring water [as a raw water supply for 
bottled and refilled water company] is managed under different Ministries. The one who gives 
the permit to use ground water and spring water is the local government. We cannot control 
them, since we’ve realize that we still cannot deliver a good quality piped-water supply. It 
[ground water, bottled, and refilled water] is also one of the main sources of local taxes, thus it 
will be hard to regulate since the local government is still in need of  local revenue” (interview, 
government official). 
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 The availability of substitutes affects the demand for goods and services (Pindyck, 2009). 
There is increasing use of bottled water as the main drinking water sources for households in 
Jakarta (Figure 12). Furthermore, households in Jakarta are still relying on septic tanks for 
sewage disposal (Figure 13). Another explanation of low pressure from the landscape level is 
due to improvement in social, health, and economic condition in Indonesia which have been 
achieved without substantial improvements in water and sanitation. This finding shows that there 
is a difference between water and sanitation regime transformations in Jakarta verses developed 
countries. The transformation of non-piped to piped systems in developed countries was 
supported by public protests through media and social unions. In rich countries, the effort to 
manage water and the desire to improve living conditions grew as the level of economic 
development increased (Briscoe, 2014). Furthermore, in developed countries there are clear 
linkages in activis between water, sanitation, hygiene, public health, and social issues (Geels, 
2005, 2006; Gosho, 2014; Hamlin, 1992, 1998; Melosi, 2000, 2011; Tarr et al., 1984). In 
contrast, outsider actors, communities, and the media in Jakarta have not paid much attention to 
water and sanitation issues in the city and to the issue linkages connecting water and sanitation 
with economic and social issues. 
 Stable-sets of rules (regulation, normative, and cognitive) of regime insider actors 
A set of conditions based on Geels (2006) that allows for  regime transformation are (i) 
the change of cognitive belief, behavioural norms, and formal regulation of insider actors and (ii) 
increased pressure from outsiders. With regard to the first characteristic, we found that there are 
no important regulative, normative, and cognitive changes in piped-water and sewer regime in 
Jakarta.  
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a. Regulation aspect: The functioning law for water supply and wastewater operators has 
remained the same since 1962 (Law No.5/1962).  In the wastewater sector, since 1945 until 
today there has been no law to regulate the sanitation sector in Indonesia. This shows that 
sanitation is viewed as non-priority sector in this country. While, there is a substitution of 
law to regulate the water sector from Law No.11/1974 to Law No.4/2004, the latter was 
revoked and replaced by Law No.11/1974 in 2015. This shows that the public still demand 
water to be treated as s social good and must be managed under full responsibility of the 
government. The inadequate regulations to implement PPP are also a contributing factor to 
the failure of PPP in Jakarta. This finding suggests that decision on PPP infrastructure 
projects are typically long term investment. Therefore, policy makers need to think and act 
carefully including in regulatory and institutional settings as many decisions will survive 
across different regime.  
b. Cognitive aspect:  The view of water as a social good is strengthened by the citizen law 
suit filed in 2012 where KMMSAJ (The Coalition of Jakarta Residents Opposing Water 
Privatization) opposed the continuation of PPP in Jakarta. They demanded that water 
resources be controlled and allocated for public benefit and that private companies cannot 
monopolize rights over water sources. Therefore, piped-water supplies in Jakarta should be 
managed by PAM Jaya, under government control. However, the government has not sent a 
strong and unequivocal message and action in this water conflict is still pending.  
Although the public demands that water to be treated as social good, in reality, water and 
wastewater are treated as economic goods PAM Jaya and PDPAL Jaya should contribute to 
local government revenue (as mandated in Law No.5/1962) even though  they are lacking 
investments to expand their services. Cross-subsidy tariff sand cost recovery have been the 
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leading rational for piped-water and wastewater tariff determination. There are several 
changes in Ministry of Home Affairs Decree for the establishment of water tariff, but the 
principle is still the same, cross-subsidy and operation and maintenance cost recovery with 
the implementation of IBT.  
The continuation of the tariff structure has persistently created disputes between PAM Jaya 
and its private operators. Disputes regarding rate-rebasing between PAM Jaya and its 
private partners have occurred since the beginning of the concession and have disrupted 
PPP implementation. The absence of any water tariff adjustments since 2007 has aggravated 
the situation of increasing investments in network expansions. Additionally, the 
development of piped-water and sewer in Jakarta has never favoured the poor they have 
always been left behind or served with low cost technology options. Rather, first priority 
has always been to provide piped-water and sewer services to affluent households and 
commercial customers.  
“One thing that the government should have ensured is integrated services for both rich and 
poor, ….. the government should not have provided fragmented services. If we provide, 
service by clusters, [differential service by the level of income, individual piped-water for 
affluent households and public taps and/or non-piped system for non-affluent households] 
one day the system will collapse [drinking water and sanitation]. I think it is the task of 
government, to bear the overhead cost [for providing service to the poor]. Financial return 
should not always be the criteria of the government to provide basic services to its people.” 
(interview, government official). 
This finding is consistent with previous studies that show piped-water supply in Jakarta is 
implemented in a fragmented approach (Bakker et. al, 2008) and is implemented with lack 
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of incentives for the poor (WSP, 2015). The driving force for the development of piped-
water and sewer network in Jakarta has not been for achieving public health goals. 
Economic and financial motives continued to be a rationale for the provision of piped-water 
and sewer both under public and private management. 
c. Normative aspect: There are reforms in political and economic system in Indonesia as 
well as reform in the role of government, particularly the role of central government. 
However, these reforms do not transform government practices in providing water and 
sanitation. Each government remained slow to reconfigure their mandates and  allocate 
tasks among their institutions to execute much-needed water and sanitation reform. For 
instance, piped-water regimes have failed to integrate piped and non-piped. water service. 
There are numerous government agencies that deal with water and sanitation provision, 
for piped-water, groundwater, bottled and refilled water, sanitation, and sewer systems. 
This condition has been happening since New Order Era (APPENDIX II). For instance, 
ground water is managed under the responsibility of Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources and bottled and refilled water under the Ministry of Industry (APPENDIX II).  
There is no integrated and robust planning prepared by the government with many policy 
changes occurring during the  New Order Era simply “window dressing” for donors. 
Many major and minor policy initiatives were implemented based on donor suggestion. 
As an example, the diffusion of septic tanks or pit latrines in the implementation of KIP 
projects during 1970s-1980s was based on the recommendation of donors. Furthermore, 
there is ageneral lack of investment for non-technical aspects of water and sanitation. 
Rather, investment focus during the Old and New Order Eras was to build water 
production treatment plants with limited investment in expanding distribution pipelines or 
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decreasing NRW (APPENDIX V and APPENDIX X). The policy was implemented with 
rely on foreign aid money. The dominant actor responsible for  the project was also the 
central government (Ministry of Public Works), not the Government of Jakarta or PAM 
Jaya. 
More severe conditions have happened during the Reform Era with a lack of private 
operator‟ investments (Figure 22). Regarding this condition, one of the private water 
operators in Jakarta stated that their distribution network has covered the entire 
concessionaire area, but that it still needs a tremendous effort to increase household 
connections, increase household demand, and decrease NRW (interview, non-
government). 
The sewer network in Jakarta has long been stagnant (Figure 12). Sanitation in Indonesia 
has been long regarded as a private business with central and local governments investing 
very small amount of their budgets for sanitation provision. The only “sizeable” 
investment was made in the mid of 1980s when the Government of Indonesia 
implemented a pilot project on sewerage development for several big cities in Indonesia 
including Jakarta (APPENDIX III). 
Government failure might be one of the explanations for the poor drinking water and 
sewer condition in Jakarta. However, findings from the case study also suggest there are 
market and donor failures which contribute to the slow progress of piped-water and sewer 
in Jakarta. Private operators have not met their performance indicators (APPENDIX IX) 
and there is on-going conflict between PAM Jaya and its private operators. There is 
asymmetric information between private operators, PAM Jaya and public as a whole. 
Donors have tended to focus on capital works rather than on governance issues such as 
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better planning of non-technical aspects of infrastructure (tariff mechanisms, community 
education, etc). These findings are in agreement with the other studies on the failure of 
PPP in Jakarta (Bakker et. al., 2008; Braadbaart, 2007; Jensen, 2005, Nugroho, 2011) and 
on the failure of  the World Bank in providing urban water supply in less-developed 
countries (Bakker, 2012).  
As documented in this case study, there are several explanations as to why the progress of 
piped-water and sewer in Jakarta has been so slow. These explanations include, that 
regulations have not been fundamentally changed, the role of government remains the 
same, communities show low demand for better water and sanitation, the public still 
perceives water as a social good, the public still expects the government to be dominant 
actor in controlling water, and the government does not alter their activities 
fundamentally from regime to regime. 
 Lack of innovation in niche 
There are four important reasons why little innovation emerges from niche actors. Firstly, 
there has been a backlog of sanitary engineers in Indonesia as well as a lack of comprehensive 
water and sanitary engineering training that is suited to local conditions. Since the Old Order 
Era, there has been low interest from society to learn more about water and sanitary engineering. 
This condition is aggravated by other factors, such as the reality that water and sanitation 
education at universities is based on a developed country approach. The water and sanitary 
engineering curriculum that is introduced at universities based on Dutch engineering and 
technical knowledge. While at times, it represented urban modernization, it also introduced  the 
disintegration of services for affluent and poor households. In Jakarta and Indonesia, there has 
been a massive use of decentralized systems such as ground water and septic tanks.  
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The utilization of non-piped systems and low-cost technology have become major 
policies for water and sanitation development in Indonesia since the colonial era. However, 
Indonesian universities have paid limited attention to bringing the real condition of Indonesian 
cities to the classroom (interview, non-government). Furthermore, many water and sanitary 
engineers work in government agencies which primarily deal with administrative issues thus 
creating limited knowledge on practical solutions that suit local condition. 
The lack of public health practitioners is another reason why little innovation emerges 
from niche actors. Medical doctors view public health as a less appealing job sector while most 
water and sanitary engineers feel that the public health aspect of this sector is not of their 
concern. Unlike the development path of water and sanitation in developed countries, there has 
been no influential public health experts that accentuate the issue linkage between water, 
sanitation, hygiene, and public health. Technical water and sanitary engineering knowledge 
counts more in policy making in Jakarta than public health viewpoints. 
Thirdly, there is little incentive in Indonesia for engineers and scientists to innovate and 
create pilot projects. From institutional setting to nationwide regulations, there is no clear linkage 
between technical ministries and R & D which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Research, 
Technology, and Higher Education.  
Finally, lack of interaction between inside and outside actors is another reason behind 
low innovation. The role of external regime actors (outsiders) and its interaction with regime 
actors (insiders) is critical to create changes (Geels and Kemp, 2007). Interactions between 
inside and outside actors through conflicts, contestations, and power struggles are some of the 
mechanisms that can create substantial changes in identity, role perceptions, and investment 
patterns of regime insiders (Geels, 2006). Despite this, there is poor coalition between inside and 
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outside actors in Jakarta, particularly between government and societal groups such as NGOs, 
community organization, and water activists. Only recently during the Reform Era (1998-2015) 
have outsiders started decrying regime insider practices when  KMMSAJ (People Coalition 
against Jakarta Water Privatization) filed a lawsuit for the change of PPP of piped-water supply 
in Jakarta. 
In summary, our findings suggest that a backlog of sanitary engineers and public health 
experts, little incentive for R & D, and lack of interaction between insiders and outsiders are 
reasons why outside actors have not pushed the water and sanitation agenda. Table 12 
summarizes the dynamic of piped-water and sewer development in Jakarta between 1945 and 
2015.
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Table 12. Summary of Water and Sanitation Development during 1945-2015 
 Phases 
1945-1966 1966-1998 1998-2015 
The introduction of piped water 
supply system 
The diffusion of interim solutions The stagnancy of piped water and 
sewer network 
Landscape Political: guided democracy (a 
democratic government with 
increased autocracy) 
Economic: economy did not 
expand and inflation reached 
600% 
Social and health: health, water, 
sanitation, and hygiene 
development had low priority 
International policy on water 
and sanitation development: - 
Political: authoritarian rule 
Economic: economic grew rapidly 
by an average of 5-7% 
Social and health: health and 
social sectors were improved 
International policy on water and 
sanitation development: The Mar 
Del Plata Action Plan and the 
International Drinking Water 
Supply and Sanitation Decade 
(IDWSS) 
Political: the rise of democracy era 
Economic: economic growth has 
been maintained between 5-6% 
annually 
Social and health: health status has 
slowly improved since the late-
1990s 
International development policy 
on water and sanitation 
development: - 
 
Regime Enabling factors: 
Development policy to develop 
sizeable projects including large 
water treatment plants 
The establishment of 
environmental health unit under 
Ministry of Public Works 
Enabling factors: 
Development policy on low cost 
technology to provide water and 
sanitation access to the poor 
Enactment of Law No.11/1974 on 
Irrigation 
The separation of regulator and 
operator function for water supply 
operators 
Enabling factors: 
The substitution of Law 
No.11/1974 with Law No.4/2004 
 
 
1
1
3
 
1
1
3
 
1
1
3
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Constraining factors: 
The dual function of water 
supply operators as mandated by 
Law No.5/1962 
Lack of health education and 
preventive action to improve 
public health 
 
Constraining factors: 
Lack of public health approach in 
water and sanitation provision 
Reliance on donor‟ assistance to 
develop water and sanitation  
infrastructure 
Increasing block tariff as a 
national water tariff standard 
Lack of investment to expand 
distribution network 
 
Constraining factors: 
Lack of national and local 
government attention to water and 
sanitation provision in Jakarta 
Lack of public awareness on water 
and sanitation issues 
Corruption in the preparation of 
water supply PPP in Jakarta 
The conflict with implementation 
of PPP in water supply in Jakarta 
Absence of water tariff 
adjustment, continuation of IBT, 
and lack of investment 
Niche Enabling factors: 
Development aid and technical 
assistance from France 
 
Enabling factors: 
- 
Enabling factors: 
- 
Constraining factors: 
Lack of sanitary engineers and 
ill-suited engineering approach 
The growth of informal water 
vending 
 
 
Constraining factors: 
Backlog of sanitary engineers and 
paradigm shift in sanitary 
engineering educational system 
Lack of public health practitioners 
The growth of water vending 
industry 
The rise of bottled and refilled 
water 
The increase of groundwater 
extraction 
Constraining factors: 
Lack of capacity of water and 
sanitary engineers  
Public health as a less appealing 
sector 
 
 
1
1
4
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6.2 The Application of MLP in Jakarta 
We found that the MLP was helpful in describing the dynamics of piped-water and sewer 
in Jakarta. The application of MLP in Jakarta provided a picture of the causes, factors, and 
interactions between insiders and outsiders that contribute to the slow progress of piped-water 
and sewer development. The MLP has allowed the author to analyze many contributing factors 
that determine the dynamic of piped-water and sewer in Jakarta. Previous studies in Jakarta have 
focused only to specific factors such as rapid urban growth outpacing urban infrastructure 
development (Chifos and Suselo, 2000), insufficient regulations of public and private service 
providers (Braadbaart, 2007; Jensen, 2005, Lanti, 2006), governance failure (Bakker et. al, 
2008), private service provider failure (Nugroho, 2011), the existence of economic rent (Crane, 
1994; Lovei and Whittington, 1993), and splintered urbanism (Kooy and Bakker, 2008). The 
case study in this paper shows that there are persistent problems which cannot directly be 
controlled by regimes such as lack of R & D to solve local water and sanitation problems, the 
continuation of IBT tariff, backlog of sanitary engineers and public health experts, lack of 
planning, and donor‟ contributions to state failure. Although, MLP has been applied in developed 
country settings, differences in socio-political contexts between developing and developed 
countries do not make the application of MLP not useful when studying less-developed 
countries. 
 There are challenges to applying MLP in Jakarta since the piped-water and sewer system 
have not been well-developed. MLP has been applied in cases where transformation from non-
piped to piped systems had been occurred. Therefore, it is the author‟s perspective that a case 
study using MLP will better match if the socio-technological system is already well-developed.  
In the case of Jakarta, piped-water and sewer is still developing and there are competing regimes 
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(ground water, bottled and refilled water) which should be further analyzed. The existence of 
non-piped services also makes analysis more challenging. 
 
6.3 Typology of Change on Piped-Water and Sewer System in Jakarta 
Based on five typologies of sociotechnical transition pathways developed by Geels and 
Schot (2007), Jakarta has been following a “reproduction process” whereby the change in 
landscape particularly on the political and economic scale (from Guided Democracy to 
Authoritarian Rule to Decentralized Era and the change from an agricultural to industrial 
economy) have not generated enough pressure on regimes to reorient the way regime actors act 
an make regulations. Furthermore, there is also limited innovation at the niche level. 
Consequently, there are dynamics at regime level but no dynamic interactions among regime, 
landscape, and niche levels. 
 Reproduction process is a commonly observed change in socio-technical system (Geels 
and Kemp, 2007). However, this type of change does not create radical changes observed in 
other types of changes (such as transformation, de-alignment, re-alignment/(transition), 
technological substitution, and reconfiguration pathway). This is due to limited pressure from 
outside actors as well as landscape and niche levels. In reproduction process, the dominant actor 
is the incumbent regime actors and the orientation and knowledge base of actors (regulation, 
normative, and cognitive) do not change fundamentally. The regime remains stable and 
continues to direct their activities within the same rule-sets (thus little variation in developing 
visions and goals, technical problem agendas, guiding principles, and laws) (see Table 4, Table 
8, and Table 11). 
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 There are two criteria used to determine the typology of transition pathways as explained 
in the Geels and Schot (2007). These are the timing of interactions and the nature of interactions. 
Based on our previous explanation of the interplay between three multiple levels, there is no 
strong relationship between landscape development, and niche-innovation that create pressure 
for regime change.  
 Table 13 illustrates the different mechanism between reproduction, transition and 
transformation pathways. Transition and transformation pathways are chosen as a comparison to 
reproduction processes as these pathways are what occurred in the water supply and sanitation 
sectors of developed countries (i.e. the United States, UK, The Netherlands, and Japan). 
According to Geels and Kemp (2007) these changes are also more complex processes. The 
changes in piped-water and sewer system in Jakarta have followed the changes that occurred in 
developed countries, as incremental changes in the regime have not coalesced with changes in 
landscape and have not been supplemented with niche-innovation. 
Table 13. Mechanism in Change Processes 
 Reproduction Transformation   Transition 
Levels 
involved 
Regime 
dynamics 
 Pressure from landscape 
 Adaptation and 
reorientation  in regime 
 Pressure from landscape 
 Increasing problems in 
regime and attempts at re-
orientation 
 New innovation in niches 
that eventually break 
through 
Role of 
actors 
Incumbent 
regime actors 
 Pressure from outsiders 
 Incumbent regime actors 
respond through re-
orienting innovative 
trajectories 
 Pressure from outsiders 
 Incumbent actors fail to 
solve  regime problem 
 Outsiders develop new 
innovations 
Source: Geels and Kemp, 2007 
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CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSIONS 
 
The case study in this project examined the dynamics of piped-water and sewer 
development between 1945 and 2015 in Jakarta, Indonesia. Each case study presented findings 
from interviews and documentation approaches, followed by interpretation using a MLP 
framework. The findings contribute to the growing discourse regarding the slow progress of 
piped-water and sewer development in Jakarta, where piped-water coverage has only increased 
10% to 48% from 1975 to 2015. During this period, the development of sewer network has been 
stagnant, providing access to less than 2% of Jakarta‟s population. 
 This study has shown the changes and even improvements in the economy, politics, and 
health in Jakarta can be achieved without much progress in water and sanitation. Although 
Indonesia has initiated a decentralisation and privatisation reform which reduces the power of the 
central government and gives more authority to local government and private actors, local 
governments and the public have failed to make water and sanitation an important aspect of 
development. This has occurred both in the centralized eras (Old and New Order) and the 
decentralized era (Reform). A main finding of this research, which is based on qualitative 
methodology, is that decentralization does not substantially increase government and public 
responsiveness to water and sanitation issues. The change of water supply management from 
public (PAM Jaya) to public-private partnership (PALYJA and Aetra) in Jakarta also did not 
bring about substantial improvements in providing piped-water access. In summary, we suggest 
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that the central government not assume that local governments and private water operators are 
fully capable of satisfying national water and sanitation needs.  
This case study shows that water and sanitation performance is better when it is managed 
by the central government, such as during in the centralistic eras. Therefore, to accelerate the 
achievement of universal access, water and sanitation should be managed centrally. Special 
consideration should be taken to prioritize the poor and ensure their improved welfare, equity, 
and access to basic needs. Also, current policy makers should pay more attention and learn from 
the country‟s history of the authoritarian bureaucrats, corruption, and weak legislative systems. 
Awareness of past fallacies and weaknesses can help law makers avoid similar pitfalls during the 
process of implementing water and sanitation project in a decentralized system. 
 The key point of the MLP is to observe where the dynamics within landscape, regime, 
and niche levels become linked. However, in the case of Jakarta, there have only been limited 
interactions between landscape, regime, and niche levels in Jakarta. The lack of interactions 
between these three levels has prevented the expansion of piped-water and sewer systems in 
Jakarta. There is some co-evolution in landscape events but not in niche and regime actors. The 
insider regime actor (i.e. the government) has overall been resistant to changes, with limited 
innovations implemented to solve water and sanitation problems.  Furthermore, there have been 
inadequate interactions between inside and outside actors. Our findings show that the Jakarta 
piped-water and sewer systems have not been substantially influenced by technological 
innovations or by environments outside the technology sector, such as macro-politics, macro-
economics, and societal behaviour.   
 The MLP is a fruitful starting point allowing for the identification of interrelated of 
dynamics within piped-water and sewer systems in Jakarta. However, the study of multi regime 
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dynamics (ground water, bottled/refilled water, piped water, sewer and on-site sanitation) needs 
more emphasis. The slow progress of piped-water and sewer has two major implications for 
Indonesia and other developing countries that aim to improve their systems. First, to accelerate 
the achievement of universal access to drinking-water and sanitation, strong leadership from the 
government in planning and implementing infrastructure is essential. The government needs to 
create a dynamic between landscape and niche. The government ought to seek out more 
opportunities for innovation and adaptation to local conditions. Second, the government should 
promote integration between cultural behaviour and water and sanitation development. The 
historical, political, economic, and cultural contexts are decisive in water and sanitation 
development pathways (Briscoe, 2003). What worked in developed countries may not work in 
developing countries due to the differences of historical, social, and cultural conditions.   
Three important limitations need to be considered. First, the author combined the 
development of piped-water and sewer as one single analysis. Because piped-water and sewer 
system development in Indonesia are managed under the same regime, these two factors were 
considered simultaneously. However, future studies should focus on only one at a time or should 
compare and contrast the progress of each, as they may behave differently even when managed 
under the same regime. The second limitation is the length of the period of the analysis from 
1945 to 2015. Although this paper focused on analysing changes in piped-water supply and 
sewer development from 1945 to 2015, the provision of water supply (using ground water as a 
raw resource)in Jakarta had begun  as early as in 1843 (PAM Jaya, 2016). Furthermore, 
Indonesia has many rivers and springs.  Some people may have relied more heavily on water 
from rivers and canals for drinking, bathing, and defecating. Thus, more information could have 
been collected by extending the time frame of focus. The third limitation is related to interviews 
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and the selection of literature. Interview subjects may be biased, have poor memories, or provide 
inaccurate testimonies. The experience of the author working in government agencies in 
Indonesia may also introduce biases in the interview process. The interviewee was selected from 
a broad range of actors in order to minimize selection bias. However, due to the inability of the 
author to travel to Jakarta, the study could be improved if the author was able to interview more 
people, such as public health experts, bottled and refilled water businessmen, etc. A thorough 
literature search was conducted; however, some literature may have been missed with valuable 
insights on this topic. Due to inaccessibility or inability to analyse several important 
documentations because it was difficult to find in Indonesia and the United States, information 
from interviewers and from literature reviews were used to describe some findings. 
Finally, there are five suggestions for future studies. First, a more complete MLP can be 
applied to conduct case studies in further depth including analyze the use of non-piped systems 
(i.e. groundwater, bottled and/or refilled water, and septic tanks). Secondly, a case study should 
be conducted on a longer time scale given that the development of piped-water in Jakarta had 
occurred during the colonial period. Third, future research should look beyond public officials 
and policy makers and seek to understand the position and viewpoints of non-governmental 
actors.  It is important to understand the viewpoints of other outside actors on the development of 
water and sanitation systems.  Fourth, future studies should compare and contrast  piped-water 
and sewer systems between several big cities in Indonesia or between Indonesia and other 
developing countries. Jakarta is an outlier in many cases because its social, demographic, and 
economic conditions are very different from other cities in Indonesia. Thus, other cities in this 
nation may not follow the same pathway as Jakarta. However, at the same time a case study of 
Jakarta could be considered as a great example to show the real conditions of water and 
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sanitation in Indonesia. Fifth, further studies could also analyse indigenous water and sanitation 
practices that contribute to current water and sanitation conditions. 
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APPENDIX I : LIST OF INTERVIEWEE 
 
No. Respondent Institution Responsibility 
1. Rooswhita 
Simanjuntak 
- PAM Jaya Expert Staff for PAM Jaya 
2. Hidajat Edhy 
Liestianto 
- PAM Jaya Head for Planning Division  
3. Ati Angkasa - PDPAL Jaya  Expert Staff for PDPAL 
Jaya 
4. Pratama S Adi - PT. Aetra Air Jakarta Corporate Secretary 
5. Risyana Sukarma - Directorate of Water Supply, 
Ministry of Public Works 
(until 1996) 
- The World Bank 
Senior Water and Sanitation 
Consultant at The World 
Bank (retired) 
6. Irma Magdalena 
Setiono 
- PALYJA (until 2006) 
- USAID (2006-2008) 
- The World Bank (2008-to 
date) 
Water and Sanitation 
Specialist at The World 
Bank 
7. Trigeany 
Linggoatmojo 
- USAID (2001-to date) 
 
Senior Project Management 
Specialist for Water and 
Sanitation 
8. Foort Bustraan - USAID-IUWASH Deputy Chief of Party of 
IUWASH 
9. Tomihara Takayuki - JICA Project Formulation 
Adviser 
10. Rudi Willem - PT. Infratama Yakti Director (Senior Water 
Supply Consultant) 
11. Winarko Hadi - Ikatan Ahli Teknik 
Penyehatan dan Teknik 
Lingkungan Indonesia 
(IATPI) – The Indonesian 
Society of Sanitary and 
Environmental Engineers 
- PT. Jagad Rona Semesta 
Head for Partnership for 
IATPI and Director for PT. 
Jagad Rona Semesta 
(Senior Wastewater 
Consultant)  
12. Arif Maulana - Lembaga Bantuan Hukum 
(LBH) – Legal Aid Institute 
Public Lawyers for LBH 
Jakarta 
13. Nugroho Tri 
Utomo 
- BAPPENAS Director for Housing and 
Settlement (2010-to date) 
14. Basah Hernowo - BAPPENAS Director for Housing and 
Settlement (2000-2007) 
15. Oswar Mungkasa - DKI Jakarta Local 
Government 
Deputy Governor of DKI 
Jakarta for Spatial Planning 
and Environment 
16. M. Fadly Haley - DKI Jakarta Local Section Head for Water, 
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Tanjung Government Cleanliness, and 
Environment , Bappeda 
(Planning Agency of DKI 
Jakarta) 
17. Handy B. Legowo - Ministry of Public Works  Deputy Director for 
Wastewater Development 
(retired) 
18. Danny Sutjiono - Ministry of Public Works Director for Water Supply 
Development (retired) 
19. Budiman Arif - Ministry of Public Works Director General for 
Human Settlements 
(retired) 
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APPENDIX II : INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN WATER AND SANITATION IN 
INDONESIA (BASED ON THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE FOR THE 
PERIOD OF 2015-2019) 
 
Ministries Responsibilities Authority  
Key Agencies 
Ministry of Public 
Works 
 Directorate General of Human Settlements: 
Setting up policies and technical regulations 
(Norms, Standards, Guidelines, and Manuals) 
for water and sanitation at national level. 
Develop water and sanitation infrastructures 
and provide technical, financial, and 
managerial assistance to local government. 
 Directorate General of Water Resources:  
Setting up policies and technical regulations 
(Norms, Standards, Guidelines, and Manuals) 
for water resources at national level. Determine 
the allocation and issuance of raw water 
extraction permit. 
 BPPSPAM (Support Agency for Water Supply 
System Development): 
Assess the performance of Local Owned Water 
Supply Enterprise (PDAM) and give 
recommendations to the Minister of Public 
Works on the feasibility of Public Private 
Partnership in drinking water and sanitation 
provision 
Technical 
aspects 
 
Ministry of Health  Issuance, monitoring and inspection of 
drinking quality standards 
 Campaign, advocacy and promotion for water, 
sanitation, and hygiene 
 Capacity building for local governments in 
terms of disease prevention through the 
provision of water and sanitation 
Health aspects 
 
Bappenas  Prepares long, medium and annual term 
national water and sanitation development 
program and its budget.  
 Coordinates policies, strategies, and programs 
among related line ministries and donors  
 Monitoring and evaluation of national 
programs. 
Policy and 
planning aspects 
 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
 Setting up regulations for water and sanitation 
in local government level including (i) the 
mechanism for setting up the drinking water 
tariffs; (ii) PDAM management; (iii) 
Local 
management 
and financial 
aspects 
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management of loans and grants in local 
governance context; (iv) accounting 
management for local government; (v) local 
government‟s financial performance 
assessment and monitoring 
 Monitoring, evaluation, and supervision of 
local government  performance  
 Develop local governments capacity and 
support the performance of 
city/district/provincial Pokja AMPLs 
 
Ministry of 
Environment and 
Forestry 
Establish policy on water pollution control 
(wastewater effluent and raw water quality 
standard)  
Environmental 
Pollution 
aspects 
 
Other Relevant Agencies 
Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral 
Resources 
Responsible for groundwater exploration as well 
as granting the ground water extraction permit 
Technical 
aspects 
 
Ministry of 
Education 
Responsible for ensuring adequate water and 
sanitation facilities available in schools 
Technical 
aspects 
 
Ministry of Finance Allocating fund for water and sanitation 
development through annual budget, loans, and 
grants.  
Financial 
aspects 
 
Ministry of Industry Establish permit and standards for bottled and 
refilled water  
Technical 
aspects 
Coordinating 
Ministry of Human 
Development and 
Cultural Affairs 
Oversee the performance of relevant ministries in 
water and sanitation development. 
 
Coordination  
 
Source: author, with information drawn from multiple source 
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APPENDIX III : WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION DEVELOPMENT IN JAKARTA 
DURING OLD AND NEW ORDER ERA (1945-1998) 
 
Name of Project Products Year 
Type of 
Funding 
Funding (US$ 
million) 
Large Water Supply and Master Plan Projects 
Unknown 
1)
 The development of 1
st
 
large scale 
Pejompongan I WTP 
(2,000 l/s) 
1953-
1957 
Loan, 
French 
government 
Rp. 70 million 
(USS 2-7 million)* 
Report on the 
Water Supply 
Extension Project 
for the City of 
Jakarta (Master 
Plan I) 
2)
 
Technical assistance to 
formulate the first long 
term water sector 
development for 
Jakarta. This study can 
be regarded as the first 
master plan for Jakarta 
Water Supply System. 
The study did not lead 
to immediate project 
loan assistance but it 
did lay the foundation 
for future related 
assistance 
1963 Grant, 
OECF/Japan 
N.A 
Unknown
 3)
 The development of 2
nd 
large scale 
Pejompongan II WTP 
(1,000 l/s) 
1964-
1966 
Loan, 
French 
government 
7.0 
Extension Project 
of JakartaWater 
Supply System 
and Master Plan 
for Jakarta Water 
Supply System 
(Master Plan II 
1972-1980) 
4)
 
The preparation of 2
nd
 
Water and Wastewater 
Masterplan. All the 
planned projects were 
implemented: main T/D 
for Pejompongan II; 
upgrading 
Pejompongan II, the 
development of Pulo 
Gadung WTP and its 
main T/D pipeline. 
1971-
1972 
Grant from 
UNDP & 
WHO 
(Executing 
Agency: 
Nihon 
Suido, 
Japan) 
0.4 
Emergency 
Project for 
Distribution Pipe 
5)
 
Supervision work for 
pipe installation of 
Pejompongan II 
1972-
1973 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
1.56 
Emergency Phase 
Project of Stage I 
Construction of 
Distribution Main of 
1973-
1974 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
1.62 
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Development 
Program 
6)
 
Pejompongan II 
The Final Stage 
of Pejompongan I 
Development
 7)
 
Uprating capacity of 
Pejompongan I from 
2,000 l/s to 3,000 l/s 
1975 Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
N.A 
Phase I Project of 
Stage I 
Development 
Program 
8)
 
Detailed Design Work 
for Pulo Gadung WTP 
1975-
1976 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
0.79 
Phase I Project of 
Stage I 
Development 
Program
 9)
 
The development of 3
rd
 
 
large scale Pulo 
Gadung WTP and 
upgrading 
Pejompongan II WTP 
from 1,000 l/s to 3,000 
l/s and the development 
of Pejompongan II 
distribution main 
1977-
1982 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
9.32 
Phase I Project of 
Stage I 
Development 
Program 
10)
 
Detailed Design Work 
for WTP Pulo Gadung 
Expansion 
1978-
1979 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
0.49 
Phase II Project 
Stage I 
Development 
Program 
11)
 
The development of 
Pulo Gadung 
distribution main 
1982-
1985 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
11.87 
Phase II Project 
of Stage I 
Development 
Program 
12)
 
The expansion Pulo 
Gadung WTP and 
development of 
distribution main 
1983-
1987 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
13.93 
Jakarta Water 
Supply 
Development 
Project 
13)
 
The preparation of 3
nd
 
Water Masterplan and 
Feasibility Study 1985-
2005. The proposed 
projects are the 
development of Buaran 
I WTP and its T/D 
pipeline; the 
development of Buaran 
II WTP, the 
development of Lebak 
Bulus I, II, and III 
WTPs and its T/D pipe 
line; the development 
of Cakung I, II, and III 
WTPs and its T/D 
1983-
1985 
Grant, 
OECD/Japan 
1.37 
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pipeline;  
Phase II Project 
of Stage I 
Development 
Program 
14)
 
The development of 
distribution main for 
Pulo Gadung WTP 
1985-
1990 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
22.92 
West Tarum 
Canal 
Improvement 
Project
 15)
 
Consultancy services 
and water pipeline 
development 
1985-
1992 
Loan, World 
Bank 
43.4 
Immediate Phase 
Project of Stage II 
Development 
Program 
16)
 
The development of 4
th
 
large scale Buaran I 
WTP and its 
distribution main 
1986-
1992 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
18.75 
Phase I Project of 
Stage II 
Development 
Program 
17)
 
The development of 5
th
 
large scale Buaran II 
WTP and its 
distribution main 
1987-
1995 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
45.51 
SAPROF Study 
for PAM Jaya 
System 
Improvement 
Project (PJSIP) 
18)
 
Pre-investment study 
for PJSIP and to 
supplement Stage II 
Development Program 
under Master Plan III 
(Distribution network 
improvement in zone 3 
and 6) 
1989-
1990 
Grant, 
OECF/Japan 
0.24 
Jakarta Water 
Supply 
Development 
Pipeline 
19)
 
Improvement of water 
distribution network. 
The area covered by the 
project were divided 
between World Bank 
(zone 1,2,4 and 5) and 
JBIC (zone 3 and 6) 
1990-
1997 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
47.75 
Jabotabek Urban 
Development 
Project II 
20)
 
Improvement of water 
distribution network. 
The area covered by the 
project were divided 
between World Bank 
(zone 1,2,4 and 5) and 
JBIC (zone 3 and 6) 
1991-
1996 
Loan, World 
Bank 
190.0 
The Study on The 
Revise of Jakarta 
Water Supply 
Development 
Project 
21)
 
The preparation of 4
nd
 
Water Masterplan and 
Feasibility Study 1985-
2019 (to review the 
progress of 3
rd
 Master 
Plan 1985-2005 and to 
assess new 
1995-
1997 
Loan, 
OECF/Japan 
N.A 
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requirements until 
2019). All the planned 
projects were not 
implemented due to 
PPP in 1998. The 
proposed projects are: 
The development of 
Buaran II WTP and its 
T/D pipeline; the 
development of 
Cipayung I WTP and 
its T/D pipeline; the 
development of 
Cisadane II WTP and 
its T/D pipeline; the 
development of 
Cipayung II and its T/D 
pipeline; and the 
development of 
Cisadane III and its T/D 
pipeline. 
Unknown
 22)
 Development of 
Cisadane treated water 
transmission pipe line 
 Loan, 
French 
government 
N.A 
Sewerage Pilot and Septage Treatment Plant Project 
Jakarta Sewerage 
and Sanitation 
Project
23)
 
Consultancy services 
and construction of 
sewerage system. The 
first project for 
sewerage development 
in Jakarta 
1983-
1993 
Loan, World 
Bank 
22.4 
The development 
of septage 
treatment plant
24)
 
Construction of septage 
treatment plant in Pulo 
Gebang (300 m
3
/day) 
1984 National 
budget 
N.A 
The development 
of septage 
treatment plant
25)
 
Construction of septage 
treatment plant in Duri 
Kosambi (300 m
3
/day) 
1995 National 
budget 
N.A 
Water and Sanitation Project for Low Income Communities 
Jakarta Urban 
Development 
Project 
26)
 
Consultancy services 
and construction of KIP 
Program (water, 
sanitation, solid waste 
and drainage). The first 
project of water supply 
and sanitation provision 
for low income 
1974-
1979 
Loan, World 
Bank 
25.0 
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communities 
Second Urban 
Development 
Project 
27)
  
Consultancy services 
and construction of KIP 
Program (water, 
sanitation, solid waste 
and drainage) for 
Jakarta and Surabaya 
1976-
1980 
Loan, World 
Bank 
52.8 (32% of the 
funding is for KIP 
Jakarta) 
Third Urban 
Development 
Project 
28)
 
Consultancy services 
and construction of KIP 
Program (water, 
sanitation, solid waste 
and drainage) for 
Jakarta, Surabaya, and 
Ujung Pandang 
1979-
1983 
Loan, World 
Bank 
54.0 (27% of the 
funding is for KIP 
Jakarta) 
Jabotabek Urban 
Development 
Project III
29)
 
KIP Program (water, 
sanitation, solid waste 
and drainage) to 
improve environmental 
quality  of low income 
areas-Kampung  in 
Jakarta, Tangerang, and 
Bekasi 
1991-
1996 
Loan, World 
Bank 
61.0 
Source: 
1)
 KemenPUPR, 2015; 
2)
 JBIC, 2008; 
3)
 Martijn, 2005; 
4)
 JBIC, 2008 and World Bank, 
1976
; 5-14)
 JBIC, 2008; 
15)
 World Bank, 1985; 
16-19)
 JBIC, 2008; 
20)
 World Bank, 1990; 
21)
 JBIC, 
2008; 
22)
 World Bank, 1990; 
23)
 World Bank, 1993; 
24 & 25)
 Ministry of Public Works, 2015; 
26)
 
World Bank, 1974; 
27)
 World Bank, 1976; 
28)
 World Bank, 1979; 
29)
 World Bank, 1990a 
* Due to fluctuated inflation during 1950s 
** T/D: transmission and distribution 
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APPENDIX IV : WATER PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN JAKARTA 
 
Year Started 
to Operate 
WTP Production Capacity (l/s) Operator 
1957 Pejompongan I 2,000 (uprating to 3,000) PALYJA 
1970 Pejompongan II 1,000 (uprating to 3,000) PALYJA 
1977 MP Cilandak 200 (uprating to 400) PALYJA 
1980 Pesing 5 (not in-operation) - 
1988 Pulo Gadung  4,000  AETRA 
1982 MP Sunter 100 (not in-operation due to high 
operating cost) 
- 
1982 MP Cakung 25 (not in-operation due to high 
operating cost) 
- 
1982 MP Muara Karang 100 (not in operation due to high 
operating cost) 
PALYJA 
1982 MP Pejaten 5 (not in-operation due to high 
operating cost) 
- 
1982 P. Cengkareng 50 (not in-operation due to high 
operating cost) 
- 
1992 Buaran I 2,500 AETRA 
1993 Cisadane (DCR-4) 2,000 PALYJA 
1993 Cisadane (DCR-5) 1,000 PALYJA 
1995 Buaran II 2,500 AETRA 
1982 MP Taman Kota 200 PALYJA 
1992 DCR-1 Cilincing 2.895 AETRA 
 
MP Condet 2 (not in-operation due to high 
flood risk in the area) 
- 
 
MP Ciburial 20 (not in-operation because it is 
located in Bogor, different area 
from Jakarta) 
- 
Source: PAM Jaya, 2016; BPS Jakarta 2000, 2001, 2007 
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APPENDIX V : PAM JAYA SHARE TO JAKARTA GOVERNMENT 
 
No. Year Amount (Rp.) Amount (US$) 
1. 2006 3 billion 327,278 
2. 2007 3 billion 328,359 
3. 2008 5 billion 516,553 
4. 2009 6 billion 577,014 
5. 2010 7 billion 770,539 
6. 2011 8.6 billion 979,556 
7. 2012 11.6 billion 1,236,623 
8. 2013 12 billion 1,148,175 
9. 2014 17.6 billion 1,481,693 
10. 2015 22.8 billion 1,702,513 
                         Source: PAM Jaya, 2016 
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APPENDIX VI : THEME OF THE FIVE YEAR PLANS (1969-1999) 
 
Plan Years Main 
Themes* 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Development Goals 
Water Supply 
Development 
Target in Urban 
Areas 
Locus of 
Water 
Developmen
t in Urban 
Areas 
Investment 
per Capita 
for Water 
Supply  
Output Sanitation 
Development 
Target in Urban 
Areas 
Long Term National Development Plan I (1969-1994): Economic Development 
REPE
LITA 
I 
1969-
1974 
Stability Rehabilitation of 
the existing water 
infrastructure and 
new development 
of water treatment 
plants 
To increase 
existing water 
production 
capacity by 8,000 
l/s  
Large cities Rp.134 
(US$0.35) 
Water 
production 
capacity 
increased from 
9,000 to 15,000 
liter per second 
- 
REPE
LITA 
II 
1974-
1979 
Economi
c growth 
Development of 
water production 
facilities and 
expansion  through 
first and minimal 
level of 
improvement (the 
provision of public 
water taps, public 
toilets, pit privies, 
leaching pits, and 
septic tanks) 
To increase water 
production 
capacity by 
12,000 l/s 
Large cities Rp.1,166 
(US$2.8) 
Water 
production 
capacity 
increased from 
15,000 to 20,000 
liter per second 
Basic sanitation 
provision 
particularly for 
rural areas 
REPE
LITA 
III 
1979-
1984 
Equity Basic National 
Approach (BNA) to 
achieve minimal 
standard 
(continuation in 
public water taps, 
public toilets, pit 
privies, leaching 
To provide a 
standardized 
water treatment 
plant units in 150 
medium and 
small cities 
Medium 
and small 
cities/towns 
Rp.2,467 
(US$3.94) 
Water 
production 
capacity 
increased from 
20,000 to 35,000 
liter per second 
- 
1
3
4
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pits, and septic 
tanks) 
REPE
LITA 
IV 
1984-
1989 
National 
resilience 
Initial effort for the 
integration of water 
and sanitation (pre-
articulation of 
IUIDP)  
To provide a 
standardized 
water treatment 
plant units in 350 
big cities and 150 
medium and 
small cities 
Large cities Rp.5,220 
(US$4.74) 
Water 
production 
capacity 
increased from 
35,000 to 51,000 
liter per second 
with only 
836,000 house 
connections 
Basic sanitation 
provision for 
urban and rural 
areas 
Sewerage pilot 
projects for 
metropolitan and 
big cities 
REPE
LITA 
V 
1989-
1994 
Preparati
on for 
take-off 
The 
implementation of 
Integrated Urban 
Infrastructure 
Development Plan 
(IUIDP) 
To expand 
distribution 
network, to 
increase the 
number of house 
connection and 
public hydrant, to 
decrease the 
NRW 
Large, 
medium, 
and small 
cities 
Rp.6,591 
(US$3.37) 
Water 
production 
capacity 
increased from 
51,000 to 66,000 
liter per second 
(which served 
for 27.6 million 
people or 36% of 
urban population 
Provision of basic 
sanitation (pit 
latrines and public 
toilets) in 200  big 
cities and 5,000 
villages 
The continuation 
of sewerage pilot 
projects for 
metropolitan and 
big cities 
Long Term National Development Plan II (1994-1999): Human Development 
Repeli
ta VI 
1994-
1999 
Consolid
ation for 
take-off 
Improvement and 
continuation of 
IUIDP and 
emphasize on 
sustainable urban 
development 
To expand 
distribution 
network by 
30,000 l/s and to 
decrease NRW to 
25%-30% 
Large cities  Rp.9,060 
(US$3.89) 
Water 
production 
capacity 
increased from 
66,000 to 96,000 
liter per second 
Provision of basic 
sanitation (pit 
latrines and public 
toilets) in 9 big 
cities, 200 medium 
and small cities, 
and 7,000 villages 
The development 
of septage 
treatment plant in 
metropolitan and 
big cities 
Source: author, with information drawn from multiple sources  
1
3
5
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APPENDIX VII : GROWTH OF BOTTLED WATER INDUSTRY AND GROWTH OF 
REFILLED WATER INDUSTRY IN INDONESIA  
 
Growth of Bottled Water Industry in Indonesia (1990-2006) 
Year Number of 
companies 
Production capacity 
(1,000,000 litre) 
Rate of growth from 
the preceding year (%) 
Number of 
Aspadin 
Members 
1973* 1 6 N.A - 
1983* 5 10 N.A - 
1990 5 399 - - 
1991 125 637 60 13 
1992 132 1,321 107 36 
1993 140 1,590 20 45 
1994 165 1,832 15 45 
1995 184 2,055 12 51 
1996 184 2,215 8 51 
1997 184 2,500 13 62 
1998 184 2,000 -20 62 
1999 184 2,400 20 62 
2000 184 3,700 54 71 
2001 246 5,400 46 71 
2002 350 7,100 31 71 
2003 413 8,100 14 108 
2004** 426 9,100 12 141 
2005** 440 10,100 11 150 
2006** 480 N.A - 165 
Aspadin: the Indonesian Bottled Water Business Association 
Source: *Kurniati, 2007; Hadipuro, 2010, and **Fudji, n.d.. 
 
Growth of Refilled Water Industry in Indonesia (1997-2008) 
Year Number of refill stations 
1997 100 
2000 900 
2002 2,400 
2005 6,000 
2008 8,500 
Source: Darmawan, 2009 
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APPENDIX VIII : WATER QUALITY OF RIVER AND GROUNDWATER IN 
JAKARTA 
 
Rivers and Canals in Jakarta 
No. River/Canal Length (m) Area (m
2
) Purpose of Use 
1. Ciliwung 46,200 1,155,000 Urban business 
2. Krukut 28,750 172,500 Water source of drinking 
3. Mookervart 7,300 233,600 Water source of drinking 
4. Kali Angke 12,810 538,200 Urban business 
5. Kali Pesanggrahan 27,300 351,900 Fishery 
6. Sungai Grogol 23,600 165,200 Fishery 
7. Kali Cideng 17,800 234,810 Urban business 
8. Kalibu Timur 30,200 392,600 Urban business 
9. Cipinang 27,350 464,950 Urban business 
10. Sunter 37,250 1,080,000 Urban business 
11. Cakung 20,700 414,000 Urban business 
12. Buaran 7,900 158,000 Urban business 
13. Kalibaru Barat 17,700 177,000 Fishery 
14. Cengkarange Drain  11,200 672,000 Urban business 
15. Jati Kramat 3,800 19,000 Urban business 
16. Cakung Drain 12,850 771,000 Urban business 
17. Ancol 8,300 240,700 Urban business 
18. Banjir Kanal Barat 
(West Tarum Canal) 
7,600 380,000 Fishery 
19. Banjir Kanal Timur 
(East Tarum Canal) 
23,000 1,380,000 Fishery 
Source: BPS Jakarta, 2014 
 
Water Quality of River in Jakarta 
Level of Water 
Pollution 
Water Pollutant Index (%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Very low 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Low  3 4 9 0 0 9 
Medium 16 16 10 6 12 9 
High 81 79 78 94 88 82 
Source: Badan Pengelola Lingkungan Hidup Daerah, n.d. 
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Quality of Shallow Groundwater in Jakarta 
Level of Water 
Pollution 
Water Pollutant Index (%) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Very low 18 16 7 25 23 23 
Low  33 33 55 43 48 41 
Medium 28 35 13 20 16 19 
High 21 167 25 12 13 17 
Source: Badan Pengelola Lingkungan Hidup Daerah, n.d. 
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APPENDIX IX : SERVICE TARIFF AND CONNECTION FEE IN PDPAL JAYA 
 
 
*From standard pipe to control chamber.  
Connection fee is Rp/unit and Rp/m
2
 for non-domestic customers. 
Source: USAID, 2006 
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APPENDIX X : TECHNICAL TARGET OF AETRA AND PALYJA 
Technical Target According to the Cooperation Agreement (Aetra) 
Technical 
Standard 
Unaccounted 
for Water (%) 
Number of 
Connection 
(units) 
Service Coverage 
Ratio (%) 
Volume of 
Water Billed 
(million m3) 
Water 
Production 
(l/sec) 
 
1997
1)
 2001
2)
 1997
1)
 2001
2)
 1997
1)
 2001
2)
 1997
1)
 2001
2)
 1997
1)
 2001
2)
 
Year 1 50.00 58.07 
251,60
7 278,083 55 57 
105.00 91.96 
8343 8523 
Year 2 47.00 51.74 
281,60
7 285,753 59 57 
121.00 105.90 
8531 7828 
Year 3 42.00 45.86 
311,60
7 304,303 64 59 
136.00 117.94 
8531 7408 
Year 4 38.00 45.03 
341,60
7 315,126 65 60 
153.00 121.83 
8531 7282 
Year 5 35.00 43.03 
361,60
7 335,413 70 62 
186.00 131.32 
8531 7309 
Year 10 25.00 34.03 - - 75 74 - - - - 
Year 20 20.00 25.00 - - 95 89 - - - - 
Year 25 20.00 25.00 - - 100 100 - - - - 
First cooperation agreement issued in 1997 
Restated cooperation agreement issued in 2001 
Source: Shofiani, 2003 
 
Technical Target According to the Cooperation Agreement (PALYJA) 
Technical 
Standard 
Number of Connection (units) Service Coverage Ratio (%) 
1997
1)
 2001
2)
 1997
1)
 2001
2)
 
Year 5 395,522 301,048 70.00 45.00 
First cooperation agreement issued in 1997 
Restated cooperation agreement issued in 2001 
Source: Bakker, 2007 
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Target vs Realization of Cooperation Agreement  
 
*Target has been revised several times and it is lower than original target in cooperation agreement 
Source: PAM Jaya, 2016 
 
Target vs Realization of Cooperation Agreement 
 
 
*Target has been revised several times and it is lower than original target in cooperation agreement 
Source: PAM Jaya, 2016
Target Realization Target Realization Target Realization Target Realization Target Realization Target Realization
1998 58.63% 58.15% 58.08% 66.64% 209,895 209,895 278,083 278,083 44.00% 32.00% 55.00% 57.00%
1999 57.84% 57.48% 51.75% 57.94% 225,813 225,813 285,735 285,735 55.00% 33.00% 59.00% 57.00%
2000 51.27% 51.19% 45.74% 50.63% 257,952 257,952 304,303 304,303 63.00% 38.00% 64.00% 59.00%
2001 49.27% 47.74% 45.03% 53.39% 282,048 290,524 315,126 320,282 42.00% 48.27% 60.00% 60.97%
2002 47.72% 45.29% 43.03% 49.93% 301,048 312,879 335,413 336,550 45.00% 49.89% 62.00% 62.17%
2003 44.88% 44.93% 46.12% 45.60% 329,987 329,987 360,469 360,469 51.00% 52.18% 64.40% 65.59%
2004 42.48% 46.86% 50.12% 48.99% 340,987 337,640 368,250 368,250 57.00% 53.74% 66.59% 67.06%
2005 38.95% 50.58% 44.55% 50.21% 351,987 344,368 379,032 364,551 63.00% 54.55% 69.20% 66.45%
2006 37.15% 49.04% 42.58% 53.15% 361,987 351,230 387,158 374,211 69.00% 55.49% 71.60% 67.26%
2007 35.40% 47.60% 40.59% 53.43% 371,987 377,765 395,253 377,790 75.00% 58.99% 74.00% 66.08%
2008 45.00% 46.46% 51.50% 53.35% 391,987 398,557 380,116 379,487 61.00% 61.85% 62.35% 65.28%
2009 44.00% 44.54% 50.30% 50.57% 400,224 412,456 386,217 382,693 62.50% 63.93% 64.00% 59.67%
2010 43.10% 42.65% 49.00% 49.86% 408,460 419,776 391,554 385,377 64.00% 64.66% 65.77% 59.96%
2011 41.30% 40.19% 47.75% 46.78% 416,694 414,470 397,615 388,166 65.50% 63.90% 67.78% 59.26%
2012 40.00% 38.80% 40.29% 45.48% 424,924 407,459 404,621 392,240 67.00% 61.93% 63.38% 58.61%
2013 38.75% 40.02% 37.14% 42.88% 430,674 404,980 415,331 398,621 68.50% 61.00% 65.24% 57.06%
2014 37.50% 40.88% 35.58% 41.94% 436,368 405,712 426,041 407,644 70.00% 60.24% 67.06% 57.89%
Coverage 
PALYJA AETRA
NRW
PALYJA AETRA
Year House connection
PALYJA AETRA
Target Realization Target Realization Target Realization Target Realization Target Realization Target Realization
1998 89,165,168 89,165,168 105,189,856 91,962,344 150,451,285 150,451,285 245,990,000 245,962,515 215,505,120 213,079,342 250,930,000 275,648,276
1999 101,728,796 101,719,778 121,729,925 106,120,986 160,094,531 160,094,531 246,820,000 246,820,737 241,268,897 239,226,814 252,290,000 252,328,266
2000 110,405,290 110,405,290 129,621,714 117,944,722 147,442,950 147,442,950 234,270,000 234,270,208 226,548,828 226,198,373 238,890,000 238,889,366
2001 114,554,783 116,769,888 127,827,238 120,422,331 153,661,139 145,741,815 229,640,000 254,005,662 225,794,422 223,461,594 232,540,000 258,354,429
2002 118,730,298 126,200,288 131,321,547 128,950,799 160,991,280 153,760,331 230,510,000 253,300,643 227,090,146 230,687,269 230,510,000 257,554,856
2003 131,310,498 131,310,500 141,400,417 142,791,817 156,828,289 156,831,189 259,571,968 259,571,968 238,247,818 238,433,878 262,455,756 262,475,085
2004 134,400,000 127,338,770 140,388,792 143,569,487 151,447,112 153,101,722 279,402,640 279,402,640 233,663,352 239,615,489 281,474,936 281,474,934
2005 138,700,000 129,344,449 144,000,000 137,736,032 145,191,744 174,828,415 259,693,417 275,283,400 227,185,344 261,740,105 259,693,417 276,633,938
2006 143,000,000 130,037,937 146,278,348 131,818,196 145,538,640 168,162,640 254,751,563 280,761,592 227,532,240 255,184,856 254,751,563 281,365,056
2007 146,926,124 130,261,004 148,474,056 121,756,904 145,444,032 164,022,464 249,914,249 261,208,390 227,437,632 248,611,913 249,914,249 261,469,202
2008 134,316,522 134,509,658 125,190,000 124,429,644 157,487,858 163,593,255 258,080,000 266,640,080 244,211,858 251,216,518 258,130,000 266,720,660
2009 137,252,018 137,732,227 128,250,000 129,414,385 158,368,890 161,402,616 258,050,000 261,814,733 245,092,890 248,349,025 258,050,000 261,814,733
2010 140,507,936 147,277,544 131,748,300 136,687,954 160,214,376 170,025,096 258,330,000 272,637,470 246,938,376 256,800,571 258,330,000 272,637,470
2011 144,416,071 153,258,418 135,290,925 144,560,814 159,299,971 167,845,113 258,930,000 271,631,182 246,023,971 256,222,941 258,930,000 271,631,182
2012 147,286,254 159,811,122 161,378,217 150,438,576 158,753,090 171,955,912 270,270,000 275,949,470 245,477,090 261,139,203 270,270,000 275,949,470
2013 150,231,979 158,547,811 172,336,976 155,771,005 158,552,700 172,901,783 274,160,000 272,696,498 245,276,700 264,326,138 274,160,000 272,696,498
2014 152,795,989 159,075,389 181,020,200 162,061,468 157,749,582 179,555,368 281,000,000 279,134,217 244,473,582 269,056,000 281,000,000 279,134,217
Year Water Production (m3/year)
PALYJA AETRA
Water Distributed (m3/year)
PALYJA AETRA
Volume of Water Billed (m3/year)
PALYJA AETRA
 
1
4
1
 
142 
 
0
8
16
24
32
40
48
56
64
72
 -
 100,000
 200,000
 300,000
 400,000
 500,000
 600,000
 700,000
 800,000
 900,000
1975197719791981198319851987198919911993199519971999200120032005200720092011201320152017
U
FW
 (
%
) 
H
o
u
se
 C
o
n
n
e
ct
io
n
 
Year 
House Connection UFW
PUBLIC ERA (until 1998) PRIVATE ERA (1998 - to 
date) 
APPENDIX XI : NRW AND PIPED-WATER CONNECTION IN JAKARTA (1975-2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author, with information drawn from multiple sources 
 
  
143 
 
REFERENCES 
Abeyasekere, S. (1989). Jakarta: A History. New York, Singapore, London, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Adzan, M.D. (2001). Water policy reform in Jakarta, Indonesia: A CGE analyzes. (Unpublished 
dissertation). Ohio, OH: Ohio State University. 
 
AKADEMIKA. (2006). Final report: Study on government‟s knowledge, attitudes, and 
motivations on pro-poor sanitation. Jakarta: Akademika. 
 
Al‟Afghani, M., M. (2015, March 9). Court decision brings water governance reforms to a halt 
(part 1 of 2). Retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/09/court-
decision-brings-water-governance-reforms-a-halt-part-1-2.html#sthash.hMD9PgSY.dpuf. 
 
Agtini, M. D., Soeharno, R., Lesmana, M., Punjabi, N. H., Simanjuntak, C., Wangsasaputra, F., 
… Schot, J. (2008). Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. Research Policy, 36(3), 
399–417. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2007.01.003 
 
Alberini, A., G. S. Eskeland, A. Krupnick, and G. McGranahan (1996), Determinants of 
Diarrheal Disease in Jakarta, Water Resoures. Res., 32(7), 2259–2269, 
doi:10.1029/96WR01102 
 
Argo, T. (1999). Thirsty downstream: The provision of clean water in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
(Unpublished dissertation). British Columbia: University of British Columbia. 
 
Argo, T. A., & Firman, T.. (2001). To privatize or not to privatize? Reform of urban water 
supply services in Jabotabek, Indonesia. Built Environment (1978-), 27(2), 146–155. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23287518 
 
Ausaid, Bappenas, and WSP. (2012). Sanitation personnel: Capacity development strategy. 
Jakarta: Water Supply and Sanitation Policy and Action Planning (WASPOLA) Facility 
 
Badan Pendukung Pengembangan Sistem Penyediaan Air Minum. (2016, February 15). KPS 
yang telah beroperasi. Retrieved from 
http://www.bppspam.com/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=94 
 
Badan Pengelola Lingkungan Hidup DKI Jakarta. (n.d.). Peningkatan ketahanan air baku 
provinsi DKI Jakarta [Improving water security] [PowerPoint slides]. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik. (2000). Statistik dalam 50 tahun Indonesia merdeka [Statistic in 50 years 
of Indonesian independence]. Jakarta: BPS 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik. (2015a). Angka kematian bayi menurut provinsi [Data file]. Retrieved 
from https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1270 
 
144 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik. (2015b). Angka harapan hidup penduduk beberapa negara [Data file]. 
Retrieved from https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1517 
 
Badan Pusat Statisik, Bappenas, and UNDP. (2013). Laporan hasil tabulasi indicator MDGs 
kabupaten/kota tahun 2011-2013. Jakarta: Bappenas 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2000). Jakarta dalam angka 2000 [Jakarta in figure 2000]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2001). Jakarta dalam angka 2001 [Jakarta in figure 2001]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2002). Jakarta dalam angka 2002 [Jakarta in figure 2002]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2003). Jakarta dalam angka 2003 [Jakarta in figure 2002]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2004). Jakarta dalam angka 2003 [Jakarta in figure 2003]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2006). Jakarta dalam angka 2006 [Jakarta in figure 2006]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2007). Jakarta dalam angka 2007 [Jakarta in figure 2007]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2008). Jakarta dalam angka 2008 [Jakarta in figure 2008]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2009). Jakarta dalam angka 2009 [Jakarta in figure 2009]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2009). Jakarta dalam angka 2009 [Jakarta in figure 2009]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2010). Jakarta dalam angka 2009 [Jakarta in figure 2010]. 
Jakarta, Indonesia. BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2011). Jakarta dalam angka 2011 [Jakarta in figure 2011]. 
Jakarta, Indonesia. BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2012). Jakarta dalam angka 2011 [Jakarta in figure 2012]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2013). Jakarta dalam angka 2013 [Jakarta in figure 2013]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
145 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. (2014). Jakarta dalam angka 2014 [Jakarta in Figure 2014]. 
Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi DKI Jakarta. (2015). Jakarta dalam angka 2015 [Jakarta in Figure 
2015]. Jakarta: BPS DKI Jakarta. 
 
Bakker, K. (2007). Trickle Down? Private sector participation and the pro-poor water supply 
debate in Jakarta, Indonesia. Geoforum, 38(5), 855–868. 
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2005.11.011 
 
Bakker, K.. (2012). Water: Political, biopolitical, material. Social Studies of Science, 42(4), 616–
623. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41721344 
 
Bakker, K., Kooy, M., & Shofiani, N. E. (2006). Human Development Report 2006 Human 
Development Report Office Disconnected : Poverty , Water Supply and Development in 
Jakarta , Indonesia. 
 
Bakker, K., Kooy, M., Shofiani, N. E., & Martijn, E. J. (2008). Governance Failure: Rethinking 
the Institutional Dimensions of Urban Water Supply to Poor Households. World 
Development, 36(10), 1891–1915. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.09.015 
 
Bappenas. (2003). Infrastruktur Indonesia: Sebelum, selama, dan pasca krisis [Infrastructure 
development in Indonesia: before, during, and after crisis]. Jakarta:  Bappenas. 
 
Bappenas (2014). Roadmap 2015-2019: Program Percepatan Pembangunan Sanitasi 
Permukiman (PPSP) [Roadmap 2015-2019: Accelerated Sanitation Development for 
Human Settlements Program] 
 
Bappenas. (2015). Jumlah penduduk perkotaan [Data file]. Retrieved from 
https://data.bappenas.go.id/metadata/browse?datamart_name=jumlah+penduduk 
 
Bappenas. (2016). Health expenditure and total health expenditure [Data file]. Retrieved from 
https://data.bappenas.go.id/metadata/browse?datamart_name=kesehatan 
 
Bappenas, UNICEF, and Yayasan Dian Desa. (1990). Monitoring and evaluation of public 
hydrants & water terminals in North Jakarta. Jakarta: Yayasan Dian Desa. 
 
Basri, M. C., & Hill, H. (2011). Indonesian growth dynamics. Asian economic policy review, 
6(1), 90–107. doi:10.1111/j.1748-3131.2011.01184.x 
 
BBC Indonesia (2013, February 15). YLKI: Air minum isi ulang tidak higienis [YLKI: Refilled 
water is not-hygienic]. Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2013/02/130215_ylki_air_minum_ulang 
 
146 
 
Boland, J.,  & Whittington, D. (2000). The political economy of water tariff design in developing 
countries: IBTs versus uniform price with rebate. In Dinar, A. (Ed.). The political economy 
of water pricing reforms (pp: 215-235). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Braadbaart, O. (2007). Privatizing water: The Jakarta concession and the limits of contract. In 
Boomgaard, P. (Ed.). A world of water, rain, rivers, and seas in Southeast Asian Histories 
(pp: 297-320). Singapore and Leiden: National University of Singapore and KITLV Press. 
 
Briscoe, J. (2014). The Harvard Water Federalism Project -- process and substance. Water 
Policy, 161-10. doi:10.2166/wp.2014.001 
 
Chifos, C. (1996). Urban neighborhoods and the natural environment: Examples from the city of 
Jakarta, Indonesia. (Unpublished dissertation).  New York, NY: Cornell University. 
 
Chifos, C., & Suselo, H. (2000). Thirty years of urban infrastructure development in Indonesia. 
In Chifos, C., & Yabes, R. (Ed.). Southeast Asian urban environments : structured and 
spontaneous (pp.153-182). Tempe, Ariz.: Arizona State University Program for Southeast 
Asian Studies Monograph Series Press. 
 
Colbran, N. (2009). Will Jakarta be the next Atlantis? Excessive groundwater use resulting from 
a failing piped water network. International Environmental Law Research Centre (IELRC) 
(Ed.). Law environment and development journal (LEAD) (Vol.5/1, pp: 20-36). Geneva: 
International Environmental Law Research Centre (IELRC). 
 
Crane, R. (1994). Water markets, market reform and the urban poor: Results from Jakarta, 
Indonesia. World Development, 22(1), 71–83. doi:10.1016/0305-750X(94)90169-4 
 
Cybriwsky, R., & Ford, L. R. (2001). City profile Jakarta. Cities, 18(3), 199–210. 
doi:10.1016/S0264-2751(01)00004-X 
 
Darmawan, B. 2009). Small-scale water purification business, Indonesia case study [PowerPoint 
slides].  
 
Davis, J. (2004). Corruption in public service delivery: Experience from South Asia‟s water and 
sanitation sector. World Development, 32(1), 53–71. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2003.07.003 
 
Departemen Kesehatan. (2007). Riset kesehatan dasar [Basic health research]. Jakarta: 
Departemen Kesehatan. 
 
Departemen Kesehatan. (2010). Riset kesehatan dasar [Basic health research]. Jakarta: 
Departemen Kesehatan. 
 
DKI Jakarta Local Government Regulation No.11/1993 on Water supply provision in DKI 
Jakarta. (1993). 
 
147 
 
DKI Jakarta Local Government Regulation No.1/2008 on Mid-term DKI Jakarta development 
plan 2007-2012. (2008). 
 
Eggers, J. P., & Kaplan, S. (2013). Cognition and capabilities: a multi-level perspective. The 
Academy of Management Annals, 7(1), 295–340. doi:10.1080/19416520.2013.769318 
 
Ehrhardt, D., Rekas, M., & Richards, K. (n.d.) Investment in Indonesia‟s water sector: Evidence 
of financing, capacity, and governance effects. Response to call for papers for the 
International Conference on Infrastructure Economics and Development 
 
Ersten, M. (2008). Indigenous or international: The evolution and significance of East Indian 
civil engineering. In Ravesteijn, W. & Kop, J. (Eds.). For profit and prosperity : the 
contribution made by Dutch engineers to public works in Indonesia, 1800-2000 (pp. 381-
401). Leiden: KITLV Press. 
 
Firman, T. (1998). The restructuring of Jakarta metropolitan area: A “global city” in Asia. Cities, 
15(4), 229–243. doi:10.1016/S0264-2751(98)00015-8 
 
Fudji. (n.d.). Bisnis AMDK [Refilled water business]. Retrieved from http://fujiro.com/bisnis-
amdk.html 
 
Fuente, D., Gatua, J., Ikiara, M., Kabubo-Mariara, J., Mwaura, M., & Whittington, D. 
(2015). Water and sanitation service delivery, pricing, and the poor: An empirical estimate 
of subsidy incidence in Nairobi, Kenya, Resources for the Future, Inc. Retrieved from 
http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1761667249?acco
untid=14244 
 
Gandy, M. (2008). Landscapes of disaster: Water, modernity, and urban fragmentation in 
Mumbai. Environment and Planning A, 40(1), 108–130. doi:10.1068/a3994. 
 
Geels, F. W. (2002). Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a 
multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy, 31(8-9), 1257–1274. 
doi:10.1016/S0048-7333(02)00062-8 
 
Geels, F. (2005). Co-evolution of technology and society: The transition in water supply and 
personal hygiene in the Netherlands (1850-1930) - A case study in multi-level perspective. 
Technology in Society, 27(3), 363–397. doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2005.04.008 
 
Geels, F. W. (2006). The hygienic transition from cesspools to sewer systems (1840-1930): The 
dynamics of regime transformation. Research Policy, 35(7), 1069–1082. 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2006.06.001 
 
Geels, F. W., & Kemp, R. (2007). Dynamics in socio-technical systems: Typology of change 
processes and contrasting case studies. Technology in Society, 29(4), 441–455. 
doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2007.08.009 
 
148 
 
Geels, F. W., & Schot, J. (2007). Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. Research 
Policy, 36(3), 399–417. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2007.01.003 
 
Gosho, A. (2014). An analyzes of the change from indigenous sewer system to modern sewer 
system: A case study of Tokyo and Japan (1850-1970). (Unpublished master‟s thesis). 
University of Manchester, Manchester. 
 
Gouda, F. (2009). Discipline versus gentle persuasion in colonial public health: The Rockefeller 
Foundation‟s intensive rural hygiene work in the Netherlands East Indies, 1925-1940. New 
York, NY: Rockefeller Archive Center. 
 
Hadipuro, W. (2010). Indonesia's Water Supply Regulatory Framework: Between 
Commercialization and Public Service?. Water Alternatives, 3(3), 475-491. 
 
Hamlin, C.. (1992). Edwin Chadwick and the Engineers, 1842-1854: Systems and Antisystems 
in the Pipe-and-Brick Sewers War. Technology and Culture, 33(4), 680–709. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/3106586 
 
Hamlin, C. (1998). Public health and social justice in the age of Chadwick : Britain, 1800-1854. 
Cambridge, UK ;New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Harsono, A. (2003, February 10). Water and politics in the fall of Suharto. Center for Public 
Integrity. Retrieved from https://www.publicintegrity.org/2003/02/10/5725/water-and-
politics-fall-suharto 
 
Haryatiningsih. (1996). Evaluation of the sanitation component of KIP JUDP III. United Nations 
Development Program/World Bank Water and Sanitation Program. 
 
Hill, H. (1996). The Indonesian economy since 1966 : Southeast Asia’s emerging giant. 
Cambridge, UK ;New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Indonesia Corruption Watch. (2000). Hasil survey korupsi di pelayanan publick (studi kasus di 
lima kota: Jakarta, Palangkaraya, Samarinda, Mataram, dan Kupang) [Corruption survey 
in public sectors (case study in five cities: Jakarta, Palangkaraya, Samarinda, Mataram, and 
Kupang]. Jakarta: Indonesia Corruption Watch. 
 
Indonesia Investment. (n.d.). Retrieved from January 26, 2016 from Indonesia Investment. 
http://www.indonesia-investments.com/id/budaya/politik/orde-baru-
suharto/item180?searchstring=orde%20baru 
 
Indonesia Urban Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene. (2012). Kajian air tak berekening-AETRA and 
PALYJA [Non revenue water Study-AETRA and PALYJA] [PowerPoint slides]. 
 
Indonesia Urban Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene. (2015). Gambaran sanitasi kelurahan 
Pademangan Barat RW 04 & RW 11. Jakarta. 
 
149 
 
Jakarta Post. (2000, March 26). Charles Suryadi moved by unhealthy urban poor. Retrieved from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2000/03/26/charles-suryadi-moved-unhealthy-urban-
poor.html 
 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation. (2008). Aid effectiveness to infrastructure: A 
comparative study of East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: Case studies of East Asia. Japan: 
JBIC 
 
Japan International Corporation Agency. (1991). The study on urban drainage and wastewater 
disposal project in the city of Jakarta. Jakarta: JICA. 
 
Japan International Corporation Agency. (2012). The project for capacity development of 
wastewater sector through reviewing the wastewater management master plan in DKI 
Jakarta in the Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta: JICA. 
 
Jensen, O. (2005, October). Troubled partnerships: Problems and coping strategies in Jakarta‟s 
water concessions. Paper presented at 4th Conference on Applied Infrastructure Research: 
Berlin 
 
Johnstone, D. W. M. (2014). Regulation and reality: some reflections on 50 years of international 
experience in water and wastewater. International Journal of Water Resources 
Development. Taylor & Francis. doi:10.1080/07900627.2013.842088 
 
Johson, C. (March 30, 2015). Indonesia: Jakarta court bans water privatization. Retrieved from 
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/indonesia-jakarta-court-bans-water-
privatization/ 
 
Jones, T. (2012). Indonesian cultural policy in the reform era. Indonesia,(93), 147-176,234. 
Retrieved from 
http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1080966026?acco
untid=14244 
 
Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian. (2014). Pengembangan terpadu pesisir ibukota 
negara [Integrated development of coastal area in state capital]. Jakarta: Kementerian 
Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian. 
 
Kementerian Pekerjaan Umum dan Perumahan Rakyat. (2015). Pengembangan air minum 
Indonesia dari masa ke masa 1800an-2009 [Water supply development in Indonesia 
during1800s-2009]. Jakarta: Kementerian Pekerjaan Umum dan Perumahan Rakyat. 
 
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi. (2004). Laporan tahunan 2004. Jakarta: KPK 
 
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi. (2015). Laporan tahunan 2015. Jakarta: KPK 
 
150 
 
Kooy, M. (2008). Relations of power, networks of water: Governing urban waters, spaces, and 
populations in (post)colonial Jakarta. (Unpublished dissertation). The University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver. 
 
Kooy, M., & Bakker, K. (2008). Splintered networks: The colonial and contemporary waters of 
Jakarta. Geoforum, 39(6), 1843–1858. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2008.07.012 
 
Kop, J. (2008a). From technical assistance to gotong royong: hydraulic engineering, sanitary 
engineering, and bridge building in new Indonesia. In Ravesteijn, W. & Kop, J. (Eds.). For 
profit and prosperity : the contribution made by Dutch engineers to public works in 
Indonesia, 1800-2000 (pp. 345-379). Leiden: KITLV Press. 
 
Kop, J. (2008b). Water in the city: drinking water, sanitation, and flood control in urban areas. In 
Ravesteijn, W. & Kop, J. (Eds.). For profit and prosperity : the contribution made by Dutch 
engineers to public works in Indonesia, 1800-2000 (pp. 309-343). Leiden: KITLV Press. 
 
KPMG. (2015). Investing in Indonesia.  KPMG Indonesia. Retrieved from 
https://www.kpmg.com/Ca/en/External%20Documents/investing-in-indonesia-2013.pdf 
 
Kristiansen, S., & Santoso, P. (2006). Surviving decentralization? Impacts of regional autonomy 
on health service provision in Indonesia. Health Policy, 77(3), 247–259. 
doi:10.1016/j.healthpol.2005.07.013 
 
Kurniati, D. (2007). Implikasi akuisisi terhadap kinerja perusahaan industry air minum dalam 
kemasan Indonesia: Panel Aqua dan Ades. (Unpublished undergraduate thesis). Jakarta: 
Universitas Indonesia. 
 
Lanti, A. (2006). A Regulatory Approach to the Jakarta Water Supply Concession Contracts. 
International Journal of Water Resources Development, 22(2), 255–276. 
doi:10.1080/07900620600648415 
 
Lanti A., Nugroho R., Ali, F., Kretarto, A., & Zulfikar, A.. (2008). Sepuluh tahun kerjasama 
pemerintah-swasta pada pelayanan air PAM DKI Jakarta,  1998-2008[Ten years public 
private partnership in DKI Jakarta water supply provision, 1998-2008]. Jakarta: BRPAM 
Jaya 
 
Lawhon, M., & Murphy, J. T. (2012). Socio-technical regimes and sustainability transitions: 
Insights from political ecology. Progress in Human Geography,36(3), 354-378. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0309132511427960 
 
Leimena, J. (1953). The upbuilding of public health in Indonesia. Jakarta. Percetakan Negara. 
 
Lovei, L., & Whittington, D. (1993). Rent-extracting behavior by multiple agents in the 
provision of municipal water supply: a study of Jakarta, India. Water Resources Research, 
29(7), 1965–1974. doi:10.1029/92WR02998 
 
151 
 
Lucossol, A. (1997). Indonesia urban water supply sector policy framework: Summary report. In 
Indonesia discussion paper series (Number 10). East Asia and Pacific Region: World Bank 
 
Lukito, P. (1994). Urban water supply: The complementarity between public hydrants and truck 
delivery. Water services for the poor in North Jakarta, Indonesia. (Unpublished master‟s 
thesis). Massachusetts, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
Martijn, EJ. (2005). Hydraulic histories of Jakarta, Indonesia, 1949-1997.  (Research project 
urban water governance in Jakarta, Indonesia). Vancouver: University of British Columbia. 
 
Melosi, M. V. (2000). The sanitary city : urban infrastructure in America from colonial times to 
the present. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Melosi, M. V. (2011). Precious commodity : providing water for America’s cities. Pittsburgh, 
Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
Menzies, I., & Setiono, I. (2010). Output-Based Aid in Indonesia: Improved Access to Water 
Services for Poor Households in Western Jakarta. Retrieved from 
http://www.gpoba.org/sites/gpoba/files/OBA%20No.%2038%20Jakarta%2011-12-
10web.pdf 
 
Minister of Home Affairs Decree No.23/2006 on Technical guidance and procedure for water 
tariff in PDAMs. (2006). 
 
Minister for National Development Planning/Head of National Development Planning Agency 
Decree No.103/2015 on List of Medium-Term Planned External Loans 2015-2019. (2015). 
 
Mungkasa, O., M. (2006). Dampak investasi air minum terhadap pertumbuhan ekonomi dan 
distribusi pendapatan di DKI Jakarta [The impact of water supply investment on economic 
growth and income distribution in DKI Jakarta]. (Unpublished dissertation). Jakarta: 
Universitas Indonesia 
 
Murakami, S. (2015). Call for doctors! Uneven medical provision and the modernization of state 
health: Care during the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1930s–1950s. In Colombijn, F. & 
Coté, J. (Eds.). Cars, conduits, and kampongs: The modernization of the Indonesian city, 
1920-1960 (pp:29-62). Leiden: KITLV Press. 
 
Nugroho, R. (2011). Public private partnership as a policy dilemma. International Journal of 
Administrative Science & Organization, Volume 18, Number 3. Retrieved from 
http://journal.ui.ac.id/index.php/jbb/article/viewFile/1325/1208 
 
Ouano, E. (1980). Training in sanitary engineering at the Institute of Technology Bandung 
(ITB), Bandung, Indonesia. World Health Organization. 
 
PAM Jaya. (2016). Data sejarah PAM Jaya [Historical data of PAM Jaya] [PowerPoint slides]. 
152 
 
Pindyck, R. S. (2009). Microeconomics (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson/Prentice 
Hall. 
 
Pokja Sanitasi Jakarta. (2012). Buku putih sanitasi. Jakarta: Pokja Sanitasi Jakarta. 
 
Prabaharyaka, I. (2014). Institutional pathologies and urban water access: A case study of 
Jakarta, Indonesia. (Unpublished master‟s thesis). Johannesburg: Monash South Africa. 
 
Pravitasari, A. E., Saizen, I., Tsutsumida, N., Rustiadi, E., & Pribadi, D. O. (2015). Local 
spatially dependent driving forces of urban expansion in an emerging Asian megacity: The 
case of greater Jakarta (Jabodetabek). Journal of Sustainable Development, 8(1), 108–120. 
doi:10.5539/jsd.v8n1p108 
 
Presidential Decree No.319/1968 on Five –Year Development Plan 1969/1970-1973/1974. 
(1968). 
 
Presidential Decree No.11/1974 on Five –Year Development Plan 1974/1975-1978/1979. (1974). 
 
Presidential Decree No.7/1979 on Five –Year Development Plan 1979/1980-1983/1984. (1979). 
 
Presidential Decree No.21/1984 on Five-Year Development Plan 1984/1989-1988/1989. (1989). 
Presidential Decree No.13/1989 on Five-Year Development Plan 1989/1990-1993/1949. (1989). 
 
Presidential Decree No.17/1994 on Five –Year Development Plan 1994/1995-1998/1999. (1994). 
 
Presidential Regulation No.7/2005 on Mid-term national development plan 2004-2009. (2005). 
 
Presidential Regulation No.5/2010 on Mid-term national development plan 2010-2014. (2010). 
 
Presidential Regulation No.2/2015 on Mid-term national development plan 2015-2019. (2015). 
 
Putri, P. (2014). Black water-grey settlements: Domestic wastewater management and the socio-
ecological dynamic of Jakarta‟s kampungs.(Unpublished dissertation). KU Leuven, Leuven. 
 
Rakhmani, I. (February 3, 2016). Insularity leaves Indonesia trailing behind in the world of 
social research. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/insularity-leaves-indonesia-
trailing-behind-in-the-world-of-social-research-53973 
 
Ravesteijn, W. & Kop, J. (2008). For profit and prosperity : the contribution made by Dutch 
engineers to public works in Indonesia, 1800-2000. Leiden: KITLV Press 
 
Sadoff, C.W., Hall, J.W., Grey, D., Aerts, J.C.J.H., Ait-Kadi, M., Brown, C., Cox, A., Dadson, 
 
S., Garrick, D., Kelman, J., McCornick, P., Ringler, C., Rosegrant, M., Whittington, D. and 
Wiberg, D. (2015) Securing Water, Sustaining Growth: Report of the GWP/OECD Task 
Force on Water Security and Sustainable Growth, University of Oxford, UK, 180pp. 
153 
 
Sato, Y. (2003). Democratizing Indonesia : Reformasi period in historical perspective, (IDE 
Research Paper No.1). Japan: Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO).  
 
Server, O. B. (1996). Corruption: A Major Problem for Urban Management: Some Evidence 
from Indonesia. Habitat International, 20(1), 23–41. doi:10.1016/0197-3975(95)00032-1 
 
Shofiani, N. E. (2003). Reconstruction of Indonesia‟s drinking water utilities: Assessment and 
stakeholders‟ perspectives of private sector participation in the capital province of Jakarta. 
(Unpublished master‟s thesis). Stockholm: Royal Institute of Technology. 
 
Sidharta, W. (2007, January 9). Keputusan tepat meniti karier di AQUA. Retrieved from 
http://willysidharta.blogspot.com/2007/01/keputusan-tepat-meniti-karier-di-aqua.html 
 
Silver, L. (1990). Review of urban sanitation experience. United Nations Development Program 
and World Bank Water and Sanitation Program. 
 
Slamet, J. (1991). Training in low-cost water supply and sanitation-an Indonesian experience. 
Waterlines Vol.9 No.4 
 
Soegijoko, B., T., S. (1995, September). Evolution of urban spatial form in Jabotabek region: 
Characteristics and its policy implications for regional development planning. Paper 
presented at the Cambridge Conference on Global City Regions: Their evolution and 
management, Cambridge. 
 
Soepriyanto, G. (2016, February 23). Riset PT dan kebijakan publik [Research in higher 
education institutions and public policy].  Kompas, p.7. 
 
Soesabdo, H. (2015, March). 24 March 2015: A black day for public private partnerships in 
Indonesian infrastructure. Retrieved from 
http://www.hhp.co.id/files/Uploads/Documents/Type%202/HHP/al_hhp_pppinfrastructure_
mar15.pdf 
 
Steinberg, F. (2007). Jakarta: Environmental problems and sustainability. Habitat International, 
31, 354-365. 
 
Stein, E. (2014). Colonial theaters of proof: Representation and laughter in 1930s Rockefeller 
Foundation hygiene cinema in Java. In Jay, M. & Ramaswamy, S. (Eds.). Empires of 
vision: a reader (pp: 315-345). North Carolina: Duke University Press. 
 
Sukarma, R. (2003). Air minum swasta menguntungkan atau merugikan? [Privatized water profit 
or loss?]. Jakarta: author 
 
Surjadi, C. (2012). Kesehatan masyarakat permukiman kumuh dan miskin perkotaan 
[Community health in slums and in urban poor areas]. Jakarta: Unika Atmajaya 
154 
 
Susantono, B. (2001). Informal water services in metropolitan cities of developing world: The 
case of Jakarta, Indonesia. (Unpublished dissertation). California, CA: University of 
California, Berkeley. 
 
Tarr, J. A. (1996). The search for the ultimate sink : urban pollution in historical perspective (1st 
ed.). Akron, Ohio: University of Akron press. 
 
Tarr, J. A., McCurley, J., McMichael, F. C., & Yosie, T.. (1984). Water and Wastes: A 
Retrospective Assessment of Wastewater Technology in the United States, 1800-
1932. Technology and Culture, 25(2), 226–263. http://doi.org/10.2307/3104713 
 
Thabrany, H. (2008, July). Politics of national health insurance of Indonesia: A new era of 
universal coverage. Paper presented at the 7th European Conference on Health Economics, 
Rome.  
 
Thee, K. W. (2012). Indonesia's economy since independence. Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. Retrieved from 
http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1151923026?acco
untid=14244 
 
Transparency International. (2015). Corruption perception index [Data file]. Retrieved from 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
 
United States Agency for International Development. (2006). Comparative study: Centralized 
wastewater treatment plants in Indonesia. Jakarta: USAID. 
 
Van der Heiden, C. N. (1990). Town planning in the Dutch Indies. Planning Perspectives, 5(1), 
63–84. doi:10.1080/02665439008725695 
 
Van de Poel, I. (2000). On the Role of Outsiders in Technical Development. Technology 
Analyzes & Strategic Management, 12(3), 383–397. doi:10.1080/09537320050130615 
 
Van Roosmalen, P. (2008). For kota and kampong: the emergence of town planning as a 
discipline. In Ravesteijn, W. & Kop, J. (Eds.). For profit and prosperity : the contribution 
made by Dutch engineers to public works in Indonesia, 1800-2000 (pp. 273-307). Leiden: 
KITLV Press. 
 
Water and Sanitation Program. (2015). Water supply and sanitation in Indonesia: Turning 
finance into service for the future. Jakarta: WSP-EAP 
 
Water and Sanitation Program. (in press). The economic impacts of sanitation in Jakarta.  
 
Whittington, D. (1992). Possible adverse effects of increasing block water tariffs in developing 
countries. Economic development and cultural change, 41(1), 75–87. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1154220 
155 
 
Whittington, D. (2003). Pricing and tariff design: A reform agenda for South Asia.Water policy 5 
(2003), 61-76. 
 
World Bank. (1974). Report and recommendation of the president of the international bank for 
reconstruction and development to the executive directors on a proposed loan for a Jakarta 
urban development project. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
World Bank. (1976). Report and recommendation of the president of the international bank for 
reconstruction and development to the executive directors on a proposed loan for a second 
urban development project. Washington, DC: USA. 
 
World Bank. (1979). Report and recommendation of the president of the international bank for 
reconstruction and development to the executive directors on a proposed loan for a third 
urban development project. Washington, DC: USA. 
 
World Bank. (1983). Report and recommendation of the president of the international bank for 
reconstruction mad development to the executive directors on a proposed loan for the 
Republic of Jakarta sewerage and Sanitation Project. Washington, DC: USA. 
 
World Bank. (1984). Report and recommendation of the president of the international bank for 
reconstruction and development for fifth urban development project. Washington, DC: 
USA. 
 
World Bank. (1985a). Staff appraisal report: Second East Java water supply project.Washington, 
DC: USA. 
 
World Bank. (1985b). Report and recommendation of the president of the international bank for 
reconstruction and development to the executive directors for a West Tarum canal 
improvement project. Washington, DC: USA. 
 
World Bank. (1987). Staff appraisal report: Indonesia urban sector loan (Report No. 6598-IND). 
Washington, DC: USA. 
 
World Bank. (1990a). Staff appraisal report: third Jabotabek urban development project (Report 
No. 8397-IND). Washington, DC: USA. 
 
World Bank. (1990b). Staff appraisal report: second Jabotabek urban development project 
(Report No. 8339-IND). Washington, DC: USA. 
 
World Bank. (1994). Indonesia environment and development: Challenges for the future. 
Washington, DC: USA. 
 
World Bank. (2006). Indonesia enabling water utilities to serve the urban poor. Jakarta: The 
World Bank Office Jakarta. 
 
156 
 
World Bank and Ausaid. (2013). East Asia Pacific region urban sanitation review: Indonesia 
country study.  Jakarta: WSP-EAP 
 
World Bank. (n.d.). Worldwide governance indicators. Country Data Report for Indonesia, 1996-
2014. Retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c102.pdf 
 
World Bank, Ministry of Public Works, and Water Partnership Program. (2012). Indonesia water 
investment roadmap, 2011-2014. Jakarta: Wira Study Team 
 
World Heatlh Organization. (2015). Implied case fatality rate data by country [Data file]. 
Retrieved from http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.177?lang=en 
 
Yazid, M. (2014). The Indonesian economic development after 1965: Developmental state, 
radical oolitics & regional cooperation. SOP Transactions on Economic Research, 1(3), 1–
14. doi:10.15764/ER.2014.03001 
 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research : design and methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, Calif.: 
Sage Publications. 
 
Zakaria, F.. (2009). Assessing pro-poor water supply programs in Jakarta. (Unpublished master‟s 
thesis). Oxford: University of Oxford. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
